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
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THE EMINESCIAN LONGING FROM POETRY TO PHILOSOPHY

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*“Without Eminescu, our people would be insignificant and almost despised.”¹
Emil Cioran*

Abstract: *Eminescu concentrated the authentic feeling of the Romanians in the word Dor (longing), which is at the same time a fundamental concept and a state of mind specific to the Romanian people. No other Romanian thinker managed to focus in Dor (Longing) so much depth of the Romanian thought and soul. Even if we encounter philosophical reflections on Eminescu's longing in Lucian Blaga's or Constantin Noica's works, no one has raised the word Dor (Longing), as it appears in Eminescu's work, to the rank of a philosophical concept with connotations of existential basis. This may be due to the fact that Eminescu has not built an explicit philosophy centered on this concept, but rather an implicit philosophy that surfaces in his poetry, where the essence of Eminescu's creation is concentrated.*

Keywords: *Dor (Longing), Absolute, creation, Romanian spirit, poetry, philosophy.*

1. Longing – a Romanian ontological dimension

Longing is an essential concept of the nature of the Romanian spirit, without which it cannot exist: in the other languages this word does not have such a concentration of meanings.

The horizon opened by certain words is essential in defining the being. In this respect, Heidegger wrote that “Language is the house of being”.² When one wants to point out that we express something else through our words and that, in this way, the Romanian language has its own right of being in the world, one can immediately invoke the word “*longing*”.

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¹ E. Cioran, *Letters*, p. 298 (apud. I. Necula, *From the Identity of Peoples to the Wallachians*, Bucharest, Saeculum Publishing House, p. 101-102, 2003.

² M. Heidegger, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1995.

Thus, *longing* becomes a Romanian dimension of existence, a basic component of the Romanian spiritual grammar; not just something you bear in your soul, but the soul itself, in other words, the pure Romanian spirit. Longing is, at the same time, a profound and devastating feeling, constituting the dominant symbol of most popular specific Romanian song - *doina*. Its main attributes are mourning, the fear of unfulfilled desire. Longing is enslaving, it is the enemy of freedom, death-related and fantasy stimulant. In the written literature, longing gains symbolic values, especially in lyrical poetry, where it becomes the term of comparison for deep, often undefined states of mind. Lucian Blaga speaks of "the state of longing" as a "Romanian state of mind through excellence".³ The poet notices its meanings: "impersonal power," "spell," "cosmic disease," "material-spiritual emanation of the individual." For Lucian Blaga, in the Romanian folk culture, "longing" is a hypostasis of human "existence": "if the omnipresence of longing in our popular poetry was to be taken into account, we could almost assert that existence itself is longing for the Romanian, an aspiration going beyond the normal horizons, an existence flowing entirely towards "something."⁴ In a poetical myth of transcendence, this "something" towards which existence is flowing is the world in the image of "origins", "of springs", whose existential meanings we can approach, in Lucian Blaga's work, to the inner "longing" of man, in a world he understood as a "totality" as a "whole".

There has been much talk about '*longing*', although there is no unanimously accepted definition. *The Romanian word 'dor' is indefinable and untranslatable*. Etymologically, the term derives from the Latin word *dolor*. The great body of specialists consider the etymology *dol-dolore* (*doleo*, *-ere*, *-ui*, *-itum*= to suffer, to feel pain), as deriving from Latin.

In the dictionary it is glossed as follows: 1. strong desire to see a dear person again, to return to something; 2. nostalgia; 3. to feel sorry for a particular thing or being; 4. aspiration; 5. desire; 6. fast.⁵

It is interesting that the concept of "dor" is preserved at the extremities of the Roman Empire in Europe, with echoes in the Portuguese word **saudade** or in the Spanish **añoranza**, in the West (both words meaning 'nostalgia'), and "dor", in our country, in the East.

In his *Words Along about the Romanian Utterance* (*Cuvânt împreună despre rostirea românească*), Noica links the word "dor" to "exile" and "wandering" and considers this term a "prototype". The word "dor" is, Noica writes, "unfinished work, a whole without parts." "It is a union, not a composition. Pain, where the word comes from, has merged into it with the pleasure arising from pain, we do not know exactly how." "If an ancient Greek was supposed to translate "dor", he would take pain on the one hand, pleasure on the other hand, and would say: pleasure of pain." Noica mentions that, in order to

³ Eugen, Todoran, *Lucian Blaga, The Poetical Myth*, Timișoara, Facla Publishing House, 1981, p. 315.

⁴ Lucian Blaga, *The Mioritic Space* (1936), re-edited, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1994, p. 160-164.

⁵ Vasile Breban, *Dictionary of Contemporary Romanian*, Bucharest, The Scientific and Encyclopaedic Printing House, 1980, p. 172.

express what “dor” means in Romanian, German resorts to composition, a method used in ancient Greek as well. *Sehnsucht*, indeed, means burning desire, zeal, but also nostalgia. According to Noica, *Sehnsucht* would derive from *Sucht* – a term that designates “passion” – in conjunction with the verb *Sehnen* (“to feel nostalgia, to long”). The resulting term therefore expresses the “thirst for longing”. The Romanian philosopher also signals the possibility of understanding *Sucht* as deriving from the verb *Suchen*, “to seek,” in which case “we obtain in the German word: search for non-discovery”. According to Noica, the words “good”, “full” in Romanian – among which “dor” – were born from “that untempted wedding”. So, there are words expressing the space of creation, of work, of building, of evocation. Noica says that some Romanian words have “a specific synthesis” born through union – not through composition, as it the case in other languages, for example in German or ancient Greek.⁶

Noica even speaks of a “longing area”, an area on behalf of which the word itself appeals, calls, almost commands, pretending to be careful, claiming for deeper listening or research. Starting from the ideas formulated by Blaga, Noica gives a new interpretive configuration to the word “longing”, referring to the horizon that certain words can open by virtue of the semantic field that surrounds them.⁷ Another approach to the significance of the Romanian word *longing* belongs to Emil Cioran. But, contrary to Blaga, ever since he wrote *The Transfiguration of Romania*⁸, Cioran asserted that *Miorița* is an open wound of the Romanian soul, defining it as a poetic and national curse. Unlike Blaga, in *The Transfiguration of Romania*, Cioran will interpret *longing* in a revolutionary sense and will transform its semantic constellation. He will try to make it pass dialectically from “the negative infinite to the positive one” in the perspective of a “tragic heroism”. According to Cioran, *longing* should have become creator of Romania’s history instead of confining itself to a sense of destiny that the Romanians live as a perpetual and resigned oscillation between fatalism and trust, without any excess. *Longing*, concludes Cioran, is the indefinite vitality of a people. It finds its expression in the instincts that “have gone astray in the soul” and have forgotten their power. This Romanian state of mind is therefore understood as an endlessly prolonged delay, a delay whose purpose is to avoid any form of concrete achievement. “The Romanians have transformed nostalgia into an affective substitute for metaphysical evil.”⁹ Cioran’s pages about the “mysteries of the Romanian soul” were well known to Constantin Noica. By entering into a kind of dialogue with them, Noica gives a new drive to Cioran’s negative ontology of the longing, a sort of *relève* or *Aufhebung*, but he does it by resorting to the “virtues” of the Romanian language. Starting from the assumption that the Romanian soul is more inclined towards the possible than the real, Noica asserts that Romanian language can work “wonders” precisely due to the failures of achieving the possible – due to the possibilities that fail to

⁶ Constantin Noica, *Words Along about the Romanian Utterance*, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2011, apud. *ibidem*. p. 206.

⁷ <https://www.revista-apostrof.ro/articole.php?id=3419>

⁸ Emil Cioran, *The Transfiguration of Romania*, Bucharest, Humanitas, 2017.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

materialize. Such a miracle of the Romanian language is also the word *longing*, which belongs to the “intellectual dowry of the language treasures” and to the native culture. For Noica, *longing* is the particular feeling of the being that seems to load the Romanian soul with its powerful affective and emotional burden. Therefore, longing is a gift (*doron* in Greek), one of the gifts that is among the wonders of the Romanian language. It sets the horizon and the meaning of the question. The question arising from the “longing area” is, in fact, the desire of thinking that transforms the state of things into sheer possibility, reactivating the inner voices of the past - and these voices whisper their nostalgic secret by means of the language. Insatiable by its very nature, this nostalgia throbs, pulsates endlessly throughout time. We, People, we are - like words “introduction to longing”. In Noica's view, being an “introduction to longing” means restoring to the question the wisdom of the possible, without destroying, without refusing, but on the contrary, leaving our being open to our own question. Longing as a permanent, active question seems to teach people about the problem of pleasure and pain. It reminds people that they are speakers and mortals. And, by making them listen to a voice driven by desire, it gives them a vague and indefinite promise for the future. “Introduction to longing” represents Noica's conception of the desire-driven intuition, of the experience of the truth that takes over, at human level, the original precariousness of the Being, and which, at the same time, fuels the question and the very possibility of uttering as a fundamental and ever elusive task of philosophy. For Noica, therefore, *longing is an absolute desire whose nuptial mystery - the one that makes the impossible possible - is celebrated in the expression of being in*. Unlike Noica, Cioran will remain faithful to the Nihilist coordinate of longing all his life. For him, due to the singular and absolute status of Eminescu's poetical expression, longing corresponds to the more “original” condition - tragic existential - of the “Wallachian nothingness”, which is very deeply rooted. He hints at a nothingness in which the original rupture of philosophical knowledge and the untouchable object of desire, of *longing*, that Eminescu's poetry seems to possess secretly within itself. For a correct reception of this philosophical research on Romanian *longing*, which we have recalled in the context of our analysis, it is necessary to highlight the idea that, for the Romanians, existence does not evolve “towards death” or “towards nothingness” but “towards *longing*”.¹⁰

2. Meanings and symbols of the Eminescian longing

“*Longing*” acquires in Eminescu's creation a multitude of stylistic nuances that fit in with the tradition of folk creativity. “*Longing*” is “one of the finest concentrations of the popular spirit, a constant fundamental of its outlook on world and life.”¹¹ The poet's longing is expressed in a poetic synthesis¹² of all that is called Eminescu's nature and the Eminescian frame: the silence of the night, the seashore, the proximity of the woods, the bed made of young branches, the

¹⁰ Giovanni Rotiroti, *Longing in Blaga's, Cioran's and Noica's Works*, in *Apostrof Journal*, no. 2/2018.

¹¹ Gheorghe Drăgan, *Eminescian Poetics*, Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 1999.

¹² <https://bibliotecafagaras.wordpress.com/2015/01/15/poetica-dorului-eminescian>

voice of the autumn or the wind, the murmur of the springs, the sound of the animals' bells, the lime tree whose blossoms fall over the grave, the moon, and the evening stars to watch over him. The terrestrial elements intertwine with the cosmic ones in this universe. They make up the delightful environment so familiar to the poet ever since he was a child and used to wander around the country. In the Eminescian poetry, longing identifies with the feelings of the creator as in the poem *O'er the Woods*: "*Sounds the horn its plaintive note / ...Blows again its sweet complaint/ Promise of eternal sleep*" the emotion triggered by the sound of the horn is associated with a feeling of melancholy, evocative of death in the sense of scattering and exaltation. Blanca heads for the woods driven by a "nameless longing" (*The Tale of the Lime Tree*), and Cătălina, under the impression of the sidereal world is seized by the desire to break the "narrow circle of her world." "*And sitting thus with rested head,/Her elbows on the sill/Her heart by youthful fancy led/Did with deep longing fill*". (*Lucifer*). In the poem "Lucifer", the "longing" remains along with the thought, with the soul ennobled by the loftness of his flight towards his origins: "*Till round his primal chaos hurled/When out of causeless night/The first, upflaming sawn unfurled/its miracle of light.*"//*Yet where he reach's is not the bourn/Nor yet where eye can see;/Beyond where struggling time as torn/Out of eternity.*"¹³

"Longing" for death involves a long-awaited revelation, a meeting with the universal spirit scattered throughout the world. In his elegy called *One Wish Alone I Have*, Eminescu transcribes this paradoxical experience as a consequence of being, for the universe itself is propelled in its continuous becoming by an "infinite longing" (Letter I). In the poem, *Why Do You Wail* "the woods' desire suggests "the latent germination power"¹⁴, its unending rebirth every spring. Human wishes and passions have the force of revelation in the poems "*To My Critics*" and "*Loving in Secret*". The mystery of sweet love is associated with "painful charm" (*The Story of the Lime*) or "sweet mourning": "*When..../ Our heart grown heavy in our breasts, that each other's pain console*" ("Călin"). "The longing" (which appears in the English translations as longing, wish, and even pain) is projected in the infinite space: "*So far it is athwart the blue/To where yon star appears,/ That for its light to each our view/Has needed thousands of years.*" (*To the Star*). In Eminescu's anthumous poems, the word "dor" appears 54 times.¹⁵ With the meaning of "nostalgia" it appears 20 times, and with the meaning of "pain" (of love) -15 times. The interferences and overlapping of meanings lead to specific relationships: "longing-dream", "longing-thought", "longing-creed", "longing-song", "longing-passion", "longing-being", "longing- mourning ". The Eminescian "dor" includes a "mythical-poetic time": "When the fairy tales were true / when the thought was guarding the dream and the eras" ("The **Story** of the Magus Reading in the **Stars**"). "Thought", "dream," "heterodoxy" (superstition) is in "illo tempore". The elegy "*One Wish Alone I Have*" reveals a "mutual irradiation between the longing

¹³ M. Eminescu, *Lucifer*, in *Selected Works*, apud <http://www.estcomp.ro/eminescu/popescu.html>

¹⁴ G. Călinescu, *Eminescu's Work*, 2nd Edition, Bucharest, Minerva Publishing House, 1970.

¹⁵ Luiza Seche, *Eminescu's Artistic Lexic in Statistical Light*, Bucharest, The Academy Publishing House, 1974.

for death and the longing for the evening stars”¹⁶: “One wish alone have I:/In some calm land/Beside the sea to die”...; “And Lucifer the while, Above the pine./Good comrade mine/”. The poet “feels his dependence on the rhythm of nature, which triggers the uninterrupted transition from finite to infinite and broadens his vision of the world.”¹⁷ The rustle of the leaves, the shores of the sea give a rhythmic and swinging motion that reveals the “harmony between the movements of the soul and the rhythm of nature to reach a symphonic sense.”¹⁸ The Eminescian line closes in itself the euphonic modulation meant to enchant the emotional flow of the poem. It is a time that creates horizons that scrutinize the infinite. The Eminescian longing is perceived as a way of transcendence “of the being towards existence.” The perfection of poem *One Wish Alone I Have* (*Mai am un singur dor*) can be remarked even from the title. The presence of the word *dor* has not only a distinctive sound value, suggesting a certain state of mind, but also one referring to the polysemy of the word. Egdar Papu remarked: “No one has illustrated with such precision of feeling and expression the two attributes (sweet, painful), which are at the same time opposed and merged in the notion of “*dor*”. Its balance does not result from a fulfillment, but from deviating and transforming an acute crisis into a bearable state. It is precisely this suppression of a vehemently destructive component of feeling that makes longing sweet. But by failing to attain a true fulfillment, a fulfillment to which it still aspires and yearns, it is also painful”.¹⁹

The atmosphere of reconciliation, the serenity that comes out of the whole poetry springs from its very title. The word “*dor*” attenuates the dramatic feeling of the desire to die. The stylistic effect is in accordance with the common people's attitude towards death, which leads us to claim that every Romanian can recognize himself in the Eminescian “*dor*”, this word being **a reference concept** for the Romanian philosophy that individualizes us in the landscape of universal philosophy.

3. Longing and Eminescu's creation

Longing is the loftiest and purest lyrical word in Eminescu's creation. The Eminescian longing has multiple connotations and meanings, some illustrated, others synthesized in the previous pages. The complexity of the term and the perspectives of the approach entitle us to speak of a concept of *longing*, or rather of a philosophy of longing in Eminescu's work, as we can speak of a philosophy of love²⁰, poverty, etc. But *longing* is to be found in everything and everywhere, in other words, everything stems from the word Longing. We can assert that Longing lies at the basis of existence, somehow in the sense of Schopenhauer's “will to live”. For example, in the cosmogony from the “Letter I” *longing signifies the “will to live,” but also a “primum movens” of the worlds: “Have come in*

¹⁶ <http://metrolinks.ro/mai-am-un-singur-dor-de-mihai-eminescu>

¹⁷ Ioan Guția, *The Feeling of Time in Eminescu's Poetry*, Rome, 1957.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 106.

¹⁹ Egdar Papu, *Eminescu's Poetry*, Bucharest, Minerva Publishing House, 1971. The author characterizes Eminescu as “a philosopher of the depths, a poet of essences”.

²⁰ G. Pohoată, *The Philosophy of Love, Cogito*, no. 1/2017, Bucharest, Pro Universitaria Publishing House.

*shining colonies rising from out infinity / Attracted to the universe by strange and restless urge to be*²¹ or in the poem *O'er the Peaks*, where Mihai Eminescu expresses *longing* in its sheerest essence: a desire not for one good or for another, but for a “fulfillment” we are seeking here, on earth, without ever reaching it, as reaching it would mean achieving the Absolute. Eminescu is and remains, through his intimate and irreducible structure, a mystical rationalist who longs for the Absolute, an absolute from which all the other values draw their guarantee of permanence: *the eternal...* in the longing for the Absolute the nostalgia for the world beyond transpires, somehow, it is that *metaphysical longing* which is the desire for another homeland.²² The fascination of the Absolute becomes thus a consuming longing for the unity, plenitude and bliss of the primordial or final totality, for the world's unrevealed secrets and for their revelation. The very reason of the whole evolution of the Eminescian universe has no other purpose. By means of longing, the imagination of the poet-philosopher gave birth to an original primary energy whose content is being continuously refreshed by the contact with the various mythical and poetical representations of the precosmic state or of that state that “starts anew” after the end of the universe. *What is more, Eminescu integrated into his concept of the Absolute, built on the foundations of autochthonous spirituality, that ancient belief in the possibility of man to merge with the universe, elements specific to the Romantic visionarism (which, in its turn, includes many religious notes) blending with others belonging to the Indian, Greek or Northern mythologies and philosophies.*²³ His unmatched calling towards the Absolute, throughout his whole work, leads us to the idea that Eminescu has gone beyond poetry or used the language of poetry to reveal the depth of his philosophical ideas. Eminescu was not only the Romanian nation's greatest poet.²⁴ Undoubtedly, he was also a philosopher; and even more than that, “the full expression of the Romanian soul” or “the full man of the Romanian culture”. He himself was the Absolute Romanian.²⁵

The philosophy of longing is a constant of the Eminescian ontological approach. Dor is not a simple word, but a prevalent concept, somehow a kind of *arche*. The Eminescian longing is hyperbolic - it encompasses everything: the desire of love, of nature, of happiness, of homeland, of the other, of knowledge, of death, of immortality, of infinity, of Absolute. The manifestations of Eminescu's longing are like the aspects of the Absolute Hegelian Idea. He does not identify himself with God but has demiurgical attributes. The whole Eminescian feeling, the Romanian one included, is focused on Longing, it is a kind of vital energy that defines the Romanian spirit. All this great thinker's life and creation oscillates swings between his longing for infinity and his longing for the Absolute. Unlike the German philosophers, *Eminescu concentrates in Longing the Romanians'*

²¹ Eminescu, Mihai, *cited works*, p. 178.

²² Rosa del Conte, *Eminescu or on the Absolute*, Cluj, Dacia Publishing House, 2003, p. 142-143.

²³ Leonida Maniu, *Eminescu, from the “endless longing” to the “longing for the Absolute”* Iași, Convorbiri Literare, 12 February 2015.

²⁴ G. Pohoată, *Towards Eminescu's Philosophy*, *Cogito*, no. 3/2010.

²⁵ Lucian Boia, *Eminescu or the Absolute Romanian*, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2015.

authentic existence, and we can say longing is both a fundamental concept and a state of mind specific to the Romanian people alike. No other Romanian thinker succeeded in concentrating in longing such a depth of the Romanian thought. Even if we encounter philosophical reflections on longing in Lucian Blaga's or Constantin Noica's works, no one has raised the word DOR, as it appears in Eminescu's work, to the rank of philosophical concept. This may be due to the fact that Eminescu did not build an explicit philosophy centered on this concept, but rather an implicit philosophy that surfaces in his poetry, where the essence of the Eminescian creation is concentrated. Everything revolves around this word with a complex and extremely profound semantics. Summing up, we can say that we are in front of an ambivalent concept: divine image and reality of life alike. The Eminescian longing, implicitly, the Romanian longing, is not identified with God, it is an original energy that defines us, as we have highlighted above. As Eminescu best identifies with the Romanian being, similarly, the Eminescian longing is the best expression of the Romanian being in its entirety. The Eminescian "longing" is an "infinite aspiration, the opening of the ego to the osmosis with the outside world, with the whole nature, which determine not only its completeness, but also its being as such."²⁶ All these arguments are meant to avoid the simplistic, unilateral, and reductionist speculations on Eminescu's longing. Thus, for Mihai Eminescu, longing does not allude only to the woman, rejected and adored, always waited for and always lost. He will acquire it only when his heart, freed from the memory of a particular image, will indulge into that love of love, which is sheer aspiration, a sheer desire for that "longing" in which the aspiration to happiness is identified with the desire for death, voice of a truly universal restlessness, and which is expressed as an undefinable melancholy in the "auroral" lyricism of the Romanian folk poetry. Thus, the state of longing appears as a human ontological state in opposition to the immutable hyperionic eternity. In this respect, we recall the fact that Lucifer's attempt to enter into the human world occurs under the existential formula of longing. *"Around him there was naught. And still,/ Strange yearning there was yet,/A yearning that all space did fill,/As when the blind forget."* Consequently, far from being a derivation or a correlate of the divine, the longing thus conceived is only the sacralisation of the essence of an ethnicity's spirituality, and its loftest aim is to secure the connection between the eternities: "Forever and forever". As a true cosmic force, Eminescu's longing acquires dynamic and creative virtues, comparable to those of the Platonic Eros, master of the space situated between the beauty of the senses and of the intellect, but also to those of Dantesque Dantean love "spinning suns and stars." In this way appears an extraordinary intuition about the eternal movements taking place at cosmic level²⁷. This accounts, in *Lucifer*, for the image of an uninterrupted genesis („The first, up flaming dawn unfurled/Its miracle of light”), questioning, at the same time, the Schopenhauerian ideas regarding the static structures of the Eminescian

²⁶ George Popa, *The Eminescian Eternal Present*, Iași, Junimea, Publishing House, 1989, p. 158.

²⁷ Leonida Maniu, *cited works*.

universe.²⁸ Adhering to the Romantic sense of becoming into being, Eminescu is also different from other Romanticists because, in his conception, longing signifies the metaphysical aspiration turned into universal creative energy, which confers a specific identity to the Romanian being.

No other Romanian thinker succeeded, like Eminescu, in synthesizing in “Dor” the integral spirit of the Romanian people, the predominant structure of the Romanian being. Eminescu succeeded because he knew his people very well, he loved it with all its qualities and flaws, being always proud to belong to this nation. We consider that only the profound experience of the purely Romanian longing could make him write randomly, in his manuscripts, “*I love this good-natured, gentle, humane people, on whose back the diplomats design maps and wars, painting kingdoms he has no the faintest idea about, I love this people who serves only as stilts for all those who are in power, a miserable people who sighs under the magnificence of all the ice palaces we put on its shoulders.*”²⁹ Eminescu loved his people instinctively with the kindness of an Apostle. *This explains how he managed to assign the Romanian longing so many meanings and significations raising it to the rank of a fundamental philosophical concept, both in his thinking and in the Romanian philosophy in general.* The consciousness of belonging to this earth bestowed by God inspired him in his creation, as he was not only a visionary poet, but above all a prototype thinker for the Romanian spirituality. It is not by chance that Cioran wrote to C. Noica on March 5, 1970, “Without Eminescu, our people would be insignificant and almost despised.”³⁰ Only out of absolute love and an unmatched feeling of longing for his country could Eminescu create immortal verses like: “What I wish for you, sweet Romania,/My country of glory, my country of longing?/May your feverish arms be a weapon of power,/May you have a future as great as your past!”³¹

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²⁸ Tudor Vianu, *Eminescu*, Iași, Junimea Publishing House, 1974, p. 49.

²⁹ M. Eminescu, *Works*, 9th vol., p. 488.

³⁰ E. Cioran, *Letters*, p. 298 (apud. I. Necula, *From the Identity of Peoples to the Wallachians*, Bucharest, Saeculum Publishing House, p. 101-102, 2003.

³¹ M. Eminescu, *cited works*.

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STATE, MODERNITY AND ANTI-SEMITISM IN ION C. BRĂTIANU'S POLITICAL SPEECHES FROM THE SECOND HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

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Abstract: *The creation of the Romanian national state was achieved by the liberal political progressive Romanian elites, taking over the Western European model of reference. In the speeches of the founding fathers of the Romanian state, as in the case of Ion C. Brătianu, we find recurrent fundamental values and concepts at the European level of the period. The anti-Semite accents that we find in his speeches, which are presented in this short study, reflect the attitude of rejection that local elites had had to the phenomenon of the migration of Sephardic Jews from the Tsarist Empire to the Principalities. This message appeared more virulent when the Great Powers of the moment had pressed politicians from Bucharest to grant citizenship to the Jews. For the specialists in comparative history, the ideas propagated by Brătianu are part of a wider European, anti-Semite trend. Throughout this study we propose analyses that will highlight the ideas that animated the liberal leader using a double key of interpretation: theoretical-doctrinal-ideological and pragma-rhetorical.*

Keywords: *nationality, modernity, state, anti-Semitism, political speeches, oratory*

Introduction

Throughout this article, the authors intend to present a series of ideas that animated liberal political thinking in the second half of the nineteenth century, as it emerges from the analysis of some pieces of discourse, initially, then two, entirely, of a political actor who, in the opinion of the works with historiographical character, was representative for both of the history of the National Liberal Party and of Romanian liberalism, but also for the native political history of the second half of the nineteenth century. The authors selected suggestive parts from two speeches, from 1866 and 1868, and another two entirely ones, from 1869 and 1875, which belong to Ion C. Brătianu.

The fundamental moment of creating a Romanian political space which generated the institutional framework for starting the process of building and, in

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parallel, modernizing the state was represented by the unification of the Principalities (January 5-24, 1859).

From 1859 until the outbreak of the First World War (1914), the Romanian political elites fought for the establishment, structuring and modernization of a state at the mouth of the Danube, which constituted, from a diplomatic and symbolic point of view, the foundation of the Great Union of 1918. The practical problems which the political elites had to deal with in the Principalities, the economic and cultural ones, were major. The reference model of the Romanian state was taken over by the “founding fathers” of the Romanian nation from Western Europe. Since the beginning of the 19th century, illuminated boyars, like Dinicu Golescu¹, understood that in order to achieve national emancipation it was time to change the paradigm that underpinned the protocol of surviving of the political structures of the Romanian people during the Ottoman domination. Thus, cultural and civilization models coming from Constantinople / Istanbul on the Greek branch and those from Petersburg through the Slavonic church culture had to be replaced by those radiated by Paris, Vienna or London. The paradigm shift was major in changing the focus of domestic elites' concerns from an Oriental model to a Western-style model. This change involved not only a mimetic takeover of concepts and models, but also an important change that had to be achieved gradually, of the mentalities and habits of the place.

Interestingly, although the extra-Carpathian territories inhabited by the Romanians were in an area controlled politically, militarily, economically, religiously and culturally by the Oriental culture and civilization, in half a century there was a reversal of that state of affairs, as a result of the influences that the ideas promoted by the French Revolution of 1789 exercised within the elites of the Principalities. At this level of our discussion, it is necessary to specify that that process was exclusively a project of the native elites. The people were not consulted, the political project of development being imposed by state policies by successive governments that functioned until 1918. The efforts of the modernizing elites were enormous, as they had to establish a state, organize it from an administrative point of view, to introduce a political model, to legislate, to centralize, to establish institutions, to create new social groups through state policies.

The reforms, and the recognition of the new state that had begun with Little Union, under the leadership of Alexandru Ioan Cuza, were continued after the arrival to the throne of the young Carol, as King of Romania, who continued the struggle for independence. Interestingly, there were no political parties in the territorial space of the young state, but rather we could talk about the existence of groups of politicians who gravitated around politicians who were acting as political parties. In this respect, we can speak of the existence of classical political parties specific to the period, which entered the category of notable parties only after the formation of the National Liberal Party (1875), respectively the establishment of the Conservative Party (1880).

The program of the National Liberal Party identified itself with classical liberalism in which we find the fight against feudalism, the support of the

¹ See, Dinicu Golescu, *The Story of My Travel*, Youth Publishing House, Bucharest, 1963.

bourgeoisie, the militancy for a constitutional monarchy, the balance of powers in the state, the promotion of the freedom of the individual in relation to the state, the rejection of the intervention of governmental institutions in social relations.

The tendencies of unification of liberal mentality groups began to manifest after the forced abdication of Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza (1866), a first serious attempt being made in March 1871, but the political instability of the times made the liberal fractions to resort to compromises all sorts to reach or maintain government. Also, the liberals managed to conflict with the Great Powers because of differences in views between local elites and those of the Great Powers in the Israeli problem.²

A fundamental theme that was found throughout the course of the monarchic regime in Romania was the one which had as the main subject the Jewish community. Starting with the first half of the 18th century the Romanian space was beginning to face a phenomenon of massive emigration of the Jewish population that originated from the Tsarist Empire. More specifically, anti-Semitic feelings within Russian society provoked, almost periodically, repression campaigns against Jewish communities throughout the empire. One of those campaigns took place in the early decades of the nineteenth century, which produced a phenomenon of emigration to neighboring states. This was the case with several secessionist Jewish communities in Galicia who tried to escape from living in the Habsburg Empire, but without success. The imperial authorities refused entry to the Jews on their own territory, which forced the Jews to reorient and penetrate northern Moldavia to the territory of the old voivode. That real migratory wave was able to penetrate because the institutions of the Moldavian Principality were too weak to block them. Some of them would also settle on the territory of Wallachia, but most of them had settled in Moldova. Thus, according to official statistical data, during 1831-1860, they represented 8.53% of the population.³

That state of affairs had created major reactions from the local boyars' elites. Those reactions, which were essentially rejection, were based on two concepts: first, and most importantly, that of the national state. According to the founding ideology of the national state, as it was promoted in the 1848 national revolution, a people had the right to found their own state on the basis of the following criteria: belonging to a common territory, common language, common history, religion, traditions etc. Clearly, given the progressive Romanian elites studying in Paris and Vienna, who actively participated in the revolutions of 1848, they had as a reference model the modern national state. Under those conditions, the unexpected occurrence of a population that did not fit into any of the conditions of the reference model could only create problems in the legitimacy of an action aimed at creating the Romanian state.

An important moment in the appearance of anti-Semitic speeches was the year 1866, when the issue of drafting a new Constitution project was raised. The most important speeches on that issue were supported by the Romanian Parliament's tribune in the session 1866-1867. This is important because the anti-

² Sabin, Drăgulin, *The origins of Romanian racism. A History of Ideas*, Sphere of Politics, no.168, no.2, 2012, pp. 37-50.

³ *Ibidem*, p.43.

Semitic discourse had almost disappeared from public space for almost a decade to return in force during the 1877-1878 session, when the Great Powers, through the Treaty of Berlin (1878) conditioned recognition of the independence by granting citizenship to the Jews who had migrated massively to the Principality.

The second concept concerned the legitimation at international level of the Romanians' wishes to create their own state, as the neighboring powers: the Ottoman, Tsarist and Austro-Hungarian Empire did not want to achieve that desideratum. Thus, the presentation of the project of the creation of a Romanian state on the basis of the arguments justifying the emergence of a national state could be invalidated in the conditions in which one nation could not be spoken of, but two peoples; Romanian and Jewish. A compromise situation had been proposed by the great powers, namely granting the citizenship of newcomers simultaneously with granting the right to set up their own state. Let us not forget that the Israeli problem was found both in the programs of the revolutions of 1848 in the Principalities and at the time of revalidation of the union after the abdication of Alexandru Ioan Cuza in 1866, and at the time of the recognition of independence in 1878, but also after the end of the First World War, when the 1918 Great Union would be recognized if Romania granted mass citizenship to all the citizens of the new state, which happened with the adoption of the 1923 Constitution.

In the '60s of nineteenth century, the Jewish question was particularly ardent and prompted the vehement reactions of the representatives of the modernizing Romanian elites, whether they came from the liberal camp or came from the Junimea camp, which later would be the catalyst for the establishment of the conservative party. Those big reactions also had a motivation that was both personal and group type. To understand this, we need to refer to the studies of Ștefan Zeletin, which he presented in his paper titled *Romanian Bourgeoisie*, where he explained very well the four phases of trade development: 1) commercial contact; 2) product offer; 3) import of products with outlets; 4) revolutionizing the penetrating economy, breaking existing structures, developing the economy of exchange. The author believed that in the first phase, the autochthons observed passively the ruin of the entire edifice, the capital of usury type having a destructive role in the country, the boyars borrowing themselves to support the expenses necessary for the purchase of luxury goods; usury being the first form of capitalism. As a result of the action of the capital, the great boyar, the descendant of the feudal land-type aristocracy, disappeared until 1866.⁴

However, whichever motivation, at the level of the Romanian political space people would continue, after 1878, to maintain anti-Semitic attitudes in the public discourse, the most important representative being Professor A. C. Cuza, who established in 1895 an anti-Semitism organization together with the historian Nicolae Iorga, entitled "The Universal Anti-Semitism Alliance", and in 1923, the "National Christian Defense League", which merged in 1935 with the National Agrarian Party headed by Octavian Goga, establishing the Christian National Party.

⁴ Ștefan Zeletin, *Romanian Bourgeoisie: Its Origin and Its Historical Role*, 2nd Edition, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1991, pp. 62-70.

Starting from this historical reality, we can identify the roots of the Romanian anti-Semitism, which intertwined with the efforts for political emancipation of the Romanian state, of the local cultural and political elite, as well as with the social modernization. The unification of the Principalities, the conquest of independence, the realization of the great union took place in half a century. That period was characterized by a particularly intense political activity which had as protagonists an elite determined to achieve the modernization of the Romanian state.

A.C. Cuza starting from the triad of historicism - evolutionism - organicism built a unitary theory explaining the process that determined the emergence of nations, the nature of the state, the concept of national state and nationality. Later, he developed ethnical theories; on the background of nationalistic and conspiracy phobias.⁵

Ion C. Brătianu and the Israeli problem

Throughout this study we propose analyses that will highlight the ideas that animated the liberal leader using a double key of interpretation: theoretical-doctrinal-ideological and pragma-rhetorical.

In this regard we propose a selection of fragments from two speeches pronounced in 1866 and 1868 and two speeches analyzed entirely from 1869 and 1875 by Ion C. Brătianu. The method used by the authors is chronological.

The extracts are part of the speeches made during the parliamentary session of June 1866, during the first government led by Lascăr Catargiu, and since 1868: *...we have declared that the government does not understand to give the land to the Jews, nor to give them rights,, which harm Romania's interests at any rate, the problem is ...just the big number that threatens, as everyone else says, our nationality...Some powerful administrative measures can get rid of this nuisance and prevent them from foreign proletarians invade our country* “⁶, the motivation of this attitude being *...they have now stuck to the ground so hard that we will never be able to strip them of it.*⁷

As we can see, the political and liberal speaker, from the highest political tribune of the country, brings into question the fears at the level of the native political class, which seem to be so contemporary if we take into consideration certain positions of opinion diplomatic representatives of a neighbouring state, such as Hungary, which refers to this time to the danger of Europe's Islamization.

Then, the “Program” that the liberals would follow and promote marked the speech delivered in 1869. Thus, Ion C. Brătianu held a speech at the banquet given to him by the Bucharest at the initiative of C.A. Rosetti in the same year that the radicals were preparing the March-April elections. *The toast-1869* program had an ideological character, outlining the program that the National Liberal Party would promote later on. As a follow-up to the idea of a migrant, in the struggle to defend the idea of nationality, liberals militated through the

⁵ *Idem*, Sabin Drăgulin, *The History of Romanian Political Thought 1848-1948*, Pro Universitaria Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010.

⁶ *Official Gazette*, no. 19.20, June 1866.

⁷ *The parliamentary speech of April 30, 1868, in the Writings and Words of Ion Brătianu*. Vol. I, Bucharest, 1930, p. 441.

program they adopted for: emancipation, independence, equality, property rights, the right to defence, the development of the education system and orthodoxy. Here are some fragments of his speech: *Gentlemen, during the great revolution of France, which was made in the name of the nation, the French people wanted to establish the cult of reason to make it personified...*

The only Romanians are a people who have a true unity based on the sole language... but... we have traditionally preserved civilization... we are a people endowed with exceptional advantages, owner of one of the most well-endowed land in Europe.... The first is the division of property and its security... so that most Romanians will be the owners....we are about to form the middle property, which will give another face to the society, will open people's gates to active jobs.

All Romanians, all free Romanians, all Romanians equal. Capital is the most powerful means... Therefore, credit institutions are for us sine qua non conditions;... Therefore, gentlemen, instruction, instruction! – for without instruction, without light, we will not be able to do anything;... the defence point when somebody comes to hit us. We were murdered because we said we were neither Turks nor Germans, nor ovate, nor Polish, nor Tatars nor Muscles, and that we were Romanians... Well, yes, we are Orthodox!... We are Orthodox... If my father himself rose from the grave and would come to strike my nationality, my homeland, I will turn my eyes with grief...but I will strike him without sparing.”⁸

As it results from the ideas presented above, Brătianu continued to promote the ‘48 generation’s ideas of independence, nationality, emancipation, emphasizing the superiority of the Romanian people as compared to his neighbours, his Roman origins, but preserving the anti-Semitic attitudes he was accused of. The discourse also made a balance sheet of the reforms adopted and promoted by the ‘48 generation and highlighted the political agenda that had as its focal points the right to property, equality, the creation of credit institutions, the development of the army resulting in the right to defence, the development of the public instruction, orthodoxy, being equivalent in the orator's view of nationality, at the expense of Catholicism, but also of other religions, resulting once again in its anti-Hungarian and xenophobic character.

From the beginning, the orator appealed to history in France, where Romanian students took revolutionary ideas through a parable: *they took a virgin, raised it on the altar of the homeland, and then worshiped the reason. They were pretending in their minds the goddess of reason. After expressing their feelings, their cult to this momentary personification of the judgment of mankind, the goddess scrambled from the altar and once again became a virgin*, transferring the account to his own person.

Through the identification mechanism, Brătianu, represents *all your feelings, your ideas, your aspirations*.

Turning to his experience in Europe, using the espanalepsis, a mechanism of persuasion, the orator shows the uniqueness of the Romanian people who have

⁸ Ion C. Brătianu, *The Toast Program 1869, Acts and Speeches*, G. Marinescu and C. Grecescu, vol. I, Part II Cartea Românească Publishing House, Bucharest, 1938, pp. 1-13

the same language, without the dialects, the same traditions, the same feelings, the same beliefs, civilized nation.

Every idea is enunciated and paraphrased, exemplified by appeal to history, past, compared to neighbouring populations, but also by antithesis, the West opposing its East, the Romanians as a *civilized nation*, different from the Hungarian *desert* that *has people as had not been seen since the time of the 5th century, the 6th and the 8th, during the barbarians*, through metaphor, *the tenderness of our peasant in his family*, totally different from *the less worshipful people, the brutality* of the Hungarians, all due to our Latin origins.

By metonymy, *small property, large property, middle estate*, meaning peasant, bourgeois, boyar, orator, explains the division of social classes, and recalls the middle class creation – the ideal of '48 revolution, which would be done without bloodshed in Romania, the secularization of the monastery, through the desire of landowners to get titles by selling lands, wanting to become civil servants, to actively evolve from the status of farmer.

The orator makes a small historical incursion when he exemplifies the struggle against feudality, through prosopopeia: *Mihai, the hero, is the one who made this start. Mihai, gentlemen, did nothing about it. He gave only a decree that was inspired by a political necessity and could not have the purpose of establishing a state of things that he had found ready*, but also by rhetorical questions: *the Romanian protested and did not want to receive how do you think he will receive it now? It is no longer possible... No, sir!*⁹

Then there is an example of the need for economic stability by creating capital, of *national credit institutions*, to avoid borrowing from foreign peoples, militating for *rallies and meetings* to explain the need for this project to all.

The need for an educated people, a peasant who understands the idea of freedom and modernity, can only be done with the establishment of as many schools, *the instruction* being also seen by the orator as *a condition of national existence*.

Another condition is the efficiency of the army as a means of protection against other conquering peoples.

The orator, handling manipulation techniques very well, calls for pathetic arguments, explaining to the audience, identifying himself with it, creating the impression of a confession, that until that moment there were many things he avoided saying, *but now, because we are among us... I want, gentlemen, that every Romanian have a rifle in his hand... to feel that here is a people who will not be killed*.

The last topic addressed in the discourse is that of religion, orthodoxy, using rhetorical questions and answers, a technique that denotes a persuasive purpose: *how do you then want me to change my name to Romanian and my religion? How do you want me, but today, to deny her? But Greeks, but Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians, Macedonians, Pan-Slavists, what are they? Do they want the loss of their nationality, their merging into the Russian one? No, gentlemen, then, gentlemen, in your slums, with your neighbors, if you live in peace with them, if you live in harmony, should somebody make you a crime for it?*

⁹ *Ibidem*.

The discursive marks are based on rehearsal figures, epanalepsis: *the Germans came, the Turks came, the Moscals came, anyone came, neither the Turks, nor the Germans, nor the Turks, neither the Turks nor the Turks, nor the Turks, nor the Moscals*, shows the pressure the neighbor peoples exercised over Romanians in order to catholic them.

In conclusion, the orator summarizes the argumentation by emphasizing the idea of nationality that is dearest to him than his own origins: *If my father himself rose from the grave and would come to strike my nationality, my homeland, I will grieve with my eyes....but I will hit him without sparing.*¹⁰

The identification process is accomplished by us, if at the beginning the term is me, it changes in ourselves in the course of time, so that it will end in me again.

Anti-Semitic and strengthening army nationalist measures proposed by Ion C. Brătianu would be given great attention by the great European powers, making the government of Nicolae Golescu to resign following the pressures in November 1868.

The second speech, which we submit to the analysis, is also one of Ion C. Brătianu, one from the Chamber Session on June 3, 1875, who spoke that time as a president of the National Liberal Party, a newly established party, in May 1875. Brătianu analysed the work of the second conservative government led by Lascăr Catargiu. He created his two-way discourse, first making a history of their existence after Barbu Catargiu's death, highlighting the decline of the policies they had led, falsifying the elections by modifying the electoral rolls, targeting in a straight coagulated junction around Manolache Costache Epureanu which he saw as vengeful and lacking the necessary political maturity to impose a viable governance program, then highlighting the policies pursued by liberals, including their ability to give up government when time had demanded, to ensure the balance of power in the state. The discourse is a polemic one, with the conservative politics being vehemently criticized, with ad personam and ad hominem arguments, the purpose being an electoral one for the 1876 elections.

I take the word not to challenge you, nor to win you, but with my little powers, I will try to persuade you. Therefore, if in my speech I will say things that may distress you and strike many, be willing to be patient until the end: to judge me knowingly, in all my word. Is there a government brought into foreign vans? Is there a party that wants in the middle Ages?... No!... Are we in the state of the Pest room, composed of several nationalities, so there is so much hatred among us?... No!... I asked you to apply the Constitution and guarantee free elections... are we seeing the orator of the Conservative Party, your Deak, the president of this assembly, rising with such anger against us?... I was here in disaster and I heard that she invoked the shadow of old Catargiu and his curses in our confrontation because we would have assassinated the jobber.... But right Juna had no credit in the country; made up of young people coming out of the school benches, had no tradition... it was not known, it did not have the power that a political party must have... We had the traditions of '48, the world knew who we are, what is the national liberal party, while the right juna had nothing...came to power Lascar Catargiu... It came to power that ministry

¹⁰ Ibidem.

brought on by a feeling, aside from vengeance and on the other, fearing, afraid, distrustful... you were the government of struggle, the government of the nudge... Well, gentlemen, I say a truth. But you came here and you said so many inaccurate things... what are not true. I untie you and untie you for six years...

Mr. Catargiu, with his proverbial good nature, never denies me. He says it clean and always comes to the tail with "Monitor" and opens it and makes it as Mohammedan who reads a verse from the Koran, seeing and reading me to consecrate his deeds now.

Well, gentlemen, even when someone is copying, because he has the modesty to declare he's just a copyist to me, he must know at least spelling to be able to copy well. Well, gentlemen, I declare that the Prime Minister has copied me very badly; that if I have used my moral influence in my choice, she has used the material power and the falsification of the lists... You have even confessed that the ministry, when it flooded the electoral colleges with the countryside, does not serve a preservation interest, but a Caesarean democracy against which I will always be with all my strength.¹¹

The speaker began his speech expressing from the very beginning the purpose of the speech, to persuade the audience, warning it at the same time that he might upset many, but hoping that the arguments put forward will support the cause.

Using irony through synchronicity: *for knowing that the sense of conscience pushes all man to defend himself, either in his life or in dignity, or freedom*, he discredits the Strat who took the word in ignorance apparently, using the rhetorical question and answer, the trademark of manipulation: *why did not he take it during the verification of powers, precisely because Mr. was not in the country and was totally alien to what spent here?*

The violent scenes of previous sessions are a reason for comparison with the modern European states, evoking the history of France's restoration, this country representing ideals for peacekeepers, with rhetorical questions: *Is there a government brought into foreign vans? Is there a party that wants to in the Middle Ages?* whose answer is *No!*

A blatant indictment is made to political opponents, the speaker uses harsh words such as: *false, liar, danger, extermination, miserable, fear, distrust, evil, pressure, illegality, split, stolen, violence* of which are accused the conservatives, in contradiction with what defines him / them as liberals: *truth, principles, free choice, good, gentile, ceded, gain, dignity, trust*, opposing the liberal government with the conservative *then* with *today*.

The revelation of the facts is made by metalepsis, *the eminent speaker* of the Conservative Party, and the persuasion, the orator ironizes the reaction of the President of the Council of Ministers: *I would have thought he invoked the shadow of Mihai Viteazu against a group of Phanariots who murdered Tudor Vladimirescu, and our nationality*, the discussion posing as an assassination accusation against the liberals of Barbu Catargiu, and by prosopopee, based on

¹¹ Ion C. Brătianu, *The Conservatives of the Government after Barbu Catargiu, Acts and Speeches*, G. Marinescu and C. Grecescu, vol. I, 2nd Edition Cartea Românească Publishing House, Bucharest, 1938, pp. 414-426.

absent-defunct in the invocation of Barbu Catargiu: *the old Catargiu, the jobber*.¹²

After highlighting by arguments and example the poor governance of conservative political opponents, their representatives, Costache Epureanu, Francisc Deak, the orator goes on to the young followers.

The right juna is the next one targeted by the orator's revelations, and this is unbreakable by the filter through which the entire conservative government is passed over time, Brătianu considering that he did not have the necessary experience to govern.

The inability of the conservatives to hold the reins of the state is underlined by the epanalepsis, the technique of manipulation: *The straight junction was formed. But Juna's right had no credit in the country; made up of young people out of the school benches, had no tradition... it was not known, it had no power that a political party must have, it must be put to work with time to create a position in the country. The right juncture of his formation was taken by Manolache Costache [Epureanu], who was his leader at the beginning. The favorable circumstances for it brought Juna straight to power too, in antithesis with the liberals, the orator refusing to reiterate the origin of the party he leads, We had a political life, at least we had the traditions of '48, the world knew who we are.*

Lascar Catargiu, the current leader of the Conservatives and the President of the Council of Ministers, does not escape the tirade started by the orator against the political opponents, using the direct addressing, using the ad hominem argument, Brătianu accuses him of *corruption, deceit, immorality and fake* in the organization of elections, by antithesis and epanalepsis: *even when someone is copying, because he has the modesty to declare that he is only a cop of mine, he must at least know the spelling so that he can copy well.* The polemic attack: *Well, gentlemen, I declare that the Prime Minister has copied me very badly;* it is enhanced by irony, *it says clean and perspicuous, like a Mohammedan who reads a verse from the Koran.*

The technique of manipulation is developed through prolepsis, assuming the arguments of the conservatives and fighting them in advance, highlighting the defrauding of elections: *you said it is easier to make voters, then to create deputies, and so you put voters in voter lists, which would make the representatives of the country no longer the ones the constitution decides.*

At the end of the speech, the orator emphasizes the struggle he will face against both the political opponents and the dictatorship they are trying to establish:

*By flooding colleges with the countryside you have even confessed that the ministry, when it flooded the electoral colleges with the countryside, does not serve a preservation interest, but a cesarean democracy against which I will always be with all my strength.*¹³

The metaphor and metonymy also highlight the discursive polemic: *loaf of polenta, the evil system, the cesarean democracy, the eminent orator, the jobber.*

The term of the speech is *me / us*, the liberals, in antithesis with *you*, the conservatives.

¹² *Ibidem.*

¹³ *Ibidem.*

Conclusions

Although exposed to differences of a few years, the discourses analyzed are recursive, the discourse marks that support the argumentation and the ideals of the '48 generation, such as: independence, France, Europe, Orthodoxy, Romania, civilization, nation, freedom, tradition. The call to history, its remembrance, appears in the 1869 discourse when it is desired to exemplify the struggle against feudalism: *Mihai, the hero, is the one who made this start, and in 1875, the French is evoked.*

The uniqueness of the Romanian people, from the 1869 discourse, which *has the same language, without the dialects, the same traditions, the same feelings, the same beliefs*, and its superiority as compared to its neighbours, and *the Right Juna* - the lack of experience in governing the conservatives, are highlighted by epanalepsis as a mechanism of persuasion.

Antithesis is another discursive mark present in persuasive speeches. *The West* is opposed by *the East*, the Romanians as a *civilized* nation, different from the Hungarian *desert* in the 1869 talk. In 1875, the orator puts antithesis *today* with *then*, liberal and conservative government, the terms: *false, liar, danger, extermination, misery, fear, distrust, evil, pressure, illegality, split, stolen, violence* are in contradiction with: *truth, principles, free choice, good, gentile, ceded, gain, dignity, trust.*

The process of identifying the orator with the audience is done through *us* in the speeches analysed. The rhetorical question highlights the aspirations of the liberals: the right to property, freedom, orthodoxy, in the Toast program, and in the Conservatives in power, the inconsistency of the conservatives, the electoral theft and the divergence of opinion, *the hatred.*

The polemic character, the ad hominem and ad personam arguments are found only in the 1875 discourse, being underlined by discursive marks such as: metalapsis, irony, bantering: *the eminent orator, the old Catargiu, jobber, a Mohammedan who reads a verse from the Koran.* Here too we find the tough language, allegations of *corruption, deceit, immorality and falseness* in the organization of elections, the opponent being the image of a cop who *needs at least spelling to be able to copy well.*

Archaisms are still quite present in the three speeches: *France, traditions, aspirations, league, civilization, reflection, conviction, constitutional, useful, stagnant, heavy, secular, secular, population, conservative, banquet, pulp, nurtured, lovingly*, along with new terms like: *heterogeneous, exceptional advantages, endowed, laborious, damping, indispensable, achieve, reforms, knowledge, temperament, retrospective, admits, indignities, tendencies, bankruptcies.*

Concluding, the period in the analyzed speeches represents a stage on the way to the constitution of the Romanian state and the struggle for nationality. The winning of Romanian independence, the Belgian constitution, the constitutional monarchy, along with the crystallization of politicians around some political parties, bring the country closer to European models. Paradoxically, for a reader of our times, Ion C. Brătianu's nationalist and anti-Semitic approaches reflect the deep connection of the liberal leader with the political conceptions of

the moment in the West, as anti-Semitic discourses were present in speeches of European politicians.

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ROMANIA IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE LATE 19TH CENTURY AND EARLY 20TH CENTURY

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Abstract: *The current study analyzes the implications of the Triple Entente establishment on Romanian foreign policy. A “small state,” Romania had to shape its foreign policy according to the relations among the Great Powers and the important international mutations that they triggered. Under the circumstances created after the Berlin Congress, Romania found its security guarantees through its alliance with that group of powers which were dominant in international life and its accession to the Central Powers was a solution imposed by the realities of that historical moment. The establishment of the Triple Entente would gradually alter the balance of power internationally. The Franco-Russian Alliance failed to overcome the Triple Alliance hegemony. The Entente Cordiale marked a certain balance of forces and strengthened France's position at international level. But the defeat of Russia in the war with Japan meant, at the same time, a weakening of the Franco-Russian alliance, which kept the impression of a certain military superiority of the Central Powers. However, the first “Moroccan crisis” proved that it could be only relative, the Entente Cordiale being strengthened.*

The conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agreement and the finalization of the Triple Entente establishment in this way, however, brought about an essential change in the balance of power at international level. While the Triple Alliance was primarily a continental alliance, the Triple Entente, given the vast colonial possessions of the member states, was a world one. Thus, the international context that imposed Romania's accession to the Triple Alliance was fundamentally altered, which made it necessary to re-analyze its position externally, in accordance with the great interests of the Romanian nation, related to the achievement of state unity. At the time of its establishment, however, the Triple Entente was not consolidated. The Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian agreements, concluded under the form of dividing the spheres of influence in Africa and Asia, did not contain firm policy commitments and, besides, future disagreements in key issues were possible. Romania needed to wait and reflect in order to tune its foreign policy to the aspirations for national reunification. The interests of ensuring the state security remained a priority, a situation in which it was necessary to maintain the alliance with the Central Powers.

Keywords: *Central Powers, Franco-Russian Alliance, Entente Cordiale, Anglo-Russian Agreement, Triple Entente, Triple Alliance.*

I. Introduction

Romania had joined the Central Powers¹ through a secret bilateral treaty

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¹ Concerning Romania's accession to the Triple Entente, see in detail Gh. Nicolae Căzan, Șerban Rădulescu-Zoner, *Romania and the Triple Entente, 1878-1914*, The Scientific and Encyclopaedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1979, p. 95-130; V. Cristian, *1878-1914*, in vol.

signed with Austria-Hungary², on 30 October 1883, on the same day as Germany. The treaty was of great value to all its signatories but, from the beginning, it was found that the weak point of the alliance was Romania's position. Although the treaty offered it security guarantees, such an alliance could not, of course, be agreed in Romania. Numerous manifestations of the public opinion showed that the situation created for the Romanians in Transylvania was an insurmountable barrier between Vienna and Bucharest through the policy of denationalization practised by the Hungarian government. Although the Romanian government could not afford clear foreign policy actions contrary to the Dual Monarchy, the "national problem" played a major role in Romania's relations with Austria-Hungary. Economical contradictions were also added, which led to a long-running customs war (1886-1893), a quite unusual situation between two countries that were signatories of a political alliance treaty. The most durable outcome of the customs war may have been of a political nature: it reinforced the hostility felt by most Romanians towards Austria-Hungary and, thus, reduced the prospects for future cooperation in foreign affairs.³ However, the 1883 treaty lay at the basis of Romania's relations with the Central Powers for three decades, providing them with certain stability. Moreover, a new initiative of Bismarck extended the relations between the signatories of the 1883 Treaty, by means of Italy's accession to it⁴, on May 15, 1888. The solution envisaged by Bismarck was not a quadripartite agreement, but Italy's accession, just like Germany's.

In order to maintain Romania alongside the Triple Alliance, great efforts were made which intensified especially after Chancellor Bismarck's resignation, when the German policy was undergoing a major change, which was also reflected in the abolishment of the reinsurance treaty with Russia. The Alliance with Romania became more precious because Germany's attitude towards Russia allowed Austria-Hungary to be bolder in Southeastern Europe. The struggles of the Central Powers for the renewal of the 1883 treaty appear natural in this context, and they are particularly suggestive of the place Romania was assigned internationally.⁵

However, the renewal of Romania's accession treaty to the Triple Alliance was a very difficult process.⁶ In 1891, the Conservatives were in power, and none of their leaders had been informed about the treaty. Rather than embarking them on the secret of the treaty, the King preferred to wait until the Liberals could be brought back to power. Another impediment to a speedy renewal of the treaty was the increasingly difficult situation of the Romanians in Transylvania. The Magyarization policy pursued by the Hungarian government had placed King Carol I in a difficult situation, as the hostility to Austria-Hungary, determined by the "national problem", was increasing in the eyes of the public opinion and had become a frequent subject of parliamentary debate. It had given rise to doubts about the future of the alliance in Vienna as well as in Berlin. Another problem for

Romania in International Relations, coord. By L. Boicu, V. Cristian, Gh. Platon, Junimea Publishing House, Iași, 1980, p. 302-321.

² A. Pribram, *Les traités secrets de l'Autriche-Hongrie*, Paris, 1920, p. 40.

³ Keith Hitchins, *Romania. 1866-1947*, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1996, p. 163.

⁴ A. Pribram, *cited work*, p. 46.

⁵ V. Cristian, *cited works*, p. 330.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 325-345.

the alliance was the gradual French-Russian rapprochement, materialized by the signing of the agreement of August 1891. This encouraged Romanian francophiles to hope for a more active French involvement in Eastern European affairs and to see in France's rapprochement to Russia an alternative to the Triple Alliance. An opening in the impasse of the renewal of the treaty with the Triple Alliance took place in October 1891. Carol I eventually gained support for the alliance from influential conservatives, Lascăr Catargiu and Alexandru Lahovary, the prime minister and the foreign minister respectively, and was able to carry out the negotiations for the renewal of the treaty.

It is worth pointing out that King Carol used the talks to draw attention again to the claims of the Romanians in Transylvania and to point out the idea that the alliance with Austria-Hungary appeared first of all as the solution for the alliance with Germany. When, in the course of the renewal talks, Bülow, the German minister in Bucharest, told Carol that, generally speaking, only a Romanian-Austrian agreement was envisaged, in which Germany would participate as a benevolent spectator, Carol replied: "If only a Romanian-Austrian treaty is envisaged, no Romanian will sign it; only the future accession of Germany makes the treaty possible and gives it, in my eyes, as in the eyes of my ministers, its true value"⁷. The treaty was signed in Sinaia on 13/25 July 1892, and on 11/23 November and 16/28 November the acts of Germany's and respectively Italy's accession were signed.

As demonstrated⁸, at a time when the second political-military group was emerging, the negotiations made it clear not only that the initiative of the renewal did not come from Romania, but that a long and energetic action of the Austro-German diplomacy was necessary to reach that goal. The contradictions with Austria-Hungary made the King himself, otherwise partisan of approaching the Central Powers, be very reserved about the alliance and he could be convinced of its usefulness only after several efforts, which clearly reveals Romania's importance for the Triple Alliance. The causes of the Romanian diplomacy's reserves prove, despite the renewal, the fragility of the treaty⁹.

II. Romania and the Franco-Russian Alliance

What were the implications of the establishment of the Franco-Russian alliance for the Romanian diplomacy? The answer to this question must be based on an analysis, from a wider perspective, which makes it necessary to assess the Romanian-Russian relations and the Romanian-French ones.

After the Berlin Congress, in Romania there is an attitude of mistrust towards Russia's policy in South-Eastern Europe. The Romanian-Russian relations, without embracing hostile forms during this period, were quite cold¹⁰.

⁷ *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinete 1871-1914*, Berlin, 1922, (it will be cited G.P), VII, no. 1484, p. 180.

⁸ V. Cristian, *cited works*, p. 344.

⁹ The recent historiographical research highlights the great difficulties that arose for Romania from the long-term maintenance of the alliance with the Central Powers, even though Germany's support for the security of the Romanian state was obtained in this way. See in detail Gheorghe Cliveti, *Romania and "the German Alliances" 1879-1914*, Junimea Publishing House, Iași, 2015.

¹⁰ See Gh. Căzan, *On Romania's Policy towards Russia between 1879-1893*, in the "Annals of

In the years when the Franco-Russian talks in view of an alliance were taking place, there were some events that caused a strain of the Romanian-Russian relations. The attempts of the Tsar's diplomats accredited in Bucharest to influence the course of events in Romania, just as the problem of the renewal of the Austro-Hungarian treaty was going through an impasse, as well as the activity for this purpose of a whole body of secret agents of the Tsarist Ohrana, some also acting in the villages under the false identity of ambulance vendors of icons and portraits of the Tsar (iconaries) or veterinarian agents (juggarians) did not meet the expected result; neither did the various articles on the same subject of the Panslavist press and the Tsarist government newspapers. Eventually, the expulsion of "iconaries" and "juggarians" from Romania created new problems between Bucharest and Petersburg and the discovery in January 1891 of a plot against the new Bulgarian prince, a shadow-led action by the Russian Minister in Bucharest, Mihail Alexandrovici Hitrovo, increased the distrust of the governors from Bucharest in the foreign policy of the Tsarist Empire. "It is obvious - said G. de Coutouly, French consul in Bucharest, in a political report to the foreign minister of France - that Russia has lost ground here since Hitrovo's arrival."¹¹

The Romanian government and the media followed the evolution of the Franco-Russian relations¹². But, as they evolved in the direction of concluding an alliance, there was an increase in Russia's hostile actions towards the Romanian state. In view of shaping the new balance of power at European level, after 1891, the Russian government deployed military forces to the Western border of Russia. The General Consul of Romania in Odessa reported that new troops had been brought to Bessarabia from Caucasus and Terek¹³.

Carol I made some trips to the capitals of the Triple Alliance countries in autumn 1891, talking with politicians from the respective countries about the new international situation and, probably, about the consequences that might result from the Franco-Russian alliance. The Russian press presented King Carol I's journey as springing out of the "fear of future events"¹⁴, as a search for new footholds abroad. In an article in the Russian newspaper "Novosti", however, there was an idea that it could not be fully accepted that, in the event of a war, Romania would immediately join the Triple Alliance. The Russian newspaper considered that, although there was an official anti-Russian trend in Romania, the majority of the Romanian people would be in favour of neutrality¹⁵. In fact, as it is known, King Carol I's visit to the Triple Alliance countries was preparing the

C.I. Parhon University", Series Social Sciences, History, no. 16, 1961, p. 107-131.

¹¹ The Central Historical National Archives (it will be cited A.N.I.C.), France Microfilms, role 51, vol. 14/1889, f. 162.

¹² See the political report of Romania's minister in Petersburg, Emil Ghica, from 2nd May 1891. A.N.I.C. The Royal House Fund, file 5/1891, f. 70. See also the newspaper "The Time" from 23rd May 1891.

¹³ The Archive of the Foreign Affairs Ministry (it will be quoted A.M.A.E.), vol. 270, file 21/1891. Report from Odesa, 6/18 sept. 1891, f. 109-111.

¹⁴ A.M.A.E., vol. 270, *The political reports from Petersburg*, Report from 28th September 1891, f. 120.

¹⁵ A.M.A.E., vol. 270, *The political reports from Petersburg*, file 21/1891. Report from 10/22 sept. 1891, f. 124-126.

prolongation of the alliance with the Central Powers.

In the years 1892-1893, we witness a worsening of the relations between Romania and Russia, as a result of some provoked or unprovoked incidents. Thus, in 1892 a strong cholera epidemic broke out in Russia. The Romanian authorities, in order to prevent the outbreak of the epidemic in Romania, decided that any ship coming from Russia should stay in quarantine for 11 days at sea and not enter Sulina¹⁶. On 17 October 1892, the Russian ship "Olga" entered the Sulina Canal without respecting the disposition of the quarantine, and the vessel was stopped by cannon blows drawn by a Romanian canon. This incident prompted an exchange of diplomatic protest notes, and the press in both countries resumed the series of mutual attacks. Unlike in the previous years, when the press attacks did not touch, at least formally, the official relationships, during these years the incidents were being discussed between the two governments. At the end of 1892 there were some incidents related to the arrest of Russian merchants who travelled without a passport in Moldova, contrary to the legal provisions¹⁷. In February 1893, due to the efforts of both sides, the incidents were declared closed. The Removal of some causes that deteriorated the relationships between the two countries created in 1893 conditions for maintaining peace and tranquility on the Romanian-Russian border. The deputy foreign minister of Russia noted with satisfaction the abolishment of all the incidents between the two countries¹⁸, within the discussions he had with the Romanian representative in Petersburg. The quarantine continued to harm the Russian trade, but after the end of the epidemic, on 15 March 1893, the Romanian government renounced this measure.

In spite of the existence of a strong pro-French trend in Romania and of a real sense of friendship of the Romanian people with the French one, the official Romanian-French relationships, in the period preceding the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance, were characterized by a rather high degree of indifference. The state of the relations between the two countries during this period was a natural consequence of the transformations that Europe was undergoing at the end of the nineteenth century in all respects. It was a direct consequence of the concrete situation for France following the defeat of 1870-1871¹⁹. The diplomatic isolation of France lasted for twenty years. France was offered the greatest chance of getting out of this isolation by a possible *rapprochement* with Russia, since the interests of the two countries, even if they did not converge altogether, did not show unsurmountable problems. Romania, threatened by the Russian dangers, had found the solution of ensuring the state security through a *rapprochement* with the Central Powers, Germany's support, which was at the same time the opponent of France, being the pivotal point of this political orientation. The small European countries, and especially the Southeastern European countries, were taken into consideration by the French

¹⁶ A.M.A.E., vol. 276, file 39/1892, f. 107-294.

¹⁷ A.M.A.E., vol. 273, file 61/1892, f. 47-65.

¹⁸ A.M.A.E., vol. 270, file 21/1893. Report of 15 March 1893, f. 199-200.

¹⁹ Vasile Vesa, *Romania and France at the Beginning of the 20th Century. 1900-1916*, Dacia Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 1975, p. 5.

politicians only to the extent that their interest or lack of interest facilitated France's policy of finding a strong ally and maintaining its alliance. France had proved to be against Romania in the Danube problem and had always refused to open its financial market for the loans requested by the Romanian governments. French educational institutions, military schools received a lower number of Romanian young people than in the previous period. It seemed that the French influence was losing ground in Romania in favor of the German one²⁰.

As a result of the French-Russian alliance in the years 1891-1893, France's policy towards the Southeastern European states had to be in line with that of Russia, which turned its influence in the Balkans into one of the stable pillars of its foreign policy. France also looked at its relations with Romania by means of its fundamental political interests. Given that France showed little interest in Romania, some Romanian politicians even considered that France sacrificed Romania's interests in favor of Russia by supporting its expansionist policy in Southeastern Europe in order to gain its support in a war of revenge against Germany. Naturally, Bülow, as it was well noted²¹, tried to exploit the French-Russian rapprochement in favor of the Central Powers, which was a great concern of the Romanian political circles. He argued that France could only obtain Russia's support through concessions in South-Eastern Europe, where Romania could only rely on the Central Powers, which was also developed in the press. But we tend not to assign this approach the significance of a simple "diplomatic maneuver" meant to help maintain Romania's political orientation with the Triple Alliance. We believe that the idea was really founded and that it was based on the intuition of the French-Russian alliance's intimate resorts, although the French representative in Bucharest struggled to combat it²². It is obvious that France was not really interested in supporting Russia in a war against Austria-Hungary, which could have broken out due to rivalries in Southeastern Europe, but, as we have shown, France had to grant Russia concessions with a view to concluding the alliance. The stipulation, under the Franco-Russian Military Convention of August 1892, of the fact that France was obliged to declare mobilization, even if Austria-Hungary, without Germany's participation, would decide to mobilize against Russia, is an eloquent demonstration of the above statement. France's policy towards Romania had to be in line with that of Russia, after the alliance had ended. Thus, the state of concern created in Bucharest by the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance had a real basis, and the constitution of this new political-military "block" could not influence Romania's political orientation in relations with the Central Powers. Even if in Bucharest there was greater sympathy for France, the deeply rooted fears of Russia could not be overcome, which made the Triple Alliance very attractive both for the liberal and conservative political decision factors. In addition, King Carol I's confidence in Germany's military power provided a solid basis for continuing the political direction with the Central Powers. The Franco-Russian Alliance could not yet represent an alternative to the Triple Alliance system for Romania.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 9.

²¹ V. Cristian, *cited works*, p. 339.

²² A.N.I.C., *The Royal House Fund*, file 5/1891, f. 124.

III. Romania Between Berlin and Saint Petersburg

Therefore, Romania's foreign policy orientation remained unchanged, despite the tension created in its relations with Austria-Hungary during the memorandum movement, which marked a climax in the national struggle of the Transylvanian Romanians and which determined the full solidarity of the Romanians from the Old Kingdom with them, also having a strong echo abroad²³. On this occasion large talks were held in the Parliament of Romania, the issue of Romania's foreign policy being addressed in close connection with the "national problem"²⁴. However, the evolution of the situation in the Balkans reinforced the orientation of Romania's foreign policy and, at the same time, raised the value of its alliance for the Central Powers. In 1895, when the treaty linking Serbia to Austria-Hungary expired, the Serbian government headed for Russia, along with an orientation of Bulgarian diplomacy towards Petersburg, which created a state of unease in Bucharest. The Alliance with Romania became more important for Austria-Hungary, after Serbia's break up. Both parties were thus willing to strengthen their mutual commitments, and, in 1896, they decided to extend the alliance treaty until 1903. Under these circumstances, the efficiency of the French representative's actions, d'Aubigny, and of Russia's representative, Fonton, had been diminished, and they were concerned to find out whether there was a formal agreement between Romania and the Triple Alliance, which they had suspected.

The conclusion of the agreement between Austro-Hungary and Russia in May 1897, whereby the two states undertook to maintain the *status-quo* in the Balkans, gave birth to a more relaxed diplomatic situation towards the end of century, which would benefit Romania as well. In this context, in July 1898, King Carol I, accompanied by Prime Minister D.A. Sturdza, visited Russia at the invitation of the Tsar Nicholas II. This visit, which re-established the good relations between the two ruling houses, although it had no influence on Romania's political orientation in the next stage, benefitted some important circles of the Romanian public opinion which had criticized the policy of exclusive proximity to the "Triplice" practised by the king and governors²⁵.

At the beginning of the 20th century, when the actions of the Bulgarian comitangles in Macedonia, where many Aromanians lived, a tense tension of Romania's relations with Bulgaria was reached, the worsening of diplomatic relations being followed by military training. This enabled Russia's policy in Southeastern Europe, the Petersburg government, to be activated by a series of actions, making it clear that in the case of a war between Romania and Bulgaria,

²³ See in this respect the documents included in the work Corneliu Mihail Lungu (coord.), *The European Diplomacy and the Memorandum Movement*, The Romanian State Archives, Bucharest, 1995.

²⁴ See Paraschiva Căncea, Mircea Iosa, Apostol Stan (coord.), *The History of Parliament and Parliamentary Life in Romania until 1918*, The Academy Publishing House, Bucharest, 1983, p. 326-337; also, Aurelia Bunea, *The Problem of Transylvania in the Romanian Parliament's Debates during the Memorandum Movement (1892-1895)*, "Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai", Series Historia, 1966, fasc. 1, p. 77-94; idem, *Romania's Parliament for a Foreign Policy Favourable to the Union of Transylvania with Romania (1892-1899)*, "Acta Musei Napocensis", VII, 1970, p. 329-353.

²⁵ Gh. N. Căzan, Şerban Rădulescu-Zoner, *cited works*, p. 188. On King Carol I's visit to Russia, see in detail A.N.I.C., Microfilms Fund Russia, role 48, c. 664-845.

the latter will have Russia's support. The situation became even more difficult for Romania because of Serbia's attitude, which tried to approach Russia and Bulgaria. The conflict was settled, but Russia's position created great concern in Bucharest. The real explanation for Russia's attitude is that in Petersburg they had come to the conclusion that a treaty had been concluded between Romania and Austria-Hungary, and the warnings given to the Romanian diplomacy had, first of all, to draw attention to the inconveniences of such an orientation.²⁶ The preservation of the alliance with the Central Powers appeared, under the circumstances, to be imposed by the circumstances. The Alliance with Austria-Hungary was renewed on 4/17 April 4/17 1902, with the accession of Germany on 12/25 July 1902 and that of Italy on 30 November / 12 December 1902. We also mention that Romania's proposal to become an equal partner through the transformation of the Triple Alliance into a Quadruple Alliance, which had long been discussed, stemming from the Romanian government's tendency to consolidate Romania's international position and to give the country greater weight in its relations with Austria-Hungary²⁷, was not accepted, as a result of Germany's opposition. Equally, the Romanian side's request was not accepted either, motivated by the international circumstances of the moment, which required the introduction of a clause extending the conditions of *casus foederis* and due to the possibility of a Romanian-Bulgarian armed conflict²⁸.

The attempt of the Romanian ruling circles to obtain broad support for their Balkan policy from the Triple Alliance states failed, although tenaciously and within the strict limits of the Aromanian rights issue in the Ottoman Empire, the three great powers supported, at certain moments, the diplomatic action of the governors in Bucharest. Austria-Hungary had an increasingly reserved attitude towards Romania's active policy in the Balkans, with the aim of avoiding a change in the balance of power that would harm the international position of the country and endanger its territorial integrity. But, unlike the circumstantial nature of the concerns of the Romanian political circles and public opinion over the Balkan problems, the Transylvanian issue was "an element of the structure of the Romanian collective mentality and influenced appropriately and permanently Romania's diplomatic relations with Austria-Hungarian"²⁹. The Double Monarchy was required to give a definitive solution to a major dilemma of its foreign policy: to support Romania's active policy in the Balkans in order to divert the Romanian public opinion from the Carpathians towards the Danube or to support the establishment of a strong Bulgarian state which, according to his minister in Bucharest, Pallavicini, was supposed to represent "the safest remedy against Romanian irredentism"³⁰.

Austria-Hungary decided on the second solution, believing that Romania's national political objectives could not be diverted. As a result, the support granted to Romania by Austria-Hungary, especially concerning its Balkan policy was

²⁶ See in detail V. Cristian, *cited works*, p. 251-253.

²⁷ Gh. Platon, *Modern History of Romania*, Bucharest, The Didactic and Pedagogical Publishing House, 1985, p. 443.

²⁸ Gh. N. Căzan, Ș. Rădulescu-Zoner, *cited works*, p. 249-253.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 260-261.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 257.

increasingly limited. The result was the expected one: Romania's gradual detachment from the Triple Alliance³¹.

In the context of the Southeastern European events, Russia's attitude towards Romania largely determined that of France, although the Bucharest representatives of the two allied countries, Fonton and respectively Henry, had not yet reached a common action, like the one of the representatives of the Central Powers. The lack of cooperation of the French-Russian diplomacy could not strengthen its positions in Bucharest, especially due to the fact that in the competition with the representatives of the Central Powers, which had already benefitted from the previous situation, it had to face the actions of some skilful diplomats such as Kiderlen Waechter or Pallavicini.³² In a report written in August 1901, the Romanian minister in Paris, Gr. Ghika, thoroughly analyzing the French policy towards Romania, stated that "from the sheer political point of view, France felt only indifference or antipathy towards Romania", mentioning that one of the causes underlying this situation was the fact that Romania had not joined the constellation of states revolving around Russia, and the Romanian ruling circles had promoted a Germanophile policy, concluding that "France will always adjust its political attitude towards Romania according to that of Russia".³³ Undoubtedly, Romania's cooperation with the Austro-German block constituted the fundamental cause of the frictions between Bucharest and Paris, the coldness and even the hostility with which the government of the Republic treated Romania. After years on end of suspicion, the Quai d'Orsay cabinet reached the conclusion that there was a formal treaty of Romania with Austria-Hungary³⁴.

While preserving this alliance as a necessary element, the Romanian leaders continued the policy of good neighborly relations with Russia. Moreover, the Russian diplomacy started to act now more vigorously to mitigate the consequences of Romania's rapprochement to the Triple Alliance, especially since the end of 1902, when Fonton was replaced by Giers-junior, who sought a closer connection with the French minister in Bucharest in order to coordinate the efforts of removing Romania from Germany's influence and from the alliance with Austria-Hungary³⁵. This activation of the Russian policy towards Romania may have been influenced by the conclusion of the Franco-Italian agreement of 10 July 1902, which meant, in fact, a first step on the path leading to Italy's break-up with the Austro-German block. The evolution of the Franco-Russian alliance was followed with interest in Bucharest, but the practical possibility of a rapprochement was out of question at the beginning of the century³⁶. Moreover, Russia's growing engagement in the Far East had made France's alliance with Russia less effective, which favored the rapprochement between Paris and London.

³¹ Gh. Platon, *cited works*, p. 445.

³² V. Cristian, *cited works*, p. 354.

³³ A.M.A.E., vol. 70. *Political reports from Paris, 1889-1901*. Report no. 1222 bis, no. A, 28VII/10VIII 1901, f. 192-200.

³⁴ *Documents diplomatiques français (it will be cited D.D.F.)*, I-ère série, t2, p. 72, Henry to Delcassé, 2nd February 1902; see also A.M.A.E., vol. 71. *Political Reports from Paris. 1902-1903*, f. 33-34 (July 1902).

³⁵ V. Cristian, *cited works*, p. 358.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 354.

IV. The Implications of the Entente's Establishment on Romania's Foreign Policy

The gradual configuration of the Entente, through the agreements between France and England of 8 April 1904, and between the United Kingdom and Russia on 31 August 1907³⁷, created a new balance of power, thus changing, to a certain extent, the complex of external factors that had determined Romania's accession to the Triple Alliance. To what extent did England's joining this politico-military system, whose basis had been laid by the Franco-Russian alliance, influence Romania's foreign policy?

In this period, the Romanian-English relations had reached a certain stage of development, including above all commercial relations, investments in the oil industry, navigation and transport³⁸. Politically, Great Britain had a reserved attitude towards Romania, the British diplomacy being convinced, just like the French and Russian ones, of the fact that although Romania was officially declared a neutral state, its external position was oriented towards the Central Powers, especially Germany. J.G. Kennedy, the British minister in Bucharest, in a report of 14 January 1903 addressed to Marshal Lansdowne, said that "King Carol controls each department of the administration in this country, and in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for which his Majesty accepts the opinions expressed by Berlin"³⁹. As to the relations with Great Britain, King Carol had constantly expressed the desire to "ensure the English government's friendly attitude towards Romania", noting at the same time that "Britain is less represented in Romania than the other powers."⁴⁰

The situation of the Jews in Romania occupied a special place in the Romanian-English relations of that period, a fact which was also reflected by the frequent approach of this subject in the English diplomatic correspondence⁴¹. The modification of Article 7 of the Constitution was not considered as a full resolution of the issue of civic-religious equality of Jews in Romania. This will cause the Western media, implicitly the British one, to maintain an unfavorable atmosphere for Romania on the issue of persecution against the Jews. The British Government, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, were frequently asked by the representatives of various Jewish organizations in the West to take steps, even to put pressure on the Romanian governments, with a view to improving the Jews' situation. Though sensitive to these requests, the British governments at that time had a cautious attitude, considering that this was, first of all, an internal problem of the Romanian state, and any foreign interference would offend and dissatisfied the authorities in Bucharest. So, the main interests of Great Britain in Romania were economic and commercial, but these were not enough to impel a greater political rapprochement between the two states.

³⁷ *British Documents on the Origins of the War. 1898-1914*, vol. IV, London, 1929, p. 618-620.

³⁸ D.B. Funderburk, *A Brief Survey of Nineteen Century Anglo-Romanian Relations*, "Revue Roumaine d'Histoire", XXI, 1982, no. 3-4, p. 433.

³⁹ A.N.I.C., Microfilms England, role 145, F.O. 104/155, f. 24.

⁴⁰ A.N.I.C., Microfilms England, role 193, F.O. 106-144, f. 211.

⁴¹ Ileana Bulz, *The Evolution of the Romanian-English relations at the beginning of the 20th century, reflected in the English diplomatic correspondence*, the "Archives Magazine" no. 1/1997, p. 114-115.

The announcement of the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale led to a certain disorientation in the Romanian political circles because a favorable reaction, publicly manifested and explained by their traditional pro-France orientation, would have contradicted the loyalty to the monarchy, and King Carol I's pro-German attitude. But the French Minister in Bucharest was optimistic, considering that the increased prestige of the French policy would have a favorable influence on Romania's future attitude. Given the above mentioned reasons, the press, especially the government, was quite reserved in commenting on the event⁴².

Despite this fact, Romania's relations with the states that formed the Entente continued to develop, with specific features, depending on the evolution of the events of international life, an important role being played by the economic one.

Shortly after the outbreak of the Russian-Japanese war, the Romanian government declared its neutrality, although Romania's geographic position did not require it, and the press published warm articles on Russia, an attitude which was understandable in those moments, under the circumstances of Berlin's reproachment to Russia. The Russian ambassador in Constantinople supported, as well as those of England and France, the Romanian efforts at the Gate concerning the rights of the Aromanians in Macedonia, attempts which were successful in 1905. That Year the Sultan's decree granted the Aromanians equality with the other nationalities in Macedonia. The Romanian government circles gave support to the Tsarist Ohrana during the uprising of the Russian sailors on the "*Potemkin*" cruised in the summer of 1905. At the Tsarist government's request, the conservative government led by Gh. Gr. Cantacuzino consented to receive in Romania the resurrected sailors as simple deserters, with the promise that the vessel with all the equipment would be returned to the Tsarist authorities. As early as 1903-1904, the Romanian government expressed several times the desire to conclude a Romanian-Russian trade convention, but, for various reasons, it was signed only in February 1906.

Paris's attitude, though far from being disinterested, helped create favorable conditions for improving the relations between the two countries. However, although the events of 1904-1907 marked an important moment in the evolution of the Romanian-French relations, under the circumstances when the French diplomacy made repeated attempts to remove Romania from the political influence of the Central Powers and to create a sound position of the French capital on the Romanian market, the results did not meet their expectations.⁴³ The French government was dissatisfied with the fact that French factories were being passed over in case of ammunition orders for the Romanian army⁴⁴, and the Romanian state could not benefit from loans on the French financial market due to its political orientation towards the Triple Alliance. As far as the Romanian-French trade relations were concerned, they were governed by the 12/28 February 1893 Convention concluded based on the Most Favored Nation Clause and on 6 March 1907 the Trade and Navigation Convention between Romania and France was signed in Paris. Undoubtedly, the convention played a

⁴² Gh. N. Căzan, Ș. Rădulescu-Zoner, *cited works*, p. 237-238.

⁴³ Mircea N. Popa, *cited works*, p. 95.

⁴⁴ A.M.A.E., vol. 73. Political Reports from Paris. Report no. 379, 21 III/3 IV 1905, f. 92-93.

positive role in the development of the Romanian-French trade relations, without changing, however, the general orientation of Romanian trade towards Germany and Austria-Hungary⁴⁵.

The Romanian-English relations will develop mainly in the economic and commercial sphere. In 1904 the new Romanian customs tariff was introduced, which brought a series of changes to the customs tariff of 1886 in order to protect the national industry. As a result, the British Government took a series of steps to protect English imports by negotiating a new trade treaty based on the Most Favored Nation Clause, the negotiations finalizing in October 1905 with the signing of the UK Trade and Shipping Treaty between Great Britain and Romania⁴⁶. In the above-mentioned period, the United Kingdom ranked first in the Romanian oil industry and secondly in cereal imports, but after 1907 there was a decrease in Romanian grain imports as a result of the cereal competition on the American market⁴⁷.

Although in the years 1904-1907 the relations were generally good with all the states that formed the Entente, they did not evolve in the sense of a political approach, Romania remaining in the Triple Alliance system.

V. Conclusions

The formation of opposing political-military alliances was an essential feature of the evolution of international relations in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. "A small state," Romania had to shape its foreign policy according to the relations between the Great Powers and the important international mutations that they triggered. Under the circumstances created after the Berlin Congress, Romania found its security guarantees through its alliance with that group of powers which were dominant in international life, joining the Central Powers as a solution imposed by the realities of that historical moment. The establishment of the Triple Entente would gradually modify the balance of power internationally. The Franco-Russian Alliance had failed to overcome the Triple Alliance hegemony. The Entente Cordiale marked a certain balance of forces and strengthened France's position on the international scene. But the defeat of Russia in the war with Japan meant, at the same time, a weakening of the Franco-Russian alliance, which kept the impression of a certain military superiority of the Central Powers. The first "Moroccan crisis", however, proved that it could only be relative, the Entente Cordiale being reinforced.

The conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agreement and the finalization of the establishment of the Triple Entente in this way, however, brought about an essential change in the balance of power at international level. Whereas the Triple Alliance was primarily a continental alliance, the Triple Entente, given the vast colonial possessions of the Member States, was a world one. Thus, the international context that imposed Romania's accession to the Triple Alliance was fundamentally altered, which made it necessary to reconsider its position externally, in accordance with the great interests of the Romanian nation, related to the achievement of the

⁴⁵ Mircea N. Popa, *cited works*, p. 95.

⁴⁶ A.N.I.C., Microfilms England, role 125, F.O. 104/170, f. 156.

⁴⁷ A.N.I.C., Microfilms England, role 252, F.O. 371/1212, f. 6.

state unity. But, at the time of its establishment, according to historian Pierre Renouvin, "The Triple Entente was a mere draft."⁴⁸ The Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian agreements, concluded under the form of dividing the spheres of influence in Africa and, respectively, in Asia, did not contain firm commitments of general policy and, besides, in addition, future disagreements in key issues were possible. The Triple Entente was not yet consolidated. Romania needed to wait and reflect in order to tune its foreign policy to the aspirations of national reunification. The interests of ensuring the state security remained a priority, a situation in which it was necessary to maintain the alliance with the Central Powers. In addition, the rule of Bessarabia by Russia made extremely difficult a possible approach of Romania to the Entente.

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IDENTIFYING ARCHETYPES IN SOCIAL DYNAMICS. CONTEXTUALIZING THE ARCHETYPAL WORLD

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Abstract: *Cultural models, the collective consciousness, the collective memory can make up a triad needed to recover the dominant values of a culture.*

The cultural models generated by the rural community viewed as a patriarchal village in the Romanian space are a topic of current debate in the context of globalization. However, the process of model destruction is older, marked by the transition from one political system to another - in the example we bring forth, from the patriarchal village to collectivization in the communist society.

We support our comparative approach with arguments from the literary universe of a Romanian writer, holder of the Herder Prize for Literature: Marin Sorescu. The comparative analysis shows that in the Romanian culture, its tradition and values have been staples for different cultural ages and social contexts, and the creators have historically and culturally defined time and space.

Not only does Marin Sorescu rebuild an archetypal world, but he also rebuilds a world of Beginnings, reconfiguring archetypes, myths and symbols. The spectacle of the archaic world is thus restored to the Romanian culture.

Keywords: *cultural models, collective consciousness, collective memory, archetypal world, the Romanian village.*

Introduction

Cultural models, the collective consciousness, the collective memory can become a triad needed to recover the dominant values of a culture. Franz Uri Boas and Edward Sapir have defined culture as characterized by its patterns, a certain style that can be exemplified at any time through exemplary narrative nuclei, even when they have been only been the co-ordinates of some models which have lasted through history.

In his volume, the *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1912), Émile Durkheim developed a theory of “collective consciousness” consisting of collective representations, the common feelings of all the members of a community. Hence the use of the phrase “collective personality” similar to “collective consciousness”.

Ralph Linton added another informational layer to the definition of culture: “a life code of a society.” Culture provides the members of a community with a guide to life events¹.

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¹ Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality*, New York, Appleton-Century-Croft, 1945.

We bring arguments for the cultural models generated by the rural community viewed as a patriarchal village in the Romanian space in a comparative excursion in the creative universe of a Romanian writer, holder of the Herder Prize for Literature: Marin Sorescu. In order to substantiate our approach, we try to answer the question of Rudolf Rezsöházy²: are our values mortal parameters that disappear during social transformations or have we come to think outside the bounds of time and to share some of them, beyond ages and cultures?³ Collective memory retained what it considered necessary in order to comply with the framework of cohabitation in the defined space of archetypes, important for defining cultural identity. But these archetypes must be preserved, recovered when ignored by generations that succeed a certain historical moment and put back into circulation through aesthetic-moralizing creations to be received as necessary references to a life of communion. And in order to be in communion, it is necessary to deconstruct the persuasive communication context.

We also discuss the relationship between the individual experience and culture which was the essence of Edward T. Hall's anthropological conception synthesized in the statement: "Culture is communication and communication is culture"⁴.

Hall's plea is all the more necessary when referring to the traditional culture, when identifying archetypes. It is known that not all cultures attach great importance to the past. In the Romanian culture, however, its tradition and values have been staples for cultural ages and social contexts, whose creations have historically and culturally defined a time and a space.

The archetypal world between tradition and current contextualization

The "archetypal world" reconstituted and re-evaluated by Marin Sorescu in the poems of the "La lilieci" (By the lilacs) series is a world "in plain sight", recognizable by its fundamental features. Moreover, E.T. Hall demonstrated (in his volume *Au delà de la culture*) that each system allows the selection, sorting, recognition and abandonment of information by the individual, an individual referring to the world. The process of contextualizing information is claimed from this process of selection and recognition. The subject of the communication, the communication situation, the status of the subject in the community, and the previous experiences are analysed in order to understand the value of the context.

The "rich context" benefits from messages rich in context ("communication in a dense context"), messages that produce the artistic form: "the qualitative expression invariably occurs in a rich context, the non-qualitative one always takes place in a poor context" [the mass of information is included in the explicit statement]⁵.

² Rudolf Rezsöházy, *Sociology Of Values*, Paris, Armand Colin, 2006.

³ apud Dumitru Otovescu (coordinator), *The Sociology Of Culture. Foreign Writers Anthology*. 2nd Edition. Prefaced and coordinated by Professor PhD. Dumitru Otovescu, Craiova, Beladi Publishing House, 2010, p. 220.

⁴ E.T. Hall, *Le langage silencieux*, Paris, Seuil Publishing House, col. „Points”, 1984, p. 219.

⁵ E.T. Hall, *Au delà de la culture*, Paris, Seuil Publishing House, col. „Points”, 1987, p. 93.

Culture is an interpretation grid (Jean Caune), and traditional culture is communication in a dense context. Contextualization is especially important from the perspective of personal experience, and in his “La lilieci” (By the lilacs) volumes, Marin Sorescu “melts” all the “happenings” of the village world filtered through the sensitivity of the child and the lucidity of maturity, in an act of restoring the ineffable and the archetypal world. This is a world of conversation, as defined by Gabriel Tarde: “By conversation, I mean any dialogue without direct and immediate utility, in which one mainly speaks just to speak, for pleasure, to play, to be polite. Conversation marks the culmination of the spontaneous attention which people pay to each other and by which they would interact infinitely more deeply than in any other social relationship. [...] It is the most powerful agent (...) of feelings, ideas, means of action.”⁶

G. Tarde named the good speaker to be a *wizard* in the magical sense of the word.

From this perspective, Marin Sorescu is a *wizard*, a presence that multiplies in so many characters who become the main characters of the “happenings” in the village world.

As a kaleidoscopic reconstruction of the village world, the “La lilieci” (By the Lilacs) is the odyssey of a rural universe structured in archaic modes of life; it is enveloped in the flavour of the Oltenian “saying” and decipherable on at least two reference levels: the diachronic progress of archaic life with its narrative offcuts about existential ceremonies, and the integration into a lyrical epic corpus, a synchronic panorama of the “first” world. Marin Sorescu defined himself and stayed true to his own definition: “I’m a lyrical writer with an outlook to prose.” The world of the village rebuilt out of narrative nuclei is seen in its existential structures, a genuine and recognizable archetypal world. Its force of attraction, the empathic springs are owed to the fluidization of time and space, to the feeling of “knowing”, and especially to the intentionally confusing use of the familial / familiar paronyms. Functional identity matrices at the micro group level that is the family are also functional and at the level of the macro-group, the village world.

It is the assumption of the world beyond the immediate world (the house); the community identifies with the exponential group: the nation. The genealogy tree becomes an axis mundi for the genuine archetypal world through acts of reconfirmation over time: traditions, customs, and magic practices. The boundary between familial and familiar is systematically crossed, ensuring a continuous affective link between the present and the collective memory, between “now” and “in illo tempore”. “The proper order” has been lost from the praxis plane but has stayed in the collective memory - the character that verbally reinstates it is not nicknamed “Late” by chance.

The world of the village - the expression of the world's folkloric vision

The world of the village rebuilt in “La lilieci” (By the Lilacs) is the expression of the world's folkloric vision, as defined by Ovidiu Papadima: “An ethical order in its depth and aesthetic in its expressions.”⁷ Marin Sorescu “rewrites” the world

⁶ Gabriel Tarde, *The Opinion and the Crowd*. Translation and preface by Nicoleta Corbu, Bucharest, Comunicare.ro Publishing House, 2007, p. 77.

⁷ Ovidiu Papadima, *A Romanian Vision Of The World*, Bucharest, 1941, p. XI.

of the village into the story frames by using the free verse technique. An essentialized “utterance” with a moralizing tinge; the well-known words of the elderly are the final formula, induced to the lecturer throughout the discovery of this reconstructed universe: “It used to be like this,” now “the world is mixed up,” “not everybody keeps the proper order”.

This perspective is one of reception and interpretation, which we will approach after glancing in the past, which recalls a moment of journalistically sparked confession. We wanted to learn about the origins of the “La lilieci” (By the Lilacs) series, what triggered the inner springs of the one who never forgot the matrix space, the primary source of his creative sensibility. We asked Marin Sorescu to do an interview on this subject. In this context, we present a significant fragment.

‘Dear Mr Marin Sorescu, the volumes “La lilieci” (By the Lilacs) have been a real delight to the elevated reader, who wishes to find Romanian spirituality in the traditional village. Please tell us about the origins of this series, to which, we confess, we would like to see no end! Each volume has given us more than one facet of this spirituality.’

‘This series has reached its Fifth Book, which was published last year, the Sixth Book⁸ has been written and I’m still thinking whether to write “the end” on the last page or to continue.⁹ I am inclined to continue an unprecedented literary enterprise, I would say. A first, in terms of Romanian poetry. To me, in any case, a reason to always be at the centre of the world, because, as it is well-known, as Blaga says, “eternity was born in the village”, and I consider the village a kind of centre of the world. Octavio Paz said that whenever a child shoots a sling, the stone always falls into the centre of the world. The centre of our thoughts is the village. I started writing this book, which is, after all, just one book, but only larger, in New York, very far from the centre of the world, but in a way another centre of the world, and I would say that this very discrepancy between the old and the new...

‘Has enhanced this state ...’

‘Yes, it has enhanced the state of naivety and nostalgia for the world which I believed to be in twilight; because of civilization and the progress that is performed in all directions, it is a threatened world. Not now, or in 10 years, or in 50, but there is this European levelling, which has taken place in all the industrialized countries and we will have a rich but artificial folklore.

‘And differentiated at some point ...’

‘Yes!’

‘... keeping only the archetypes.’

‘Yes, because the real creators will be hiding in towns. The victim will be hiding in the executioner or the executioner in the victim. This migration from the village to the city, which has occurred in recent years, the rather poor situation of the peasants after the war, etc. in addition to this steamroller of modernism destroys the ancient fortress of the Romanian village.

⁸ Published posthumously, 1998 *n.n.*

⁹ Professor PhD. George Sorescu, the writer’s brother, is trying to bring together the last manuscripts for the “Book Seven” *n.n.*

‘Have all these thoughts made you write La lilies?’

‘Yes, all these thoughts, enhanced within the resonance box of the concrete and stone skyscrapers. I went back to my origins, to Bulzești, and I said to myself, “What if I wrote my autobiography within hundreds of other autobiographies? That is, the biographies of my parents, grandparents, neighbours, villagers, of all those who in one way or another touched my childhood or the lives of my parents or relatives, and so on.” In the beginning, though not so clearly, rather instinctively, the first book was born, I evoked my childhood years and things developed along the way.

After a year or two of confusion for the critics, when no one knew where to place such writing, if it was poetry, if it was parody, prose, or a kind of modern replica to Sămănătorism, after a while, many stood up for this kind of lyrical construction; of course, I would have continued my thoughts regardless. If I am to blame for anything in writing this book, it's that this book is hard to translate. It is such a genuine Romanian phrasing, so unusual, that it is hard to find its equivalent in other languages. However, the book has been successfully translated into German, French, and recently, into Swedish. The echoes are also very good worldwide. Still, I think the phrasing is the good thing, because, as I once said, I wrote the book for the sake of the Romanian language, for the sake of the words that die, for the sake of the words that named some crafts that are about to be extinct, that would evoke the loved ones, everything that for me meant living and a direct participation in the existence of a community in Oltenia.¹⁰

On the Identity of a Symbolic World

A comparison between the poems in Book I of “La Lilies” and those in the posthumous volume, Book VI, made us define the world rebuilt by Marin Sorescu as an “upside down” universe, a reflection in mirrors that deforms the prime reality, in the sense of the primordial; it is a metamorphosis of the rural universe struggling to save the first world, but unable to do it due to the interference of the city and especially of the socio-politics, the collectivization. This is a difference we can define through the traditional “night and day” phrase, in its primordial sense from the sacred to the profane, from accuracy to alterity.

It refers to the descending path from the identity of a symbolic world encompassing the known and respected “proper order” to the devolution of a world that has lost its self-identity. Our conclusion is supported by the lyrical confession of poet Marin Sorescu in “An Ugly Man” (Book VI).

“I’m writing all this now, in July 1995, in the new house at Bulzești. I’m trying to collect all the characters of the lilacs. To see who has done what, *what happened to them* (s.n.)”.

An applied comparison will help to support our assertion: Marin Sorescu would rebuild an archetypal world as frame stories; his lyrical prose approach configures the mangling of the first world, the “proper order” due to the process

¹⁰ Interview taken on 15 January 1996, published in Gabriela Rusu-Păsărin, *Marin Sorescu. Images. Ethos. Evocations*, Introduction by George Sorescu. Translation into English: Andreea Bratu. Translation into French: Dana Dincă, Bucharest, Academy Publishing House, 2007, pp. 43-44.

of collectivization. The verticality in the beginning with its feeling of belonging to an identity matrix corresponds to the “overturned” image of the tree with its roots in the sky in Book VI; only faith and beliefs save what was once rooted from oblivion.

As we have stated our intention to compare the First and the Last Book of “La lilieci”, we have considered the change of perspective, some images’ change of meaning, it being in fact the same universe in different historical stages.

„The Hanged Man” in the First Volume has as a family life narrative core:

(Mitrele, every time he argued with his wife/ Took his cord down to the willows, to hang himself / She’ll see, evil take her, / What he meant to this house, there!)

The ending bears the print of peasant humour, a funny view of life seen from the “noose”. The reaction of the community was circumscribed to the area of compassion, whereas the children accepted it as a play: “We would have liked to see a man hanging so he would frighten us.”

On the other hand, the poem “The Unused Whip” strikes the tragedy register, in a radical change of perspective. The gesture of the hanged man is not just an intention, to scare the woman, it has a social reason - the collectivization:

„Gosu lu’ Mitru Măriei lu’ Niță”. „S-a spânzurat. I-auzi că se spânzură!”. „I-au luat grădina”. „Acum nu mai avea nici boi, Ce să mai mîne cu biciuşca?” / Și-a pus-o la gât”.

(“Gosu of Mitru of Mara of Niță”. “He hung himself. Hear him hanging himself!” “They took his garden.” “He had no more oxen now, What would he urge with the whip?” / “He put it round his throat.”)

The ending of the poem reminds that the trauma is only a pretext for the poet Marin Sorescu, whereas the last sequence outlines the writing in the nimbus of the reverberating poetic image: “He left so angrily to the other world, / With his long neck, to stretch it. To look over the fence, onto the gardens of God.” These are two aspects of the same gesture, in different temporal frames - a complex journey from anecdotal to tragic.

The patriarchal village is received both as a whole and as its defining material components. For the peasant, the animals “in the backyard” represent part of his existence. Traditional mentality interpreted an “empty yard” or a “barren animal” as symbols of material precariousness.

Two “mirroring” poems support our assertion, the change of perspective on existence, in an explicit trajectory from the strange to the tragic.

The initial dialogue has an affective connotation, with a whim of involuntary humor:

“Woman, we had sheep enough... / ‘What are you talking about?’ / ‘They’re so happy, they’re not even howling ... / ‘Who?’ / ‘The wolves ... I brought them one, that gentle one, I left it by the pond, bound / ‘By a willow.’ [...] / The old Mother crossed herself [...] / ‘Why couldn’t you at least have left that one, the barren one ... / Old Mother said, two hours later, unable to sleep.” (“Hau-hau!”, Book I)

From the humorous the poems will evolve to the tragic, the essential cause being the collectivization and its implications in the change of existential rites, an existence under the sign of loss, of dispossession.

The “Sun Eclipse” projects the same image of giving the animal away, this time under the social imperative: the peasant takes the sheep “to share it”.

The village after collectivization is associated with the sun eclipse. The night and the sun eclipse are times of evil, implicitly, of sacrifice.

The feeling of loss is experienced in a crescendo which pursues a devolving world that loses its original unit.

The “mirroring” of poems „By the Lilacs” (Book I) and “The Man” (Book VI) is equally significant. From the image of the whole village gathered in the graveyard to the commemorate the dead to the woman’s desperate search throughout the cement-covered cemetery by the order of the new society, the drama is assumed serenely (according to the traditional mentality) or desperately (in a society malformed by the intrusions of the new order). From “the proper order” to the “new order” - this is the diachronic journey of a desecrated time and a space that loses its identity matrix.

Conclusions

Not only does Marin Sorescu rebuild an archetypal world, but he also rebuilds a world of Beginnings, reconfiguring archetypes, myths and symbols.

Therefore, the spectacle of the archaic world is restored to the Romanian culture, with its unique cyclic rituals, the insidious presence in the claim of the recomposing some archetypal and mythical models.

It is a unique work of restoring myths, an impressive universe based on the technique of fascination while gradually experiencing of an age that loses its sacred nature, but which is designed in the universality of the creative act.

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A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF LOCKE AND BERKELEY ON THE PROBLEM OF PERCEPTION

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Abstract: *This paper engages in a critical comparative analysis of John Locke and George Berkeley on the problem of perception. The problem of perception centers on the question of whether our sensory or perceptual experiences can serve as a basis of justification for our knowledge of physical entities in the external world. The philosophical stances of Locke and Berkeley present foundational background to the empiricist claim that the senses are a reliable source of knowledge. However, given the question that the problem of knowledge claim based on perceptual experiences have been plagued with, this paper attempts to address the problem of perception based on a critique of Locke's and Berkeley's empiricist claims. This involves a critique of the empiricist's claim on the reliability of perceptual experience in the justification of our knowledge claim. This paper submits that the position of empiricism, if properly delineated, can solve the problem of perception.*

Keywords: *Empiricism, Justification, Knowledge, Perception, Perceptual Experience.*

Introduction

One of the central problems in the discourse of epistemology is that of perception. The problem of perception is the challenge posed to the claim that sensory experience is a source and warrant for knowledge claim. On the question of the source of knowledge claims, two major philosophical schools of thought - empiricism and rationalism - have engaged in a debate on the reliable source of knowledge. For empiricism, the senses or sensory perceptual experiences serve as a reliable source of knowledge, while rationalism holds that knowledge can be gained independently of the senses. The focus in this paper shall be on the empiricist claim that sensory perceptual experiences are a source of knowledge as well as justificatory basis of knowledge. The empiricist claim shall be engaged and critiqued from the philosophical stances of two foremost British empiricists, John Locke and George Berkeley.

The views of Locke and Berkeley, though differing in some points, serve as a foundational background upon which the empiricist claim that knowledge comes from the senses will be examined. The challenge that the empiricist claim is faced with stems from some of the errors encountered in knowledge claims based on sensory experience as well as the relativism that is involved in our various

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perceptual experiences. For instance, perceptual hallucination, illusion and sometimes health, sociological or biological conditions of an epistemic agent may hinder the reliability of the judgement of knowledge claim based on the perceptual experience.

Given this, I shall engage and try to address the problem of perception from the background of the empiricist claims of Locke and Berkeley.

Source of Knowledge: An Empiricist Claim

According to Bruce Hunter, empiricism holds two major theses which include that:

(1) nothing around us can be known to be real unless its existence is revealed in or inferable from information we gain directly in sense experience, or in introspection, or later recall; and (2) genuine, intelligible differences in our claims about this world must express these knowable differences in experience, so that the truth of rival hypotheses (“the world rests on an elephant” vs. “it rests on a tortoise”) must make a potential difference to experience or their terms (e.g. “tortoise”, “elephant”) must be differentially definable in terms of experience.¹

From the above, it can be seen that the main concern of empiricism is sense-experience which is regarded as a source of knowledge and also as a means of justification for our knowledge claim. Empiricism rejects the claim that knowledge is gained independent of the senses. It rejects claims of innate knowledge or the idea that knowledge can be gotten through intuition or deductive/ apriori means. However, an important point need be stated here about two main versions of empiricism, namely radical and modest empiricism. Just like the two theses cited from Hunter above, radical empiricism holds that sense-experience and sense-experience alone is the source of knowledge. But for the fact that some knowledge claims seem directly not gained from sense-experience, modest empiricism, on the other hand, holds that sense-experience is a source of knowledge and a justificatory basis for knowledge claims not directly gained from the senses.

The implication of the empiricist claim is that our knowledge of the physical objects in the external world is through our perceptual experiences. British empiricism was a movement of British scholars in the 17th century which included John Locke, Bishop George Berkeley and David Hume who all championed and upheld the thesis of empiricism. Although they differ in the manner of arguments and reasons for their empiricist claim, the positions of each of these philosophers serve as fundamental background to the position of empiricism and as well the challenges that the claim of empiricism has been faced with in the problem or perception. In this work, focus shall be on Locke and Berkeley whose positions on empiricism shall be examined in the sections that follow.

¹ Hunter, B. “Empiricism” in Jonathan, D., Sosa, E. and Steup, M. (eds.) *A Companion to Epistemology*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Limited, 2010, p. 326.

John Locke's Empiricism: Sensation, Qualities, Ideas and the Problem of Substance

John Locke aims "to inquire into the original, certainty and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion and assent".² This, he argues, requires the knowledge of the extent of what the human mind is capable of understanding, what is useful to the human course of living as well as distinguishing between what forms valid knowledge as different from mere beliefs or opinion. Given this layout of Locke's inquiry, he proceeds to examine "ideas" which are considered as the raw materials upon which knowledge is constructed.

Firstly, Locke denies that ideas are innate. Innatism is the claim that some ideas are pre-natally imprinted on the human mind and it is upon these that the other ideas are formed or built. For one, Locke rejects the universality claim of Innatism on the grounds of logical contradiction and the fact that it is not true that innate ideas are universally known.³ He argues that innate ideas are not naturally and pre-natally imprinted on the human mind because children and idiots lack the apprehension of them. He thus declare the human mind to be a "tabula rasa" (a clean slate) at birth and it is through sensory-experiences that ideas re imprinted on the mind. The crux of Locke's rejection of the claim of Innatism is that Innatism does not provide "an adequate criterion for distinguishing innate proposition from other propositions that the ind may come to discover".⁴

Locke argues that ideas which are the objects of human knowledge come to the mind through experience. This is possible, according to him, through the observation or interaction of our senses with the external world and through the operation of the mind to introspect on the ideas gotten from sensory-experience the action of the mind in reflecting and arranging the mass of ideas that come in through the senses. Thus, for Locke, the two basic means of gaining knowledge are sensation and reflection.⁵ On the question of how our senses relate with objects in the external world to get ideas upon which our understanding is built, Locke argues that physical objects have both primary and secondary qualities. Qualities have the power to produce ideas in the human mind such that when one perceives an object, it immediately produces an idea upon which one's understanding of the object is formed. He, however, distinguishes between primary qualities and secondary qualities of an object. Primary qualities of objects include solidity, extension, figure and motion. These qualities are infinitely present in an object. Secondary qualities include colour, taste, smell and sound which, unlike primary qualities, are not inherent but accidental properties of an object. Locke sees secondary qualities as having the power to produce various sensations in us.

Qualities of physical objects, both primary and secondary, are perceived unarranged, disjointed and unblended but the operation of the mind helps separates and rearrange the to form a uniform concept in the mind. The mind

² Locke, J., *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. London: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1952, p. 93.

³ Locke, J., *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. pp. 95-96.

⁴ Uzgalis, W., "John Locke" in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved February 01, 2017 from http://plato.stanford.edu/john_locke.html

⁵ Locke, J., *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. p. 121.

does not have the power to create qualities. These qualities create simple ideas in human mind and with the operation of the mind, complex ideas can be formed. In this regard, the human mind, according to Locke, can engage in three different activities. The first is to combine simple ideas into forming complex ideas. The second is bringing two ideas (whether simple or complex) together for the purpose of relation and the third is the abstraction of ideas from other ideas accompanying them, that is, separating particular ideas from general ideas to get a clearer picture of an idea. With the centrality of qualities in Locke's inquiry and empiricist position, he bases the foundation of secondary qualities on primary qualities and in turn bases that of primary qualities on substance which he claims is that which he knows not what.

The inquiry of Locke and his arguments for this empiricist position have various implications both in epistemology and metaphysics. The concept of qualities holds a conceptual explanation for the nature of reality and our knowledge of it. Also, it is helpful for the inquiry of what the constituent of the universe is and how we can understand them. This key point in Locke's inquiry has, however, attracted a lot of criticism. For instance, Michael Jacovides argues against Locke's definition and differentiation of primary and secondary qualities. Jacovides states that Locke's definition of secondary qualities seems indistinguishable from what seems to be his official definition of quality...one might doubt that there is any principled difference to be drawn between the power to produce the idea of red and the power to produce the idea of oblong. Why should our ideas of color pick out mere power to produce ideas in us, while our ideas of shape pick out intrinsic, mind-independent qualities?⁶

The point in Jacovides' argument is the critique of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. George Berkeley also holds a similar position which shall be discussed in the section that follows. The puzzle about what supports primary qualities, which Locke gives as substance, has been criticised as incoherent since Locke has no concrete explanation for the nature of substance.

Berkeley's Empiricism: Mind, Ideas and Immaterialism

Bishop George Berkeley is another British Empiricist who, like Locke, lays premium on sense experience as the source of knowledge but disagree with Locke on some of the premises for this claim. George Dickers summarises Berkeley's claim thus:

Berkeley's main claim to fame is his immaterialism. This is the view that only minds and ideas exist, there is no such thing as matter. By holding this view, Berkeley does not mean that rocks, trees, tables and chairs and so on do not exist. Rather he means that they are only collections of ideas or of what he also calls sensation, which have no existence apart from being perceived by the mind.⁷

⁶ Jacovides, M., "Locke's Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities" in Newman, L. (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding"*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 102-103.

⁷ Dickers, G., *Berkeley's Idealism: A Critical Examination*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 3.

Hence, for Berkeley, reality is to be understood from the standpoint of minds and ideas. Berkeley's position on immaterialism is premised on his rejection of materialism on two grounds. One, he states, is that materialism promotes scepticism as it may mislead us concerning the natures of material things. Secondly, he argues that materialism promotes atheism as it can explain the affairs of the universe without God.⁸ This second reason is traceable to the fact that Berkeley was a Bishop who has to uphold the existence of God.

For Berkeley, knowledge is derived from experience and the only two existents in the world are the mind and ideas. The mind, whether finite or infinite is an active causal agent in which ideas exist. Ideas cannot exist without the mind in which they inhere. Berkeley states of objects in the external world that "*their esse is percipi*, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them."⁹ Thus, to be is to be perceived or be the perceiver. On the question of how knowledge is gained through the senses, Berkeley holds that all our ideas or sensations are inactive and have no power to cause anything in us. This is unlike Locke's view that qualities of physical objects have the power to cause sensations in us. For Berkeley, it is the mind, an active-causal agent that interpretes ideas in us.

This view of the inactiveness of ideas in Berkeley's empiricism supports his rejection of the Lockean distinction between primary and secondary qualities. For Berkeley, there is no such thing as inert, senseless, material substance. Everything is in form of ideas in our minds. Thus, the supposed qualities of motion, extension, figure, taste, colour and so on are mere ideas that exist in the mind. There is no concrete difference between primary qualities and secondary qualities as there is no material substance that tangibly and independently exists. To conceive of the existence of a material substance independent of the mind is to entangle one's self in a contradiction.

Sensory-perception is the ultimate medium of existence. For a thing to be, it has to be perceived or be the perceiver. However, given the limitation of the finite mind and the problem that may arise from accounting for the existence of entities that are not, at a particular time, being perceived by the finite mind, Berkeley posits that there is an infinite mind which always perceives. It can, therefore, be seen that though Berkeley and Locke hold an empiricist position that the senses are our source of knowledge, they differ on how this is so.

The Problem of Perception

Perception is simply the awareness that the senses take of the external world and objects in it. It is conceived to be the means through which information about the external is passed to the senses. According to Robert Audi, there are four elements involved in the process of perception. These elements include: (i) the perceiver (ii) the object of perception (iii) the sensory experience involved in the process of perception (this may be visual, tactile, audio and so on) and lastly (iv)

⁸ Downing, L., "George Berkeley" in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved February 01, 2017 from <http://plato.stanford.edu/georgeberkeley.html>

⁹ Berkeley, G., "Treatise Concerning Principles of Human Knowledge", p. 64.

the relation between the perceiver and the perceived.¹⁰ These four elements are essential in the perceptual process of knowledge claim and justification. However, instances of perceptual errors such as mirage, hallucination and illusion have called to question the reliability of perceptual-experience. The epistemological problem of perception also raises a metaphysical concern on the nature of reality. For it is intelligible to question the claim that it is indeed the way entities are in the external world that we perceive them. This raises the question of appearance versus reality, in which case, there is the question of whether our perception relays the real nature of things to our mind or it only relays things as they appear to it.

One particular implication of the four elements of perception is the idea that there is a causal relation between the object of perception and the perceiver. This is so given the fact that physical objects cause a perceiver to notice them through any of the appropriate sense organs. A further implication of this is the view that the existence of physical objects is independent of our minds and thus come to the notice of our minds via the notice that the senses take of them. A theory of perception that holds this line of reasoning is naïve realism.

Naïve realism holds that the senses perceive physical objects the way they are. Some fundamental assumptions of naïve realism include the fact that the external world exists as well as entities in it; existence of the world and entities in it are independent of the human mind; the world and entities in it are knowable through sense-perception and that the senses perceive them directly the way they are. Naïve Realism is faced with the challenges of hallucination and illusion. For instance, if one perceives a straight pencil as bent when placed in a glass of water or one perceives a glass of cold water to be warm because of the condition of one's temperature at the time. All of these are perceptual illusions that indicate a perceptual misrepresentation of the object of perception.¹¹

Given these problems against naïve realism (and any other form of direct realism), some advocates of the theory of perception argue for a sense-datum theory as a form of indirect/representative realism. This, Audi, defines as a theory that "conceives perception as a relation in which sense-data represent perceived external (hence real) objects to us."¹² This is a departure from direct realism. It holds that we do not perceive objects directly but through sense-data which serve as copies of the objects we perceive. Just like in Locke, where qualities are what we perceive from objects, the idea of a sense-datum theory is that objects are not directly perceived but through some data that the senses can relate with in the perception of the objects. This theory is also not without challenges. It is argued whether what we actually perceive represent the real nature of the objects of perception. For it is possible that the data that serve as the intermediaries between a perceiver and an object of perception may serve as a misrepresentation of the real nature of the object of perception.

Advocates of the theory of perception develop theories to address challenges raised against existing theories of perception. A detailed discussion of these

¹⁰ Audi, R., *Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*. New York: Routledge. 3rd Edition, 2011, p. 17.

¹¹ Audi, R., *Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*. p. 40.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 43.

theories is not the focus of this paper. However, for the fact that the idea of perception stem from the position of empiricism, I shall, in the section that follows, engage in an appraisal of Locke's and Berkeley's empiricism in view of the problem of perception.

An Appraisal of Locke's and Berkeley's Empiricism in Addressing the Problem of Perception

One major point of difference between Locke and Berkeley is their accounts of the nature of entities in the external world. Berkeley rejects the idea that there are material or corporeal substances, but conceives entities in the external world to be ideas which exist in minds. For Locke, there are material substances which have qualities that the senses perceive to form understanding. These qualities, as said earlier, are either primary or secondary depending on their nature and they help to develop ideas in the mind of a perceiver. Berkeley also rejects this distinction between primary and secondary qualities, arguing that there is no such difference since all qualities exist as ideas in the mind. Locke's empiricist account holds that there are material entities which exist independent of the mind, the qualities of these material entities cause a perceiver to notice them through sensory-perception. The implication of Locke's claim here is that there is a causal relation between a material object and a perceiver. A further implication is in the claim that what is perceived from material objects are ideas which signify an indirect form of perception, hence, the claim that Locke's empiricism is a representational theory of perception. The senses, according to Locke, do not perceive material objects directly but perceive the ideas in these objects.

On his own part, Berkeley argues that the mind is an active agent in which all ideas exist and we get these ideas through perception, for there is no idea which is unperceived. However, this does not imply that the external world or real objects in it does not exist, for Berkeley establishes this claim thus:

The ideas imprinted on the senses by the author of nature are called *real things*: and those excited in the imagination, being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed *ideas*, or *images of things*, which they copy and represent.¹³

Thus, Berkeley's immaterialism and his notion that only mind and ideas exist do not imply a denial of the existence of real things. What he does insist is that they are only ideas perceived in the mind. He argues that it is self-contradictory to assume the existence of an entity which is neither perceived by the finite or infinite mind. Berkeley rejects the idea of a substance in Locke's empiricism as this would imply the existence of something other than the mind and ideas.

The problem of perception which stem from errors that arise from the misrepresentation of the judgement of our sensory-experience constitute a serious challenge to the claim of empiricism that knowledge comes from and can be justified by our senses. Various attempts have been made to address the problem of perception, however, it is important to address the problem from the

¹³ Berkeley, G., "Treatise Concerning Principles of Human Knowledge", p. 74.

standpoint of a proper understanding of some foundational empiricist claim such as that of Locke and Berkeley.

To start with, Locke's empiricism is realist in nature in which case he asserts that the external world and entities in it exist independent of our minds unlike Berkeley's subjective idealist position. The primary qualities which he argues are inherent in objects cause the object to be noticed by a perceiver. Thus, it is to be seen in Locke's account that a causal relation exist between an object and a perceiver. He claims that ideas come into the mind through the senses unarranged, unblended and in scattered mass but the operation of the mind, that is, reflection, helps rearrange them to form an understanding of the object. Locke, thus, is not a radical empiricist because he allows for the operation of the mind. He significantly holds that knowledge is gotten through sensation and reflection but primacy resides in sensation which is the window of a knower to the external world. In instances of illusion or hallucination, given Locke's empiricist account, it can be said that the senses get ideas from the objects of illusion but the operation of the mind arranges them in such a way as to allow for such. Does this in any way solve the problem of perception? The claim here is not that there are no instances of illusion or hallucination involved in the judgement of perceptual contents but this also does not imply that the senses do not perceive that upon which judgement is passed. For example, if a perceiver sees a pencil in a glass of water and says the pencil is bent, it would not be the case that the perceiver did not see/perceive any idea from the pencil, but that the secondary qualities (which are qualities that produce ideas in a perceiver) are responsible for the ideas that cause the judgement that the pencil is bent at the time. As seen in Locke's characterization of primary and secondary qualities, one can argue that what is termed perceptual errors may be understood as then ideas that a perceiver gets from the secondary qualities of an object.

Conclusion

Thus far, I have tried to examine the empiricist claims of John Locke and George Berkeley. From the arguments, I have shown that the problem of perception poses a challenge to the thesis of empiricism. However, the problem was addressed from the standpoint of Lockean empiricism which distinguishes between primary and secondary qualities. This paper submits that the Lockean distinction of primary and secondary qualities can account for some of the misrepresentation of our perceptual content in a way that the claim that perceptual errors do occur in our perception of external objects would not diminish the plausibility of the empiricist claim that knowledge comes from the senses.

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THE REVERSAL OF THE THEORY – IDEOLOGY RELATION IN *POST-TRUTH* ERAS

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Abstract: *The logical analysis of the expression **post-truth**, as used by its advocates, reveals that it signifies a complex of four elements: the term itself, the appeal to a prestigious tradition of thinking, a cognitive dissonance and the simulation of the justification game. The fundamental element for its success with the public is the last one which clearly relegates this ideology into the class of intentional (auto) manipulative discourses. As a strategy for counteracting the post-truth ideology, it is suggested to reconsider Immanuel Kant's critique of such sophistical strategies which the author of **Metaphysics of Morals** had to overcome in his own time.*

Keywords: *Post-truth, ideology, cognitive dissonance, justification game, Kantian ethics.*

I

"Innocence is a wonderful thing, yet it is really regrettable that it knows so little about protecting itself and it can be easily seduced. Thus, even wisdom – which otherwise consists more in conduct than in knowledge – needs science, not so much to learn something from it, but rather to endow its own percept with accessibility and durability."

(IMMANUEL KANT

Groundwork for Metaphysics of Morals)

Choosing the phrase post-truth as the Word of the Year 2016 was surprising not so much for the wide public's disposition to accept the use of a term which is specific to philosophy in day-to-day communication, but rather mainly for the molding force that the discourse centered on this phrase had in regard to orienting the behavior of enormous masses of people towards achieving extremely pragmatical goals (of electoral nature). A linguistic construct, which was usually not able to influence the conduct of more than just a few students from a philosophy college amphitheater towards achieving predictable goals suddenly escaped this confined laboratory and became overnight *a must-have* of any supposed reasoning in the political debates taking place in two of the most important Occidental democratic societies. Almost a year after this unanticipated success with the public, the community of researchers in the field of philosophy still struggles to make this paradox intelligible: the usual aversion towards the philosophical terminology, which the general public holds as a professed defining trait, transforms itself into an exceptional interest or even adulation for two or

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three little words that seem to pardon everything: post-truth age. For, indeed, some philosophical terms cannot be absent from any message which aims at guiding the actions of rational beings and, if they are properly understood, properly used and also in good faith, this kind of molding can produce the good itself.

When analyzed, the phrase *post-truth* seems to indicate a complex made up of four elements:

1. *The linguistic expression itself*, but exactly in the manner it is used nowadays in non-academic circles, i.e. as used in the public space in a large sense – since this phrase is frequently used by a very large number of people who are seemingly fascinated by it, we must assume that it has a specific meaning (even though one which is arbitrarily established) and it also has a peculiar capacity to mobilize and gather individuals into groups whose actions converge towards the same goals and the reality of these actions is objective (see the counterintuitive result of the Brexit referendum as well as the result of the most recent USA presidential elections).

2. A possible appeal to the authority of an acknowledged line of thought which benefits from an undisputed prestige and which is also relevant to the persuasive force of this phrase when used in a dispute of ideas or principles against adversaries who invoke arguments based on the authority of another acknowledged line of thought (one may only assume that the appeal to the authority given by tradition is preferable in comparison to using a formal logical analysis of arguments in order to decide their validity, especially in a mass-media dispute or in an online dispute where there are certain limits regarding the time and the ability to verify immediately the sources of information).

3. A *psychological component*, sometimes of an unconscious or subconscious nature, which is mostly rational or affective (e.g. resentment), and which constitutes the mechanism that triggers, steers and maintains actions when the *post-truth* phrase is invoked. This motivational component could be in agreement or at odds with what the *post-truth* might objectively designate.

4. A component of cognitive nature - one could call it theoretical - which in the theory of knowledge is called the justification game, by which it is attempted to objectively justify the legitimate character of using a term or a phrase relative to a given context – in our case there should exist the possibility to demonstrate in an objective manner the coherent character of using the phrase *post-truth* in a single system of utterances-behaviors-beliefs so that this phrase will not contradict other fundamental utterances-behaviors-beliefs which are already accepted and at the same time this phrase (post-truth) can refer to objective situations.

The first two components have already been analyzed by Prof. James Derian in the article “Why Trump demands a post-post-truth response” which was published on the University of Sydney’s website¹. First of all, he observes that, although declared word of the year 2016, the post-truth phrase does not have a definition, instead it indicates a state which is marked by the declared

¹ <http://sydney.edu.au/news-opinion/news/2017/05/31/why-trump-demands-a-post-post-truth-response.html>; (most recently accessed at September 03 2018).

preeminence of a tendency in selecting the criteria on which we do or do not accept specific sets of grounds:

“How did we get here? The question of truth first became weaponized in the culture wars of the 2016 US presidential campaign. The Oxford Dictionaries fired the shot heard around the infosphere when it announced its Word of the Year was “post-truth”: ...relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion that appeals to emotion and personal belief.”²

The cited author underlines that, although in a legitimate way the phrase post-truth (which is the core of the constellation *post-truth* – *post-facts* – *alternative-facts* – *fake-news*) may lead our thought to what we call perspectivism apud Nietzsche, although it is not legitimate to reduce a fundamental philosophical position in the history of western thought to a simplistic form of relativism:

“Relativism, Nietzsche’s ‘breath of empty space’, is not some malignant creation of post-truth philosophers or politicians; it presents as a historical condition of diverse origins, beginning with the death of God and other adjudicators and executors of a universal or transcendental truth. This might constitute a repudiation of philosophical realism (based on a correspondence theory of the truth), but Nietzsche did not reject physical realism (based on empirical facts) or political realism (based on contestable judgments).”³

Another significant observation of James Derian is that there is an ethical dimension connected to the success of the arguments in which the expression post-truth (and its correlatives) is used in the public space:

“What is notably missing from [this kind of] narcissism [...] and solipsism is any sense of ethical responsibility towards ways of seeing or being in the world that differ from their own. An ethics that begins in response to relativism necessarily entails a mutual recognition – rather than the eradication or assimilation – of difference and otherness.”⁴

James Derian’s article is a remarkable tool which substantially reduces the time needed to uncover the true issue at hand, since, as the terminological and especially the logical analysis seems to reveal, the expression post-truth simply has no meaning; it relies on the ad-hoc meaning of the other associated phrases (alternative facts, post facts, fake news, etc.) and their argumentative force depends exclusively on repetition (the sophistic argument of circularity) and also on the dominant position in the mass-media context which is occupied by the one who uses at a given moment in an empirical context this sort of pseudo argumentation (which means that the force of such an argument is exclusively an empirical and dogmatic one). In spite of this, we still cannot entirely explain the power of this phrase to efficiently mold towards achieving predictable goals the

² <http://sydney.edu.au/news-opinion/news/2017/05/31/why-trump-demands-a-post-post-truth-response.html>; (most recently accessed at September 03 2018).

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

behavior of an extremely large number of persons who most certainly are literate⁵ and supposedly rational human beings.

II

What follows now, in regard to the phrase post-truth, is the attempt to move from the analysis of its purely linguistic aspect to that of its profound theoretical aspect: how does one explain the success of a discourse which is grounded on a meaningless term, discourse which is addressed to educated people and who are also, at least in principle, rational beings?

On the one hand, it can be observed that the expression post-truth has all the marks of a cognitive dissonance. Then, as usual with every cognitive dissonance, there arises the problem of reestablishing the equilibrium between what is said, what can be subjectively accepted and what can be said on (purely) objective grounds. Thus, we reach the main problem - determining the relation between theory and ideology and also (dealing with the aspect of) identifying the criteria which determines whether a body of enunciations, apparently objective, belongs either to the realm of theories or to the realm of ideologies.

Cognitive dissonance is a latent conflict which exists between a person's profound beliefs and other ideas, opinions, values according to which that person must act at a given moment, although between the two bodies of ideas or values there is an irreducible logical contradiction. At a psychological level, this internal conflict can manifest itself as a profound state of discomfort which must be overcome. Also, the cognitive dissonance has two fundamental components: a magnitude⁶ (this results from the importance which a conviction is granted in a person's internal system of values), respectively a strategy⁷ to reduce the psychological tension (a. either a change in behaviour or opinion; b. or a justification of a person's behaviour by modifying their opinion; c. or the justification of a person's behaviour by adding a new opinion; d. either ignoring or denying the information that contradicts fundamental convictions).

Cognitive dissonance is marked and caused by simultaneously supporting two sets of convictions which are contradictory and which require, on a medium or long term, quitting the set of beliefs that do not correspond to the objective situation. Hence, there are three dimensions: one on the surface, superfluous, the temporary "justification" of a behavior through opinions that cannot objectively justify that behaviour (a well-intended lie, a white lie) – a delay in establishing an objective relation with reality; then, at a deeper psychological level, there is the solving of the conflict which was initially generated – here the moral dimension may intervene, the practical necessity, although, more often than not, it is marked

⁵ Or educated, in a broader sense. I consider that it is necessary to maintain the logical discrimination between these two terms – in contrast to education, the simple fact of being literate does not also imply assuming the axiological dimension of knowledge which serves to efficiently achieve the goals (education equates to obtaining autonomy in choosing the goals – these are always selected and evaluated also by taking into account objective values such as human dignity).

⁶ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_dissonance#cite_note-Festinger.2C_L._1957-1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_dissonance#cite_note-Festinger.2C_L._1957-1;); (most recently accessed at September 03 2018).

⁷ *Ibidem*.

by psychological inclinations; the two aforementioned levels necessarily presuppose the fundamental level of objectivity – how things are as a matter of fact beyond any psychological need – this is the realm of theory, the relation between our system of beliefs and what is “real” or objective.

If we apply this test to phrases that pretend to be grounded on the supposed existence of a “post-truth” era, we will find all the signs of this cognitive dissonance: 1. the expression itself is a contradiction in terms – *truth* is a term which implies objectivity, or related to objectivity, so, in the realm of thought, it cannot be substituted with any other term – we cannot substitute a term which has categorial function with one which does not have this kind of function⁸; 2. The contradiction is simply ignored in order to avoid justifying it – in the alleged “post-truth” era one can “justify” any personal belief through the arbitrary reconstruction of the foundation of proof, according to one’s psychological needs and by using one’s own means irrespective of one’s level of intellectual education or ability to apply oneself to theoretical rigor - in fact, the essential element of the grounding process is eluded by simulating the justification game⁹. 3. The goal is not to solve the cognitive conflict and to diminish or cancel the psychological tension but exactly to exacerbate it so that it could be used to achieve pragmatic political goals¹⁰.

In order to obtain a theoretical description which is functional at an empirical level there must be three actors: one who utilizes the applications of theory (in our case, the citizen), another one who translates the language of

⁸ By categorial function I refer to the capacity of a linguistical or symbolical expression to objectively indicate a structure which can be without contradiction integrated into systems of cognitions that constitute relevant theoretical representations of reality and that also can be in principle evaluated objectively in regard to their “truth” (the addition of theoretical intelligibility) or their “falseness” (the reduction or absence of the addition of theoretical intelligibility when compared with competing descriptions of the same realm of reality) – the theoretical descriptions of reality differ from any other type of cultural description of reality exactly by this aspect that after all the latter tacitly presuppose the possibility of relating to objective states of fact as their ground but do not pretend to demand/impose the effort of objectively identifying (by a logical demonstration or a pure rational demonstration) the correlation between this representation and its ontological, epistemic or axiological ground.

⁹ It is true that during the justification game, by which we award the status of “theory” to a body of statements, we, methodologically and temporarily, suspend the profound attachment to our own body of fundamental beliefs but we do this only inasmuch as we aim at revealing what is objective or gaining more intelligibility and we especially do *well intended* (see the term/concept *Gesinnung* by Kant).

¹⁰ The stimulation of not entirely rational expectations or behaviors in individuals is to be found frequently in marketing strategies and (more significant) in macro-economical strategies aiming at boosting the consumption during times of booming economical development or during periods which come after economic crises. This transfer of argumentation techniques from the field of economics to that of political marketing is not at all unproblematic - while regarding society from an economical point of view we could, in certain limits, treat this kind of statements as “ethically neutral”, the principle of political action is the dignity of the person and here to ignore the moral dimension of an individual means to invalidate your own argument– “In the Kingdom of Ends everything has a price or a dignity. A thing which has a price can be substituted with something else as its equivalent; on the other hand, some thing which is beyond any price, has no equivalent and thus has dignity.” (Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Bucharest, Humanitas, Publishing House, 2007, p.82.)

theory into a device which at the same time observes the theoretical principles but can also be efficiently used by any citizen who lacks any theoretical knowledge (in our case this is the politician) and, most important, the one who makes sure that between the objective level of reality and the level of its description in terms of common knowledge there is a tacit (not obvious, but objective) correspondence (this is the theoretician or the scientist). (See Fig. 1)

At the level of common knowledge and ordinary experience we cannot use concepts of science in an unmediated manner. Therefore, the direct terminological transfer (either improperly mediated or improperly “translated”) from the theoretical realm to the realm of common discourse is illegitimate, improper and also represents the first warning sign in regard to the invalid character of this kind of discourse. Within a theory, the body of theoretical knowledge is completed with a description, basically a rigorous translation in terms which are intelligible at the common knowledge level, and the correspondence between the two levels is maintained by employing an adequate analogy. The absence of an adequate analogy automatically leads to losing the connection to the rigorous theoretical description, in this case, the body of cognitions, only supposedly theoretical in nature, becomes a simple ideology, and, at the language level they become a simple mixture of phrases that are grammatically correct but lack any epistemic value (since the process of their theoretical justification becomes impossible as long as their principle is ignored).

The post-truth discourse seems to have the following specific characteristics:

1. The *illegitimate transfer of terminology* from distinct domains of knowledge;
2. The simulation of the process through which the statements are logically justified (*simulation of the justification game*);
3. *Losing the capacity to establish the hierarchy of facts* by taking into account objective criteria;
4. *The reversal of the theory-ideology relation*;
5. *Inciting the psychological tension* which is generated by the cognitive dissonance instead of searching for the means to diminish or dispel it – since what is intended is to fuel resentment as a psychological mechanism which prevents people from having a rational dialogue.

One could argue that the reason why it is important to search for objective statements and for integrating them into an authentic theory is constituted by the need to diminish or eliminate altogether cognitive dissonances. Instead, the objective of developing any ideology which aims at obtaining (self)manipulation (what we called a “second class ideology”) is to create and maintain cognitive dissonances in order to use all the social energy caused by this to achieve goals which were arbitrarily or on pragmatic grounds chosen. Also, although any ideology claims to be based on a theory, not all ideologies have or are genuinely interested in discovering their relation with the theory on which they claim to be grounded. Otherwise, their creators or advocates would be logically constrained to accept that the actions legitimated by their beliefs are in fact incompatible with the values that ground these beliefs.

III

Assuming that we indeed live under the effects of a new emerging ideology, that ad-hoc called of “post-truth”, and that this manner of referring to public discourse is undesirable and should be identified, controlled and eliminated, a new question arises: whether this social phenomenon of voluntary blinding of reason is something absolutely new or it has already occurred sometime in the history of the western society? If we accept the assumption that we live in a “post-truth” era, does this mean that earlier we lived in an era of truth? And before that was there a pre-truth era?

Although the XXth century was dominated on the political level by the conflict between the three major ideologies¹¹, it seems that the most successful one was the fourth which claimed “the end of history” and thus brought a decrease in vigilance towards the threat represented by the infiltration of dogmatism into the public discourse. It seems that “the end of history” lasted no more than a quarter of century and now we find ourselves disarmed in face of some methods of justifying and shaping behaviours that only a few years ago we would have simply considered excluded from the debates that took place in the western public space. How can we adequately react in order to re-establish the proper objective perspective? The solution, although not obvious, has always been the same when the turmoil of history calmed and once again the problem of reconstruction has arisen: one must resort to philosophy – not the one which is practiced in common conversations, but the authentic one practiced in libraries, this means practiced firstly as private reading.

If, in the interest of re-establishing the natural relation between things and in order to trigger the mechanism of a true communication, evaluation and critique regarding the issue of post-truth, we accept that it is possible that we have entered, for some time and without noticing, such an era, some questions arise immediately: how did the previous era (the one that preceded the post-truth era) instated itself and, if it collapsed indeed, is there any chance that it may revive at some point in time? Was there a real confrontation between the values of the two eras or it is only a matter of taste if we choose in a particular day to carry the paper flag of a self-contradicting relativism only to be constrained later that same evening to wear the less extravagant, but heavier coat of searching through our own rational powers for the criteria by which one distinguished good from evil, justice from injustice or even truth from un-truth?

I have already argued that the discourse which attempts so legitimate itself by appealing to a pseudo-era of “post-truth” is an incipient ideology, that it can be identified as such and efficiently averted by developing an alternative discourse based on an authentic theory. Although the specific traits of this alternative are not yet entirely outlined, the generic and exemplary form a strategy for refuting dogmatism and moral or epistemic relativism is to be found by philosophers who

¹¹ I mean by that the nazism, communism and the occidental liberalism.

founded the era which preceded the “post-truth” one, i.e. in the writings of those philosophers who founded modern age Kant, in his effort to coin a new model for justifying the moral evaluation on grounds that have a greater degree of objectivity, has, in my opinion, at least three elements which belong to the strategy of surpassing a situation where the ideology attempts to substitute theory.

First of all, both *The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and *The Metaphysics of Morals* begin with large sections in which he stresses the decisive importance of not mixing the rigorous philosophical terminology with the common language, not even with the academic language of his time and even less with the language of common experience:

“It would by itself be an object not unworthy of consideration to ask: whether pure philosophy in all its parts might not require its own specialist, and whether the learned profession as a whole might not be better off if those who, confining to the taste of their public, are in the habit of peddling the empirical mixed with the rational in all sorts of proportions unknown to themselves - who call themselves independent thinkers, but others, who prepare the merely rational part, ponderers - were warned not to pursue two occupations at once that are very dissimilar in the way they are to be carried out, for each of which a special talent is perhaps required, and which united in one person produce only bunglers. But here I just ask whether the nature of the science might not require that the empirical part always be carefully separated from the rational, and that actual (empirical) physics be prefaced by a metaphysics of nature, and practical anthropology by a metaphysics of morals, which would have to be carefully cleansed of everything empirical; so that we may know how much pure reason can accomplish in both cases, and from what sources it draws by itself this peculiar a priori instruction, whether the lower business be pursued by all teachers of morals (whose name is legion) or only by some, who feel a calling to it.”¹²

What here becomes the object of Kant’s critique is the illegitimate transfer (or even consciously abusive) of philosophical terminology into discussions and disputes that take place in public space. Surely, this temptation and practice were not specific only to the XVIIIth century but they equally belong to the XXIth century as they belonged to Socrates’ age as well. On the one hand, this transfer of philosophical terminology is abusive (illegitimate) if it is not realized by a theoretician (a philosopher who is specialized in filtering the pure part from the empirical part of the theory, some terms being able to function in both these parts but with different meanings or being absolutely unable to express something meaningful in the pure - or the impure - part, although they belong to the body of the theory as a whole, since used in this manner they would become meaningless). On the other hand, this kind of transfer is purely abusive when the philosophical terminology is absolutely severed from its foundational apparatus (by which it gets objectively grounded) by undermining the authority of theoreticians (described as “wild-goose chasers”) and through reinterpreting the terms by attributing them meanings which they could have never had in the original context. A person who proceeds in this way willingly ignoring the

¹² Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. A German-English Edition*, Cambridge University Press; Bilingual, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 5 and 7.

objective distinction between domains is “a botcher” who sells to the public, according to public’s expectations, a mixture of opinions, possibly by chance true, but which in fact no longer constitutes real knowledge.

Here we encounter the mention of the pseudo-legitimation by appealing to relativism and departing from requirements of objective knowledge which are specific to “independent thinkers” (*Selbstdenker*). In spite of the fact that Kant apparently mentions this aspect only briefly – “But although it would be not useless to ask ourselves whether pure philosophy might require a certain person to be dedicated for each of his sides...” – given the extremely limited space reserved for the *Groundwork*, the style of his writings (nothing of what is logically part of a structure is missing from a paragraph, and at the same time nothing useless is added to a paragraph) and the emphasizing in the same context (paragraph) of the fundamental distinction between the pure part (the metaphysics) and the empirical part (the anthropology) of the theory as well as the necessity for maintaining the distinction between the two from a methodological and terminological point of view, it is obvious that Kant makes sure that on the first step of using a theory is the requirement to recognize and follow the specific of its terminology. Apart from those who deliberately abuse the philosophical terminology, Kant accepts a given fact, under specific conditions, the activity of those who translate into a language that is accessible to the common public elements and advancements in the theoretical domain although, even at this point, it is preferable that this “translation” should be done by those who “have an talent for it” and not by the entire “legion of the teachers of morals”.

This deference for the specific and especially for the limits of using the philosophical terminology, implicitly the necessity that when one uses it, one should do so in the presence of a theoretician who is specialized in that field, it is also a prerequisite to avoid what we nowadays would call the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance which is fundamentally associated to our interaction with newly acquired knowledge which imposes the reevaluation or even the radical transformation of our usually profoundly rooted habits, regarding the way we judge and evaluate the world, namely they impose changing our beliefs.

Although, in the first section of *Groundwork*, Kant accepts that the common moral reason has the same principle as the pure practical reason¹³ and that many times (in contingent situations) the first one operates correctly and very efficiently in applying the supreme principle of morality (SPM) without having its representation in its entire purity, still the beginning of the first section emphasizes out of all exactly the limits of the moral behavior that is legitimated exclusively through resorting to the particular psychology of the individuals and emphasizes the necessity of moving from the common moral wisdom to the metaphysics of morals:

“The human being feels an inner powerful counterweight to all the requirements of doing one’s duty - which reason portrays to one as worthy of the highest respect – this counterweight resides in one’s needs and penchants, whose entire fulfillment he describes as being happiness. Now reason issues its

¹³ Imm. Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Bucharest, Humanitas, Publishing House, 2007, p. 42-45 (see, also, p. 27 and p. 79).

prescriptions unrelentingly, yet without promising anything to the inclinations, hence somehow humiliating and disrespecting those claims, which are so vehement and yet seemingly so reasonable (and will not be eliminated by any command). But now a *natural dialectic* arises, i.e. a propensity to rationalize against those strict laws of duty, and to cast doubt on their validity, or at least on their purity and strictness and, where possible, to make them better suited to our wishes and inclinations, i.e. to fundamentally corrupt them and deprive them of their entire dignity, something that in the end even common practical reason cannot endorse.”¹⁴

This “natural dialectic” (sophistical argumentation), as Kant calls it, is the spontaneous reflex of the psychological process by which in an irrational manner we tend to ignore objective facts in order to maintain, at least temporarily, a behavior that is convenient to us. Even more, this psychological mechanism tends to subjugate the natural functioning of reason – “(...)the frailty and impurity of a human nature (...) use reason, which should serve it as legislation, only to take care of the interest of penchants (...)”¹⁵

The third reason to reject the use of pure philosophical language at the level of public communication, beside the fact that it is highly probable that the terms will lose their meaning in the new context and the tendency of the general public towards self-manipulation – tendency that exists naturally in every one of us as empirical beings endowed with a self-preservation instinct - would be amplified, is imposed by the structure of theory itself:

“Yet, as in a metaphysics of nature there must be application principles of each principle of the highest level of generality (*allgemeinen obersten Grundsätze*) regarding a nature in itself to objects of experience, in the same way, a metaphysics of morals cannot lack such application principles and often we must accept as object the particular nature of the human being in order to identify the consequences of the universal moral principles (*allgemeinen moralischen Prinzipien*) upon it, without affecting in any way the purity of these universal moral principles, or casting doubt upon their a priori origin. This amounts to saying the same thing as: a metaphysics of morals cannot be grounded on anthropology, yet it can be applied to the it.”¹⁶

¹⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. A German-English Edition*, Cambridge University Press; Bilingual, Cambridge, 2010, p. 39.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 41.


¹⁶ “So wie es aber in einer Metaphysik der Natur auch Prinzipien der Anwendung jener allgemeinen obersten Grundsätze von einer Natur überhaupt auf Gegenstände der Erfahrung geben muß, so wird es auch eine Metaphysik der Sitten daran nicht können mangeln lassen, und wir werden oft die besondere *Natur* des Menschen, die nur durch Erfahrung erkannt wird, zum Gegenstände nehmen müssen, um an ihr die Folgerungen aus den allgemeinen moralischen Prinzipien zu *zeigen*, ohne daß jedoch dadurch der Reinigkeit der letzteren etwas benommen, noch ihr Ursprung a priori dadurch zweifelhaft gemacht wird. – Das will so viel sagen, als: eine Metaphysik der Sitten kann nicht auf Anthropologie gegründet, aber doch auf sie angewandt werden.” (Imm. Kant, *Die Metaphysik der Sitten*, Stuttgart, Reclams Universal Bibliothek Nr. 4508, 2011, p. 50). The translation of the paragraph was done by me (n.m., G.D.).

According to Kant, moral philosophy has two parts: a pure one (the metaphysics of morals) and an empirical one (the moral anthropology)¹⁷ and they are strictly methodologically separated since metaphysics provides the ground which is absolutely necessary for the validity of moral judgments regarding concrete moral acts or categories of moral acts that are influenced by contingent factors, but the proper representation of the universal and necessary moral laws that constitute the metaphysics of morals is maintained only if we follow strict procedures and we do not try to present as authentic moral laws some statements that have only a high level of generality (still, they are not truly universal) since they have been obtained by induction from experience.

What is relevant for our argument is the fact that a theory has a strict hierarchy of levels and of domains at which its terms can be validly applied and a person who is not familiarized with the rigors of scientific research cannot obey these prerequisites and from here arises the imperative that one should not pretend to be able to use in a proper manner this terminology in the space dedicated to public disputes – when one claims that actions which require the complex coordination of a very large number of people towards achieving the same pragmatic goal were realized in a “spontaneous” manner through understanding the meaning of a theoretical idea which until that moment lay hidden inside a library, it is highly probable that the motivation here belongs in fact to inclination and not to duty.

Is there (such a thing as) a post-truth era? One could say that there is if the mark of such a relativistic era is the reversal of the preeminent element in the relationship between theory and ideology when one evaluates the claim of a phrase to be true. Objectively the descriptions of reality which involve the claim of being authentic knowledge are tested by taking into account the rigors of scientific knowledge not only in regard to the stringent conditions which allow to call something as “objective” but also by taking into account ethical criteria that are specific exclusively to fundamental research. This ethical element is essential to maintain the access to objective descriptions of reality and it is the first element which is eliminated in the process of developing a new ideology.

¹⁷ For a presentation and a detailed explanation of the structure of Kant’s moral theory see Valentin Mureșan, *Categories and Formulas*, Bucharest, The University of Bucharest Publishing House, 2016, p. 144-152.



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REFRAMING GENDER IDENTITIES AND DISCOURSES IN POSTCOMMUNIST ROMANIA

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Abstract: *The fall of communism at the beginning of the '90 inaugurated an important process of renegotiation and adaptation of collective identities. The main aim of this research is to analyse the restructuration of gender identities in post-communist Romania through the filter of two interconnected phenomena: the deconstruction of communist residual clichés and the reconstruction of new gender symbolic frames. Thus, the reconstruction and deconstruction of gender identity were influenced by the intervention of two essential factors: resurrection of a traditionalist culture and survival of cryptic or hybrid fragments of totalitarian gender stereotypes. The study intends to identify the fundamental features of such process and to reveal its consequences over the general phenomenon of reshaping collective symbolism inside transitional societies.*

Keywords: *changing societies, gender identity, post-communism, social representations.*

Introduction. Women through the Lens of Cultural Transition

The systemic crisis experimented by East-European communism at the beginning of the '90 became the emerging point for a large-scale experiment in the field of social and cultural identities. The dissolution of communist archipelago had revealed an alternative Europe, dominated by multiple fragmentation lines and evolution cleavages, but still bound by a common cultural pathology. Thereby, separation from the recent past and reconstruction of social landmarks were influenced in some contradictory ways. The fall of communism left the former socialist camp a difficult legacy in the subject of collective identities. If the socialist revolution failed in reaching the idealized quest of classless society or the aim of perfect equality, communism still proved its efficiency in the sphere of social identities. The presence of a tremendous ideological pressure, exerted very often through violent tools, had as a central consequence the apparition of a set of structural societal modifications.

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Communism represented for the Eastern European space an experience with a contradictory vocation. First, it remains important to emphasize that communist regimes seized the fragile democracies raised in eastern part of Europe, exploiting an acute deficit of modernity. The apparition of a cultural gap between the urban culture and the patriarchal and agrarian universe of the village became the triggering vector for the future totalitarian slippages. The institutional scaffolding of the East European emerging democracies was underdeveloped and precarious and the insertion of communist rule did not face an organized and systematic resistance. The paradoxes of incomplete modernization were not surpassed through the fragmentary modernization promoted by communism, the transitional societies being forced to manage a complicated heritage in the field of social identities.

One of the most discussed themes regarding the communization of Eastern Europe in the context of the new political order inaugurated by the Second World War concerns the problem of pre-totalitarian political tradition. The assertion of the communist regimes patronized by Soviet Union was apparently suspending a democratic order, slowly developing into a stabile societal pattern. Therefore, the essential referential points of the post-totalitarian evolution were apparently dependent by the recovery of the “democratic tradition”. Still, this type of argument, very often used in a variety of lectures concerning post-communist evolutions, is strongly influenced by a false assumption. The pre-totalitarian political tradition was suffering from multiple malfunctions, most of them related to the sphere of collective identities.

Nonetheless, the invocation of the pre-totalitarian social and cultural standards was not a genuine recovery process. The traditionalism promoted by the transitional societies was the fruit of an invented memory¹. As it was mentioned before, one of the most successful social interventions of communist regimes was connected with the process of reconstruction of social identities². The transformation process inaugurated by the communist archipelago at the beginning of the '50 was built around one major concept – the creation of the *New Man*³. The general project of reconstruction of class identities originated in the early stages of Bolshevik experiments; in the '20, it was intuitively concentrated on the masculine archetypes. The ideological ideal of New Soviet Women was inspired by the initially masculine sketch and would conserve, in its internal structure, this initial deficit of identity⁴. In case of Romania, the alchemic project of the *New Man* was based on the presence of two main symbolic operations, the hybridization of modernity and renegotiation of gender status. Hence, those two major components would become responsible for a variety of transitional evolutions. Also, the crisis of social identities experimented by former communist states could be explained through the intervention of a dual

¹ Eds. Eric Hobsbawm, Terence Ranger, *The invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 108.

² *Idem*, p. 13.

³ Barbara Evans Clemens, *A History of Women in Russia: From Earliest Times to the Present*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012, p. 221.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 221.

phenomenon, which was reuniting simultaneously the former totalitarian tradition with new forms of traditionalism and patriarchal nationalism⁵. Gender identity represented thus one of the most difficult to reconstruct social benchmarks and an extremely tensional cultural construct.

The study aims to explore the process of renegotiations and restructuring of gender identities in the former communist space, with a focus on the Romanian transitional evolutions. This particular interest in the Romanian transitional case is motivated by the presence of a specifically violent local memory, which tends to express its influences even after the material conditions of the regime were suppressed. The study is built around one major research hypothesis. The post-communist evolutions are directly influenced by two types of phenomena: the hybridization of modernity and the persistence of some dominant patriarchal collective archetypes. By assuming a masculinized referential pattern and through the presence of an incomplete modernity regarding the gender theme, the post-communist societies were pressed to solve a set of internal dilemmas. Thereby, despite the profound transformations experienced during the transitional era, the gender subject remains one of the most controversial elements in recreating a social symbolic consensus regarding identity.

Communism and the Fragmentary Emancipation. Gender as Marginal Identity.

The transition encouraged the gendering of nations and bodies, in cultural and symbolic patterns which stimulated the degradation of women social, economic and political status⁶. Gender remained in such cases, a guiding mark strongly dependent on the dysfunctional layers of post-communist societies, trapped at the peripheries of the new emerging political order. The sources of the loss are multiple, but one of the main factors that contributed to this degradation and marginalization of women is connected with the communist legacy. After the fall of East European societies they found themselves in a systemic representational crisis. The former communist structures and practices were denounced, while the new democratic regimes were confronting with strong difficulties in creating new social landmarks. If in the field of political culture, the changes were becoming more intuitive and acceptable, the fluid space of collective identities was supporting an interesting conservation of the previous cartography. Therefore, the fall of communism did not reveal a uniform transitional landscape; the former socialist sisterhood had some interesting peculiarities and shades.

Still, the history of women under the communist regime began under the auspices of a promised emancipation and liberalization. Thus, in 1924, I.V. Stalin opened his speech dedicated to the International Women's Day with a programmatic statement "*The work of Soviet women [...] will change the history*

⁵ Katherine Verdery, *What was socialism and what comes next?*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 62.

⁶ *Idem*, p. 222.

*forever*⁷. This major announcement regarding gender ideology was the starting point for an accelerated process of reconstructing the representational and functional relations of the communist world. Nonetheless the major interest of the communist project concerning the gender theme was hiding some complex motivations. The emancipation of women was important mainly as a triggering vector for the insertion of a new type of societal paradigm. The communist regimes were imposed in a space suffering from an acute deficit of modernity, lacking institutional culture and concealing strong social cleavages. At the end of the Second World War, Eastern Europe was still an environment trapped in a patriarchal equation, marked by the presence of deep social and economic fractures and with a dysfunctional political culture. The fragmentary secularization of Eastern Europe acted also as an adjuvant element for the installation of Soviet patronized regimes. The communism exploited the local vulnerabilities of the collective representational sphere and captured the former religious archetypes and transferred them to a new form of iconography of power⁸. Through this type of hybridization, the political culture suffered a cryptic contamination with a latent form of regressive traditionalism. The late evolutions of some of the communist formulas in the aftermath of the system are to a great extent the result of resurrection of the traditionalist germs, conserved inside the official ideological frames. Obligated to deal with a historical dephased picture, communism was pressed to engage in a general reformation of its social structure. The two leading objectives of the communist ideology in its primary stages concerned the extension of the labor force reservoir and the promotion of large scale urbanization. Without those two mandatory quests, the ideology lacked the functional and justificatory support of its very existence.

The gender border represented an essential separation line inside the traditional societies from Eastern Europe, strongly affected by the Second World War. In the same time, the fragile democratic regimes experimented in the interwar period did not trigger an authentic reformation of gender status. The first wave of general reconsideration of gender identity was produced at the beginning of the '50. Motivated especially by the necessity of the growing number of labor force, the emancipation of gender had also some other subsidiary motivations: the urbanization of the patriarchal and agrarian societies could not be accomplished without destroying the foundational landmarks of the village. The deceitful liberation of women from their home dependencies and the insertion of gender inside the active work force offered communism a modality to invent its missing link: the proletarian class. As a conclusion, the gender reform operated inside the popular democracies in Eastern Europe at the beginning of communist regimes was also the result of a structural pressure. The gender was extracted from its subordinated traditionalist vocation and transformed in a marginal expression of the masculine identity. Nonetheless, communism broke the previous gender frames, but did not replace them with new functional

⁷ Jeanette E. Johnson, Jean C. Robinson, *Living Gender after Communism*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006, p. 7.

⁸ Victoria E. Bonnel, *Iconography of power*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, p. 33.

archetypes. Still, the communist ideology functioned as a melting pot, all the former identities and symbolic images being captured and replaced with new foundational narratives. Under those auspices, the general project of the *New Man* represented the fundamental source for a major identity loss.

As an intermediary conclusion, it remains important to emphasize the fact that communist emancipation of gender had to do with a fragmentary and incomplete modernization of social roles. The rising accessibility of new professions and the increase of civic rights were doubled by the assertion of new types of social, political or even economic burdens. A paradigmatic case of analysing the evolutions of gender politics remains that of Romanian communism. The extreme virulence of the gender ideology and the presence of an isolationist cultural frame turned the Romanian communist experience into a laboratory case for the decomposition of the identity pathology that engraved Eastern Europe for more than five decades. As mentioned before, the major changes operated in the field of social identities, and especially in gender equation, were produced in a strong correlation with the theme of modernity. Nevertheless, the communization of eastern societies implied the promotion of some major frames of modernity, but still conserved, very often in a hybrid manner, some of the pre-modern and traditionalist structures. In this context, the evolution of gender ideology remains a relevant aspect of this incomplete trajectory towards modernity propagated by communism, and whose effects remain persistent even in the final transitional stages.

The evolution of gender policies in communist Romania has known three major phases: a Soviet era, marked by the aim of a mechanic equality and by the dissolution of gender boundaries, between 1947 and the middle of the '50', a national era, defined by a slow relaxation of political pressure, between the middle of 5th decade and the beginning of the '60, and a regressive dictatorship, defined by extremely violent gender policies, from 1965 to the final collapse of the system, at the beginning of the '90. These three major stages mentioned before represent three main models of aggregation of gender identity. In the same time, their succession was acting as a proof of an inverted evolution of the gender theme inside the Romanian communist experience. The Soviet stage in gender ideology remains one isolated frame, which generated a perishable deconstruction of the local traditionalist culture. The productive emancipation initiated under the Soviet patronage transformed the gender identity in a de-personalized tool. The "working mothers"⁹ were now just revolutionary and productive comrades apparently separated by their domestic servitudes and transferred into the alchemic project of the *New Man*.

The dominant archetype of this era is a masculine one; the gender remains just a secondary expression of this new foundational frame. The portraits of strong, manful, de-gendered workers replaced the traditional image of domestic women. Still, the local identities did not genuinely adapt to these imported cultural products and the soviet gender ideology remains a surface operation in the field of social representations. A first argument that tends to validate this

⁹ Barbara Einhorn, *Cinderella goes to market: citizenship, gender and women's movements in East Central Europe*, London: Verso, 1993, p. 40.

diagnosis refers to the short historical existence of the Soviet gender model. At the beginning of the 50, the Muscovite troika which led Romania from 1947¹⁰ was relegated and the elimination of the supreme *Communist Woman*, Ana Pauker, inaugurated a new stage in reconstructing gender ideology.

The short experiment of de-gendered¹¹ identity had encountered a major resistance, mostly motivated by the isolated patriarchalism of pre-communist Romania. The rural civilization could not accept the abolition of the domestic vocation of women, the traditional archetypes surviving the communist offensive in the sphere of productive emancipation. Through this contradictory dynamic between modernization and pacification of the traditionalist civilization, Romanian women still gained some steps in their way to liberty. At the beginning of the '60, the national communism promoted by Gheorghiu-Dej regime created a slow relaxation of the social, political and economic pressure. The liberation of abortion at the beginning of the Soviet patronage, in the late '40, and the extension of the working force through urbanization and industrialization, projected gender identity in a new configuration.

The distancing from the rural culture also diminished the religious stereotypes and created a space for aggregation of new identitary frames. The status of Romanian women was slowly improving, but that apparent emancipation represented only an intermediary stage. The cultural politics of national communism depended on the traditional structure of pre-modern society. This structural vulnerability became very soon materialized in a violent turn operated in the field of gender ideology. The Ceaușescu era started in 1965 and would be defined by an extreme nationalism, which pervaded all social and cultural spaces, culminating with a virulent oppression of gender and any other alternative identities¹². The presence of a gendered form of terror is strongly connected with the definition of gender as marginality. The dominant model for the *New Man* will almost exclusively be a masculine one and Romanian women will pay the price for a natural deviance. A pronatalist demographic legislation reopened the tensional subject of gender emancipation. The confiscation of the body and the forced maternity are the marks of one of the most violent forms of regressive nationalism. Often called "dynastic socialism", Ceaușescu personalized communism determined a violent downfall of gender social roles. Through the 1966 State Decree¹³, the national communism began a dramatic process of gender oppression and exploitation. By a violent control over the reproductive rights, Romanian communism was committing to a parallel evolution. The abortion debate constituted an inflamed subject for the communist founding ideology¹⁴,

¹⁰ Muscovite triumvirate (A. Pauker, V. Luca, T. Georgescu) conducted Romania until 1952, when was eliminated by Gheorghiu-Dej, with Stalin's participation, George Hodos, *Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954*, London: Praeger, 1987, p. 100.

¹¹ Gail Kligmann, *The politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceaușescu's Romania*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, p. 148.

¹² Vera Tolz, Stephanie Booth, *Nation and Gender in Contemporary Europe*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, p. 182.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 2

¹⁴ Elizabeth A. Wood, *The Baba and the Comrade: Gender and Politics in Revolutionary Russia*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002, p. 107.

but in the '60 most of the communist countries accepted the liberalization of the reproductive legislation. A structural tension appeared between the productive and reproductive vocation of the women; it was never solved within the official ideology, pushing the Romanian women to the periphery of the working class.

The "double burden"¹⁵ of motherhood and production tasks generated an accelerated deformation of gender identities and social status. Women became the most exploited part of the ruling class; the nationalization of their bodies inaugurated a new cleavage inside the communist silent terror. Thus, forced motherhood became the sources of a paradoxical identitary complex. Gender image was supporting an asymmetric pressure, the parenting relation being deformed in a ritual manner. The dynastic regime of late Romanian communism also used to show a symbolic monopolization of fatherhood¹⁶. The ideological patriarchs were invading all the public and communion spaces, in an obsessive iconography of power, while the *Father of the nation*, the *Supreme Ruler*, was confiscating the symbolic fatherhood. Romanian women were transformed in *single mothers*, facing the productive and the reproductive abuses under the rule of anonymity. In the last years of the dynastic communism hosted another interesting mutation in the field of gender identity. The public ascension of Elena Ceausescu inaugurated a paroxysmal stage of decomposition of gender referential frames and values. The dictatorial couple acted as a bicephalous Totem, crossing the gender border, beyond the natural logic of the family structure. Thus, the ritual masculinization¹⁷ became one of the most aggressive forms of infestation of collective identities; the effects propagated over the gender equation proving to be extremely resistant. The de-personification of motherhood and the dissolution of the dual parenting formula remain an important mutation in the field of social and cultural identities. By assuming an excessive motherhood and through annulation of natural masculine benchmarks, the Romanian women faced a strong symbolic aggression. Their identities and referential scales were deformed and reformed in a constitutive logic which has been subject to very little analysis. The atrocity of communist politics was well discussed, but the profound effects and consequences of this type of fragmentary terror still remain cast in shadow.

Living Gender in a Changing Society. *Working Mothers* and other Troubled Identities.

One major question raised by the evolutions of gender identities under communism refers to the complex topic of modernity. The regression encountered in the space of gender social roles is also strongly connected with an inverted dynamics in the subject of modernity. In its early stages communism imported some of the constitutive elements of a modernization movement, but its late manifestation became the mark of a pre-modern societal model. The urbanization, the industrialization or the growing literacy are genuine conditions

¹⁵ Eds. Nanette Funk, Magda Muller, *Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union*, London: Routledge, 1993, p. 32.

¹⁶ Ed. Sarah Ashwin, *Gender, State and Society in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia*, London: Routledge, 2012, p. 71.

¹⁷ John H., Harvey *Perspectives on a Loss*, London: Routledge, 2014, p. 204.

of modernity¹⁸, but the reconstruction of an internal social order motivated by the gender cleavage support the argument of a fragmentary evolution. The communist legacy concerning the gender theme is a complicated one, but its multiple stratifications and layers manifest an internal coherence. The dominance of a maternal vocation and the marginalization of gender, seen as a deformed expression of the masculine archetype, are rooted in an extended historical heritage. Romanian communism extracted a considerable part of its values and identities from a regressive form of nationalism, and this symbolic source was not disrupted after the dissolution of the system. The presence of a gendered deficit of modernity and the reconversion of the traditionalist culture in a post-totalitarian *invented tradition*¹⁹ are the main consequences of the post-postponed evolution created by local communism. Despite its alchemic project concerning the creation of the *New Man*, the Romanian Communism preserved the expression of an anachronistic form of patriarchal oppression.

Living gender after communism implied a complex reconstruction in the space of social and cultural identities. The fall of totalitarian rule pressed Romanian society to confront with a generalized referential crisis. The Communist era triggered some important mutations concerning the societal configuration and those mutations also brought about important consequences in the subject of gender identity. As mentioned before, the communist quest for modernization had produced some hybrid results. Still, the social status of women got slowly modified. By entering the productive sector and given the additional state incentives and facilities regarding social and childcare, women's identity was apparently shifting to modernity. The abusive reproductive practices imposed in the '60 annulated those initial progressive changes, but gender identities still conserved some new evolutionary features. The presence of a tremendous ideological pressure in the obsessive decades of the '70 and '80 had as subsequent results the apparition of a set of derived phenomena. Thus, gender identity was directly influenced by the violent degradations of the social climate. Scarcity of food resources, as well as the aggravation of everyday living conditions transformed gender in symbolic agent of parallel identities. The life of Romanian women in the late '80 was strongly affected by the extension of the family circles and by the apparition of informal social networks. These underground channels ensured supplementary access to food supplies or even political or social entertainment. The general phenomena of *oppressive solidarity* generated a fragile balance concerning the social and cultural exploitation of women; the last years of Ceaușescu's regime brought an ironic limitation of gender borders. When individual abuses and generalized terror became acute, the fall of the totalitarian rule brought about high expectations for a genuine liberalization of the gender values, identities and social norms.

Nevertheless, the clash of the totalitarian system did not bring an authentic modification of the gender identity equation. Furthermore, the transitional

¹⁸ Eds. Karl Deutsch, William Foltz, *Nation Building in Comparative Contexts*, Chicago: Aldine Transaction Publishers, 2010, p. 5.

¹⁹ Eds. Eric Hobsbawm, Terence Ranger, *The invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 108.

culture included in most of the post-communist societies a resurrection of some previous pre-modern or even totalitarian clichés. These types of representational paradoxes can be explained only by assuming the complicated landscape revealed by the 1989's revolutions. At the end of the communist era, Eastern Europe had multiple cultural and ideological fractures. The schismatic move inaugurated by the *Gorbachev doctrine* at the beginning of the '80 let the European space trapped in a configuration with multiple shades of modernity. Such contradictory legacy was also visible in the complex subject of gender identity. If the reformed communist countries had experienced a slow relaxation of the ideological pressure and consequently a gradual reconstruction of social identities²⁰, the isolated formula of Romanian communism made those incremental changes impossible. Therefore, the general issues of reshaping collective identities remain connected with two essential symbolic resources: the recovery of pre-totalitarian traditions and the denunciation of the communist design practices, as well as with the official gender ideology. In the same time, those two major functional axes were also influenced by other structural or functional conditions, such as the presence of a strong rural - urban cleavage or the apparition of a deformed collective memory.

All the communist regimes were aware of the importance of balancing the labor emancipation of gender, through institutional facilities for the new class of working mothers. The social policies developed by the communist states aimed to provide the functional foundation for the new social and economic vocation of women. The gender work force benefited from the institutional support of the communist regime, even if that type of assistance did not imply a real equality. The mechanism of transition from communism to democracy triggered a general reformation and restructuration of the state scaffolding. The communist institution of working mothers was one of the first victims of such purification measures. Through mass abolition of communist social systems and practices, the transitional society meant to create a total and absolute liberation from the past. Nevertheless, in the new democratic society women gained back their reproductive rights and liberties, but this new body politics lacked the supportive and the corrective measures of the communist state²¹.

The cultural construct of *working mothers* was thus fragmented into two antagonistic elements. The maternal vocation became contradictory with the productive action; the gender labor force was transformed once again into an oppressed faction of the democratized society. The abolishment of the communist practices regarding the social politics of reproduction abandoned Romanian women at the periphery of the transitional economy. The ritual motherhood specific to the last years of dynastic communism was replaced by a refusal of the maternal role, labelled as a deficit of social or economic equality. Unfortunately, the situation of *working mothers* remains a cultural and social paradox for the Romanian post-communist society, the new democratic order making the life of

²⁰ Zillah R. Eisenstein, *The Color of Gender: Reimagining Democracy*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, p. 16.

²¹ Gillian Pascal, Anna Kwak, *Gender Regimes in Transition in Central and Eastern Europe*, Bristol: Policy Press, 2005, p. 18.

women much less secure. The denunciation of communist institutional and cultural practices also determined another depreciation of the women social and cultural status. The communist regime instituted in the early stages of popular democracy a mandatory quest for gender participation in the public affairs. The presence of a *numerus clausus* regarding gender inside the communist society determined a set of posthumous reactions. The presence of women in public activities or the positive discrimination practices were defined as parts of a genuine communist political culture and rejected without any other further analysis. In the light of these considerations, the transitional gender identities became the subject of negative perceptions, the communist formula of a double burden, productive and reproductive, was replaced by a more oppressive equation, implying also the lack of realistic institutional support²². Apparently, the era of ritual motherhood and forced reproduction was followed by an epoch of fragmentation and antinomy. Women were pressed to choose between the maternal and the productive role, their exploitation in the private and domestic space became more and more acute.

In the same time, the *privatization of motherhood*²³ did not eliminate the asymmetrical parenting, acquired as a cultural landmark in the late 80. The vanishing of the oppressive solidarity also abandoned women in a social environment conducted only by competitiveness and brutal market rules²⁴. The elimination of the gender regulations in the childcare of social policies generated a particular vulnerability inside the Romanian transitional society. The communist gender regulations were laid aside which was also accompanied by another influential mutation. Lacking new and acceptable identity landmarks, the Romanian transitional society operated a regression to its traditional representations, strongly related to the symptomatology of pre-modernity. The locative expression of the idealized patriarchal society was the Romanian village, a timeless cultural mark that became the source of new hybrid gender identities. The reinforcement of gender traditional images induced a new semantic of motherhood. The insertion of the western cultural models and the theme of gender emancipation encountered a local resistance, materialized in a new societal cleavage. Thus, the evolution of gender identities in post-communist Romania became dependent on two contradictory spheres. The peripheries of the newly emerged democratic society were shifting slowly through a form of neo-traditionalism, which forced women to assume unpaid work and a revival of gender subordination; so the urban space acted as an epicentre of de-gendered culture, women being pressed to accept an unfair market competition. Consequently the urban - rural fracture is responsible for the apparition of two transitional ways of the reconstruction of gender identity and cultural representations.

Both cultural patterns were dysfunctional and both were suffering from contamination with former totalitarian clichés. Starting from the rural gender

²² *Idem*, p. 18.

²³ Francesca C. Cancian, *Child Care and Inequality: Rethinking Carework for Children and Youth*, London: Psychology Press, 2002, p. 51.

²⁴ *Idem*, p. 18.

model, reuniting pre-modern stereotypes such as domestic unpaid work or lack of social autonomy, to the urban female worker, performing motherhood as a private social role, the Romanian women gradually became one of the most affected social groups in the transitional experience. Under those auspices, the rural – urban gap is representing a structural proof of the existence of a gendered deficit of modernity, which tends to affect the society as a whole. The Romanian women were confronted with continuous degradations of their social and cultural identities; the result of these representational pathologies is too little discussed. The gender topic concerning transition is very often concentrated on issues such as participation in the labor force, educational accessibility or electoral activism. The problem of gender's foundational and referential frames remains obscured. The Romanian society lacks an authentic emancipation process, as a result of its fragmentary modernization dynamics. The recent memory or even the distant tradition of pre-totalitarian society is not able to provide some functional landmarks in the field of gender identity. Trapped between a specter of ritual motherhood and an image of a de-gendered social actor, Romanian women were experiencing difficulties in reconstructing their identity. The multiple initiatives triggered in the transitional cycle are paying the price of a pyramidal approach. The urban centers are step by step reinforcing a new model of gender competitiveness, which transfer the childcare costs and issues to a private sector, while in the rural area the phenomenon of poverty feminization becomes perceptible²⁵.

The cultural anatomy of gender is still disputed, but some elements tend to benefit from the general approval. The structural deficit encountered by the Romanian society in the field cannot be compensated under the present circumstances. Nowadays gender represents a troubled form of identity, from all the perspectives. Nor will the revival of all the traditional culture or the de-gendered social competitiveness solve the gender paradoxes. The situation of working mothers and the general issue of women's participation in the economic and public sectors will still depend on multiple conditions. Between a strong state interventionism and a social balance a wide range of solutions and dosages subside. Still, the subject of gender identity reconstruction remains too little problematized, in favour of its very material consequences: feminization of poverty, nostalgia, resurrection of regressive traditionalism. The sources of these representational cultural pathologies are deeply connected with a deficit of modernity, which requires an important exercise of decomposition.

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TACKLING THE CRISIS – AN ASSESSMENT MODEL¹

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Abstract: *“The main contribution of this article is the design of a model for the economic crises. At the depth level of this model are concepts like saving, investment, money and goods, while at its intermediate level are mainly concepts referring to the public policies like quantitative easing and interest rate and at the surface level are concepts referring to the exceptional behavior of different variables present in the diverse economic functions. I test that the diverse responses to the recent crisis against this model and I discuss the social and economic implications”.*

Keywords: *economic crisis, model for economic crises’ causes, response to the crisis, economic risk, social implications.*

This second article of the three-part series on the recent economic crisis and its social and political implications is of a composite nature. Its main component is to propose an evaluation tool, a model for crisis responses according to the depth levels of the crisis’ causes to which these responses are addressed. The article also includes references to two other ways than this model for the evaluation of these answers, which will not be insisted on much here. It is, as it can be seen, a rather epistemological and methodological article, as the first was devoted to factual aspects, and the latter will be devoted to interpreting these facts using the tools introduced in the present article.

For a better understanding of our approach, some remarks of an orderly character are useful. First of all, the temptation to refer to the measures for combating the effects of the crisis. If we would had considered in the previous article only the measures taken to mitigate the effects of the crisis, we would have shown from the start a strong bias, that the decision-makers only acted against the effects, completely ignoring the level of the causes. However, the task is precisely to thoroughly assess the proposed response to the crisis, that is to say, to determine which parts of the evolutionary chain causes-development-effects were addressed by the measures taken.

Secondly, we need to make an observation that we consider essential, not only for the discussion in this article, but also for the solution proposed for financial crises in the next one, even for their prevention or for limiting their effects. Therefore, this observation is essential even for understanding the course and purpose of the research. It is about the fact that in most of them, and even in

¹ The following article is the second part of a series of three that can be placed under the generic title *Too-big-to-fail or for whom public policies are made*. Each of the three articles can be read and understood independently of the others, but the central ideas of each can be better understood by reading of them all.

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their vast majority, the entities that generated the crisis and propagated it are private. At the same time, the measures we refer to are, in their vast majority, public policies. There are measures taken by public entities of a political or administrative nature, and, in an exception case, by the US Federal Reserve, in which, despite its predominantly private nature, the state's representatives in its management have the right to veto decisions. Once again it is about taking decisions; they were taken by people who, to a greater or lesser degree, have political legitimacy, because they are invested by the polis, the community of citizens. As recognized in political theory, for example by Kant², the political decisions are taken by the general will of the citizens expressed by vote in the modern, democratic and under the rule of law state. In other words, the decision of the financial institutions that generated the crisis, in particular the will of their shareholders and management, and the will of the citizens expressed through public policies confront each other. This is the principle, and for this reason Paulson and his assistants said they would be hanged by Congress. We have already found out that the general will not only did not hang them, but a decade after the crisis does not seem to be worried about the quadrupling of quantity of money they engineered even though it considers – in a wrong way, as Blinder stated – that TARP was a set of failed policies. We will return to aspects that concern what the citizens decide through their representatives. We do not want to prejudge in any way, but it is good to know that not only in Greece, but also in the United States or wherever the speculative exuberance of the banks was manifested, the latter would not have been possible without the absolutely significant, from a numerical point of view, participation of the bearers of the general will, i.e. the citizens. So, the story is not just about bankers, not even only about them and politicians, but also about citizens (when it is not about, as in Paulson's case, one and the same person who was in all three hypostases: a citizen, a banker and politician). However, it is advisable to state that negative externalities existed because there were citizens – albeit in varying proportions depending on the state – who did not enter the speculative game with the banks and were supposed to be tax payers, if not in Greece, at least in the US.

Thirdly, it should be noted that any assessment must state its nature. Is this an evaluation in the traditional axiological sense: is it necessary to determine whether something is good or bad, beautiful or ugly, etc.? Is this a cognitive assessment in which we establish by strong epistemological criteria which measures were correct and which not? Clearly, this is not an assessment in any of these ways. Without prejudging the possible relationship between economy and morals, at least as long as moral positions are questionable and their relationship with the economic sphere disputed, it is preferable not to make moral judgments, not to do axiology. On the other hand, as long as economic science, political science and, moreover, philosophy are not rigorous sciences like mathematics or physics, we believe that no strictly cognitive assessment according to hard epistemological criteria is suitable here as long as it will always be questionable. The term *evaluation* refers to three procedures. The first one consists in

² Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysik der Sitten*, Leipzig, Felix Meiner, 1919, pp. 136-137.

measuring the usefulness of public policies, and the basic criterion on which this measurement is made cannot be a comparison with other hypothetical measures, but simply finding out if the measures succeeded, how long it took and with what costs or risks in the long run. Where comparisons are possible, because as we have seen national economies are different, we will be able to pronounce ourselves from this perspective on the usefulness of the measures. The second procedure to which the term *evaluation* refers is to compare the measures taken with the various causal explanations of the specialists regarding this crisis. In order to achieve this form of assessment, we take into account three levels: of depth, intermediate and the surface one, in which we group the various theoretical or rhapsodic positions³ about the causes of the crisis; in other words, we will produce a model with three causal levels to explain the crisis and we will try to find out to what extent the public policies adopted have satisfied this model. Finally, the third procedure to which the term *evaluation* refers is to report public policies taken against the crisis to the principles advocated by the actors involved, first of all politicians and bankers, as well as voting citizens. The finality is obvious, to determine whether there is a coherence between the principles, actions and the way in which financial institutions were treated. It can be easily observed that in all three of these uses of the term *evaluation* the cognitive positioning is specific to the disciplines that lack the apodicticity of physics or mathematics. It can also be seen that the data for the first procedure was presented in the first article of this suite; using the data that can be found in my PhD thesis⁴, this first form of assessment can be done extensively by any reader; here we will refer to it only briefly. The third procedure is just outlined here and will be discussed extensively in the article concluding this suite as it forms the analytical basis for presenting the proposal for crisis management contained in that article. It is understood that the present article will be devoted exclusively to the treatment of the second procedure.

As we have just said, considering that everyone is able to compare the figures presented on the evolution of the crisis and recovery with the anti-crisis measures described in the first article of this suite, it is understood that the various evolutions presented in time series (GDP, the level of indebtedness, unemployment, etc.) for

³ cf. Șerban-Costin Crețu, *Too-bit-to-fail and the modern capitalist society*, PhD. Thesis (forthcoming), National University for Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, 2018, Chapter III, Section 2 where the explanations regarding the causes of the crises are primarily classified according to the criterion regarding the systematic nature of those explanations (i.e. the explanations can be of a systematic theoretical character, an intermediate kind or of rhapsodic nature). Secondly, drawing attention that this classification should not be confused with depth level of the proposed causes for each of these theories, there is also a classification of the various explanations from the point of view of the depth of the causes (it can be seen that a rhapsodic view of the causes of the crisis may refer to depth causes and, conversely, a systematic theoretical perspective on surface causes). However, these two classifications are useful for better understanding of the model proposed below.

⁴ On the negative effects of the crisis and the periods needed for correcting them, the duration of which is related to the measures discussed in the previous article, I insisted in Șerban Crețu, op. cit., Chapter III, Section 2; anyone who goes through that text together with the first article in this suite can find out how the measures taken by each state against the crisis are evaluated based on the length of the recovery period.

the period 2000-2015, have been strongly influenced for the 2009-2015 segment precisely by the measures taken by each state in order to stimulate and relaunch their own economies. However, in order to illustrate and to facilitate the understanding of the first evaluating procedure, we recall that the anti-crisis programs' success is judged by the GDP growth criterion in the reference years. This evaluation mode – even if it is not done through statistical regressions that determine grades of correlation – has the advantage of being of a quantitative nature: some measures have quantitatively influenced a country's GDP in a certain way. There is no need for the statistical approach precisely because the measures taken were anti-crisis, that is, it was in their logic that what followed after they were implemented resulted from them, not from the “natural” evolution of the economy.

After all, as we have seen, there are two great ways of intervention: the first practiced in the Anglo-Saxon area, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, by stimulating the economy through capital injection and the second, continental, promoted mostly by Germany, which has two distinct forms, the Western one, practiced in countries such as Germany, France, the Netherlands or Belgium, who preached austerity without resorting to it and declared their reserves regarding the bail-out policy but embracing it almost as strongly as the Americans (the big difference was that the ECB did not make quantitative easing, at least not as significant as the US Fed); the second was the eastern form in which austerity measures and recourse to loans used to inject liquidity into the market were the norm. In this second instance, there can also be distinguished two categories of states, namely those like Romania, which led a drastic austerity policy combined with major loans thus prolonging the recession, and those like Bulgaria, which refused loans and agreements with the IMF and acted by using moderate austerity measures and came out of the recession sooner. Hungary and Greece are two distinct cases, the first because it had initially pursued a policy of Romania's type, then moving to a national policy of the Bulgarian type, thus managing to overcome the crisis more quickly. In the case of Greece, the specificity is that the country had indebted itself immensely without finding the domestic engines to restart the economy. In simple and essential economic terms, exit from the crisis cannot be done through pro-cyclical measures, i.e. when liquidities leave of the market, when interest rates grow, money becomes expensive very rapidly and insufficient to maintain the economy functioning. Thus, public austerity policies are inevitable since there is no money and you cannot borrow; you have to live with what you have, even sell what you have. This was the situation of Greece, even now without positive exit. In contrast, Romania's situation was different, there were reserves in the National Bank and bonds could be issued. Under these conditions, IMF's requirements have prompted pro-cyclical measures, i.e. austerity measures by which market liquidity further declined, aggregate demand fell, and the economy had contracted. If you proceed in the Romanian way by contracting loans which will be expatriated by foreign banks, those loans do not solve the situation, but impoverish the economy even further. However, if income levels are maintained and borrowed money is directed into public investments aimed at increasing aggregate

demand⁵, then the economy will be stimulated by these anti-cyclical measures. In short, for better or worse, the public policy mixes that have been adopted have gone beyond this line of minimal demarcation in the economy: counter-cyclical measures-positive outcomes, pro-cyclical measures-negative outcomes.

With this in mind, we can interpret GDP figures from 2009 to 2015⁶ in a simple and clear way: the states that have adopted anti-cyclical policies, for example the US and Germany, have at least formally come out faster from the crisis than those countries that have followed pro-cyclical policies, like Romania. States that have been deprived of the means to take the smallest anti-cyclical measures, like Greece, still bear the consequences of the crisis. Of course, we can see from the mentioned data that there are differences within the first two categories. For example, the US emerged from the crisis in a longer period of time than Germany and with a lower per capita income growth, although the anti-cyclical policies of introducing liquidity into the economy were stronger. The explanation comes from the fact that the genesis of the crisis is mainly American and, consequently, the US economy was the most affected, even if in 2009 the fall of the German economy was higher, because the difference in scale matters. Therefore, the evaluation of the anti-crisis measures through the divide between pro-cyclic and anti-cyclic public policies is working. And in the second group there are differences, the Hungarians came out of the crisis faster than the Bulgarians and the Romanians came out last. But here, from the measures mentioned in the first article of this series, the differences are clear: those who took faster and more decisively anti-cyclical measures came out of the crisis more rapidly, while those who took pro-cyclical measures came out with more difficulty. In short, the assessment of the measures taken is based, once again, on their pro or anti-cyclic character.

On the other hand, taking a set of measures is under the strong constraint of the existence of the resources needed for anti-cyclical measures.

Thus, the US, using the “exorbitant privilege” of the dollar without concern for the global present and future risks implied by the excessive dollar printing, could – after political decision’s difficulties were surmounted – relatively easily adopt anti-cyclical policies. Germany, which relied on its considerable trade surplus and its close-knit link between the political realm, banks, real-world companies and citizens, allowed the same anti-cyclical policies with much lower risks⁷. Countries such as Romania, Hungary or Bulgaria had the resources to adopt anti-cyclical policies, but this largely depended on political boldness. The Romanian Right and the Hungarian Socialists in power did not have the courage and adopted pro-cyclical policies. The Bulgarians and the Hungarians, after the change of government, had the political force to use their internal resources for

⁵ See the example of the French, Germans and, indirectly, Americans.

⁶ cf. Șerban Crețu, *op. cit.*, Chapter III, Section 2 where all the relevant data is presented and in World Bank, *World Bank Data World Development Indicators*, Washington DC., 2017 in <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?ReportId=49206&Type=Table#advancedDownloadOptions>.

⁷ From this point of view, the German taxpayer’s refusal to subsidize the loans to Greece is understandable.

anti-cyclical policies. Even though the Greeks, through the initial effort of Syriza, especially Varoufakis's, who at that time was finance minister, were at least seeking to limit pro-cyclical policies, that is, of austerity, they did not have the resources to do so and their case proves the best that pro-cyclical policies do not lead to the exit from the crisis but extend it.

Assessing the responses to the crisis from the point of view of the first procedure, the quantitative one related to the recovering of the main development parameters, led us to more rigorous lessons obviously closely related to the analyzes in the previous article and to the one that concludes this series. Thus, a truth about the crisis situation, even from the perspective of economic theory, is that coming out of the crisis can be done more easily through anti-cyclical policies. Even if we said that we are using crisis moments as a revealer for capitalism in general, we must not infer from this finding that, by symmetry, in the periods of growth anti-cyclical policies must be taken. Economic theory does not say that in such periods necessarily pro-cyclical policies overheat the economy, but many – from journalists to bankers –, transformed into Cassandras, warned, especially in the case of Romania, against this possible evolution. Such ideas are not heard by anyone in the real economy when money can be made. Besides, they're meaningless, it's like someone wants to choke economic growth. The problem is quite different: of size. If you stimulate economic growth too much, you will surely end up with a speculative bubble of one kind or another. However, those responsible for not getting here are: the Executive, which has the means to eliminate speculative growth through adapted fiscal policies; the Central Bank, which has to ensure that commercial bank balances are fairly kept, besides its obligation to control the amount of money; and the various regulators and supervisors, who have to do their jobs, of course, if the Legislative previously legislated correctly.

Returning now to anti-cyclical policies, it is good to learn that these can be done in a variety of ways, ranging from some that recall the good-old Keynesian increase in aggregate demand (for example by stimulating vehicle purchases, like in Germany or France), to mechanisms specific to the financial economy (for example by buying toxic assets, like the Fed, or by guaranteeing them, like Fed and, in particular, the ECB). However, we must bear in mind that the economy and the finances are areas of reality where voluntarism – of any kind – of the involved actors has limits. The fact that the latter seem fairly wide should not deceive us. We will talk about the risks involved by the dimension of the voluntarism, but first we must show its form we are considering. When investment banks invented financial instruments that they held out of balance, which they separated from the economic and financial realities, a speculative bubble appeared from one point forward. But the United States and Germany have also shown voluntarism at the level of public policy. Thus, the US Fed, whose balance sheets can be made limitless, unlike the ones belonging to private banks, had bought during the crisis toxic assets at their nominal value by printing currency. Private banks are not allowed to do this. From this simple comparison, we understand whether or not the Fed is a major risk carrier; obviously it is. Germany did something even more daring, requiring that the state aid package be

kept outside the ECB's balance sheet, just as private banks were doing before the crisis. The need is the mother of all invention, and the need to eliminate the risk today is the genesis of tomorrow's risk. The economic term is *constraint*. Constraints can be of an economic nature, those that cannot be overcome in any way, as was in the case of Greece that was without financial resources, or regulatory constraints, that are decided as public policies. And, as the economy cannot disappear, for the overcoming, even though economic contraction, of a blockage situation due to the real constraints, political measures are taken; regulations designed to maintain major balances are simply bypassed or changed when actors are in the face of major imbalances, as in a crisis situation. The most striking change in game rules is the bail-out, capital injection in one form or another designed to rebalance the market after the latter went into an exotic position. On these issues, we will refer in particular in the following article.

For the general picture of capitalism proposed in this paper two or three additional observations should be made. The constitutional arrangements of contemporary states create democracies under the rule of law, welfare states in which the political proposes and realizes a mix between market and profit, respectively the general benefits of society.

This mixture is strongly questioned not by one or another bail-out as well as by the repetition of this mechanism in the post-WWII period, and, especially, by the level of intervention in the last crisis. Immediately after the economic liberalization proposed by the Reagan-Thatcher couple, various voices, especially from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, started a campaign stating that the welfare state's golden age has passed, the population is aging and pensions would no longer be able to be paid and that, in general, the social system has to shift from guaranteed benefits to guaranteed contributions, although sound analyzes show that there are many resources to overcome such problems even if they are real. This campaign has hit absolutely embarrassing situations: concentration of wealth in a smaller number of hands, narrowing the middle class, increasing poverty (not in Africa but in the Western world). Exactly at the heart of this period, China, with its impressive numerical workforce of 776 million employees, managed to move from an average annual salary of 4,598 dollars in 2008 to 10,641 in 2016⁸. And the argument that the growth of the Chinese economy takes place on the background of an industrial structure, not a financial one, is only partly true, looking at the share of the economic sectors. On the other hand, in India in 2010, the average annual salary was \$ 1,100, and in 2014 it was only \$ 1,200⁹. Looking at these parallel evolutions between the developed West respectively China and India, which are emergent countries, we see that in all these areas economies are capitalist, the difference being that the West decided immediately after the end of the Second World War to have a welfare state which it now wants to adjust, to reduce it; while India has no political initiative to build such a system, and China has started to build it. It is

⁸ Tradingeconomics.com, China Average Yearly Wages, 2018a in <https://tradingeconomics.com/china/wages>.

⁹ Tradingeconomics.com, India Average Daily Wage Rate, 2018b in <https://tradingeconomics.com/india/wages>.

clear that decisions such as these are public policies, so political decisions. When you see these macro-trends in the developed capitalist society and observe that the political decision makers responsible for them are those who encourage moral hazard through bail-outs you can only conclude: the capitalist varieties we meet today are determined by politicians and their public policies at least as, if not to a greater extent, they are determined by the free market.

In order to assess the response to the crisis from the perspective of the second procedure, i.e. using the ideas about the explanation of the crises formulated by various economists, as well as our own elaboration of these ideas in an explanatory model in which the causes are structured on three levels (depth, intermediate and surface¹⁰) it is useful to make some observations¹¹. We have distinguished between theorists of economic crisis: economists who deal with them in a general theoretic perspective and economists who treat the subject in a rhapsodic way (no negative connotation intended), i.e. economists who study the crises more or less independent of an economic general theory (including their own, if they have one). These last ones are divided in two categories, economists referring to crises in general and economists referring to the recent financial and economic crisis. We have also drawn attention that the systematic analysts are dealing mainly with the depth level of the crises, considering them virtual threats in the process of the capitalist economy, especially in its financial stage. Even if the other two categories could be considered as dealing with the intermediate causes (the economists that analyze the crises in general rhapsodically), respectively as dealing with the surface causes (the economists who are analyzing the current crisis), they are in fact making considerations regarding all three levels.

It is worth mentioning from the outset that all four explanations of the causes of crises made within the systematic economic and financial theories we analyze come from contemporary economists and have in common the fact that they discover the depth causes of crises – that is, causes inherent¹² to the functioning of capitalism – which exist in the financial sector. This circumstance, on the one hand, is based on the nature of money being the blood of the economy in every type of capitalism, but also, in particular, by the specificity of the financial type of capitalism, by the fact that comparatively the financial sector has the highest profitability, bringing the highest profit per unit of investment¹³.

¹⁰ Of course, those are only useful labels; what they denote will be understood from the following.

¹¹ A more detailed analysis of them in Șerban Crețu, *op. cit.*, Chapter III, Section 2.

¹² This term is of a philosophical kind; it is used to denote the inherence of the accidents in the substances (like in the Aristotelian philosophy); it says that the accident cannot exist without the substance, but the substance can exist without some accidents. So, a crisis must be understood as a manifestation of the most essential part of the capitalist processes, but as a possible one – even a very probable one – not as a necessary one.

¹³ cf. Șerban Crețu, *op. cit.*, Chapter III, in particular the data provided by UNCTAD Secretariat Task Force, *The global economic crisis: Systemic failures and multilateral remedies*, New York, United Nations, 2009, pp. 21-22: “in 1983 the financial sector generated 5% of US GDP and represented 7,5% of the total corporatist profits; in 2007 [...] generated 8% of US GDP and represented 40% of the total corporatist profits”.

For Hyman P. Minsky, the main and unavoidable cause of crises is the increase in the volume of investment, attracted even by the success of the economy; this creates a financial risk because under uncertainty the interest rate decreases due to the positive trend of the economy, but when a limit on the presence of money in the market is reached, the trend can be reversed¹⁴. Roger Garrison, although he cannot accept the underlying idea of Minsky's argument that the market cannot perfectly balance the supply and demand of money, reaches, from the point of view of the Austrian school, the same conclusion, even though it positively presents it, namely that in the market there is some uncertainty and lack of knowledge. Thus, in the boom period, the value of the loans increases and, implicitly, the amount of money in the market becomes greater, increasing consumption and the volume of investments, but, unlike dynamic consumption, production is static and hence a monetary expansion can generate crises¹⁵. For Kindleberger, who's theory is very close to Minsky's, not just any investments, but speculative ones (the emergence of which is inevitable in a free market) lead to an increase in the money supply that in the short term attracts economic growth, then a euphoria followed by a speculative mania, followed by the revulsion, the crisis¹⁶. Finally, Frederic S. Mishkin considers the lack of knowledge regarding risk, the fact that there is asymmetric information (to the advantage of creditors in the face of the debtors), as well as the adverse selection (higher interest rates for the lower income) and moral hazard as causes of the crisis because they create, through the interest rate mechanism, an unpredictable increase or fall in asset prices¹⁷. We note that in all four of these explanations there is at least a cause of depth, that, in the opinion of the cited authors, inevitably¹⁸ leads to economic crises, namely the fluctuation of the monetary mass (and when we say this we are considering not only the monetary base – M₀ – but also the money placed on the market by the various bank instruments – M₁ – as well as the population's deposits - M₂) coupled in two cases, Garrison and Mishkin, with insufficient knowledge, and in the other two, Minsky and Kindleberger, with a lack of ethics.

¹⁴ Hyman P. Minsky, *Stabilizing an unstable economy*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 2008.

¹⁵ Roger W. Garrison, *Time and money: The Macroeconomics of capital structure*, London, Routledge, 2002.

¹⁶ Charles. P. Kindleberger, Robert Z. Aliber, *Manias, panics, and crashes: A history of financial crises*. 6th ed., Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

¹⁷ Frederic S. Mishkin, *Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises: A Historical Perspective in Financial Markets and Financial Crises* ed. Robert G. Hubbard, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991.

¹⁸ We can observe that between this conclusion and our previous statement that crises are very probable but not necessary there is a contradiction. In fact, things are simple: in each explanation intervene subjective factors like knowledge and ethics. We do not pretend that these factors are functioning at the intermediate level of the public policies; we are aware that these factors are present at the depth level of economic processes. But, like Garrison, we consider that at this level the market has the capacity to minimize the risks of crisis if moral hazard is not introduced by the intermediate level, that of public policies. In conclusion, at the depth level, crises are only very probable, not necessary and, in time, with the "educative" action of the market their probability will diminish.

In the category of rhapsodic explanations for the crisis, the first group is represented by the ideas of those economists who formulate explanations for crises in general without resorting to a background economic theory, even if they are more or less close to one of them. It should also be noted that most of them chose to adapt their general explanations to the present crisis, as virtually do all the ones mentioned below. Eichengreen, who is specialized in the study of the Bretton Woods Agreements, considers the main causes of crises – including the recent one – to be the abandonment of fixed exchange rates and the speculative investments made possible by this (as we can see this is the same idea as in Kindleberger's, but underlining that the situation worsened after the abandonment of the Bretton Woods System)¹⁹. In fact, Eichengreen was one of those who popularized the idea of the dollar's exorbitant privilege; Varoufakis²⁰ and, like him, Reinhart and Rogoff²¹, makes the exorbitant privilege of the dollar and the fact that by enjoying it the US draws 70% of the surplus created in countries with surplus exports (China, Germany, Japan) the main cause of the financial exuberance in the US, followed by the rise in the price of assets and then its fall and the crisis. From his position as economist and former Chairman of the Fed, Alan Greenspan sees the unsatisfactory activity of rating agencies as the main cause of the crisis. In other words, the market with its actors and decision-makers with their public policies could function well in principle, and even if they have malfunctions, those can be known and corrected, provided that those in charge have the ethically correct behavior (to what extent is their breach of trust encouraged by the fact that rating agencies are paid by banks, Greenspan does not develop excessively)²². Reinhart and Rogoff consider as a cause of crises the exorbitant mechanism of the dollar and the fact that regulations have been circumvented (meaning that they were sufficient, but there was an ethical flaw in the behavior of banks)²³. Stiglitz, in his analysis developed by adapting the general explanations for crises to the present one, refers to the existence of imbalances in the real economy that make it fragile, to the rise in the level of public and private indebtedness and to defective regulation, arguing that in the present crisis the main culprit was deregulation because, in a relatively unbalanced economy, over-indebtedness was possible due to the elimination of the necessary (especially under such conditions) regulations²⁴. It should be noted that in this set of explanations there are, more than in the previous one, besides central references to the financial aspects, references to causes specific to the real

¹⁹ Barry Eichengreen. *Exorbitant Privilege. The Rise and Fall of the Dollar*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011.

²⁰ Yanis Varoufakis, *The global Minotaur. America, the true origins of the financial crisis and the future of the world economy*, London, Zed Books, 2011 and Yanis Varoufakis, Nicholas Theocarakis, Joseph Halevi, *Modern political economics: Making senses of the post-2008 world*, London, Routledge, 2011.

²¹ Kenneth Rogoff, Carmen Reinhart, *This time is different: Eight centuries of financial folly*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

²² Alan Greenspan, *The map and the territory 2.0: Risk, human nature, and the future of forecasting*, New York, Penguin Books, 2014.

²³ Kenneth Rogoff, Carmen Reinhart, op. cit.

²⁴ Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy*, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2010.

economy, respectively to the level of the political decisions. It is natural to be so because in their systematic perspective the four authors of the first group worked with certain stylized facts regarding economic life, that is the financial-banking sector, while the authors of this second group precisely because they do not analyze the crises inside a systematic theory can refer to them, even to each of them, considering other aspects than the financial ones.

The second group of rhapsodic explanations is provided by economists who refer strictly to the recent financial crisis. Considerations from previous group's analysis are also valid for the ideas and authors of the group presented below. Alan Blinder finds no less than seven causes for the recent crisis: rising asset prices; the excessive level of indebtedness; poor regulations; incorrect banking practices; the euphoria of derivatives; the inaccuracy of rating agencies; the excessive bonuses of Wall Street management²⁵ (it is easy to see that references to the real economy – assets, finances, derivatives, debt levels, political decision, regulations – appear in the seven causes highlighted by Blinder). Martin Feldstein considers that there are six causes: low interest rates, insufficient regulation, the policies referring to the housing market, the inaccuracies of rating agencies, the inadequate risk study models used by banks, excessive indebtedness²⁶ (it is easy to see that financial, political, and, indirectly, even real economy issues are again involved). Münchau also refers to six causes of the crisis: the bankers' greed; the combination of investment funds and tax havens; wrong models of risk assessment; deregulation; the Fed's monetary policy; global imbalances²⁷ (it should be noticed that besides the usual causes of endogenous, financial and political nature, Münchau realizes that the financial economy functions in conditions of globalization, and that in the real global economy, not only in the internal one, those imbalances becomes significant; plus, Münchau recalls in a more interesting formula than Blinder, which refers only to bonuses, the psychological cause of the crisis, i.e. the banker's greed, which includes not only the managers, the agent, but also the shareholders, the principal, stressing that all of them participated in one form or another in the game and that they have their responsibility in something that threatens to resemble more and more with a Ponzi scheme). Finally, The National Commission on the Causes of the Financial Crisis also found five major causes of the crisis: flawed regulatory policies; poor bank management; inadequate saving coupled with excessive indebtedness; insufficient information collected by the Treasury and the Fed; the systemic collapse of ethics and accountability²⁸ (even if the Commission assumes

²⁵ Alan S. Blinder, *After the Music Stopped: The Financial Crisis, the Response, and the Work Ahead*, New York, Penguin Group, 2014.

²⁶ Martin Feldstein, *How to Avert Recession*, Washington DC., National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007 in <http://www.nber.org/feldstein/wsj120507.html> and Martin Feldstein, *How to achieve stronger U.S. growth*, Washington DC., National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013 in <http://www.nber.org/feldstein/AEA-2014-GROWTH.pdf>.

²⁷ Wolfgang Münchau, *The meltdown years: The unfolding of the global economic crisis*, New York, McGraw-Hill Education, 2010.

²⁸ National Commission on the Causes of the Financial Crisis, *The financial crisis inquiry report: Final report of the national commission on the causes of the financial and economic crisis in the United States*, Washington DC., U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011.

certain responsibilities for politicians, after it mostly distributes it to banks and their clients, concludes that the crisis was avoided and tries to treat it politically convenient).

It is easy to notice that besides the fact that the explanatory model of the crises – and hence of the recent one – has three levels of depth, another idea is needed, that the opinions of the listed economists intersect, so their explanations also consolidate each other. We now have a benchmark, a model that we will clarify a little bit immediately in order to eliminate any doubt, so that we can assess the measures taken against the crisis as outlined in the previous article. The development of any model involves certain assumptions. As long as we present a three-level model for the causes of economic crises, the first important assumption is that the realities that are located on each of these levels and to which we will refer immediately present themselves as a whole with a certain structure and functionality. The second assumption closely linked to the former is that the respective realities, as indicated by the idea of distinct levels, play different roles in triggering economic crises. The third assumption made to introduce this model is that the distinction between the depth, intermediate and surface levels is introduced by the criterion regarding the degree of inherence²⁹ of those realities. It will be seen that the balance between the commodities market and the financial market – in another economic analysis, the balance between supply and aggregate demand including besides the commodities market also the financial market and the labor one – defines the depth level. The intermediate level includes other economic realities that consider either the equilibrium between the commodities market and monetary policies, or the balance between supply and aggregate demand and inflation. The surface level includes a variety of measures taken in both public and private realms that are conceptually subordinate to those in previous categories such as regulating or deregulating a particular market (for example, for a given class of financial instruments, management's bonuses, supervision by rating agencies, etc.). Based on these assumptions, the model has depth, intermediate and surface causes. Even if it is not an assumption, but rather an implication, attention should be drawn to the fact that we spoke about the causes of economic crises, we talked about economic realities of different levels and it may appear that we neglect the societal aspect, the overall picture of capitalism, the one that is actually of interest. In fact, as we have already seen by studying the responses to the crisis, we will see, by analyzing the pattern of causes and the extent to which the responses to the crisis corresponded to them, that, in one form or another, the whole of society is involved in the economic aspects and, in particular, in those relating to the crisis. We have to consider first and foremost the fact that labor and entrepreneurship

²⁹ Here the term has to be as it explained in note 19. Accordingly, we assume that there are different degrees of inherence, i.e. of probability, of the features/actions pertaining to each level. E.g. there is a significant probability that a contraction intervenes cyclically at the depth level; it is a less significant probability that a policy of bail-out to be taken; it is even a less significant probability that in this crisis the managers exploit their positions limitless. Or, there is a case for such probabilities in our ideal model; in fact, we will see in the next article that such probabilities are reversed, which means that the fundamentals of the economy and of economics are reversed. We will see in the next article that this is an important explanation for the emergence of crises.

are fundamental parts of society; then that any kind of social costs are borne by the economy and, finally, that any aid granted to an economic sector in difficulty is based on other economic and financial resources which distribution affects the whole of society.

In order to clearly present the causal model of the crises it is also necessary to make a few considerations about how the economists in the last seven or eight decades have thought about the central element of the capitalist economy, the market. They have created theories and based on them models about the market. In all these models – which are important in understanding the proposed model for crises, but which must not be confused with it – the essential element that cannot be missed is the relationship between demand and supply (indifferent of its forms of expression). By using mathematical mechanisms, in most of these models, supply and demand do not longer appear as such, but as other variables, such as interest rates, savings, inflation, but also as supply and aggregate demand or as money supply and demand. Importantly, in each of these models, the ultimate consideration is the establishment of an equilibrium, of a stable state, between two main variables (which in turn hide other variables) of the model. The basic idea behind any model is to help us understand the functioning of the economy and, of equal importance, to give us an idea of how the economy can be influenced by public policies through the variables in the model. These issues are of paramount importance because the overall state of the contemporary capitalist society depends on them, on a federal funds rate, on a balanced labor market or on a balance between economic growth and rising interest rates.

We have previously stated that we place at the depth level the balance between the commodities market and financial market. This is the so-called *IS-LM Model* developed in the late 1930s and early 1940s on the basis of the Keynesian theory by John Hicks and Alvin Hansen. It is at its core the balance between, on one side, the supply and demand on the commodities market (IS) and, on the other hand, the balance between the demand and supply of money on the financial markets (LM). The *IS* actually refers to the balance between investments and savings, which is nothing more than a mathematically equivalent expression with the one regarding the balance between the supply and demand of goods. If we look closely at this model, we see that economists have proposed and studied it in order to determine the effects of monetary and fiscal policies on it; but today it is mostly used as study material precisely because it doesn't include as variables public policies like interest rates, quantity of money etc.³⁰ The reality is that although the IS-LM model was developed on the basis of the theory belonging to the parent of public policies that use the growth of aggregate demand, if necessary by massive state contracts, it analyzes the relation between demand and supply of goods/investments and saving in its optimal, of equilibrium, relationship with the relationship between supply and demand, as a given. The public policies are considered only indirectly through their effects on investments and savings. Sure, as we shall see immediately, public policies are also taken into account in other models. In our analysis, it is essential to

³⁰ cf. Olivier Blanchard, David H. Johnson, *Macroeconomics*. 6th Edition, New York, Pearson, 2013, pp. 85-96, especially p. 93 fig 5-6.

understand that there is a kind of a “natural ratio”, a desirable balance between the money and the goods market that ensure the healthy functioning of the economy, regardless of the components, the variables that influence the two markets. What this basic model says is that if we keep the demand and supply of goods, respectively the demand and supply of money, each one in its balance and if we keep the two balances in equilibrium, then the economy is healthy. Moreover, this simple model tells us that the capitalist economy does not have inscribed in the genetics of its core, i.e. the market, the appearance of the major imbalances that are the crises.

As for the market, the ideas outlined below are clear: under non-violent conditions it is impossible to cartelize or monopolize the market in the long run or with disastrous consequences for the economy. Under conditions of non-violence and non-intervention, the market has the means to discipline the various actors' natural attempts to speculate. This simple model shows that, considering the market as a given in which no exogenous interventions or endogenous violence occur, the economy can know the so-called cycles, but they do not automatically imply a crisis, but periods of economic growth and contraction, not even around a balance that is more a concept than a reality, as Irving Fischer once said³¹.

It is interesting to note that the IS-LM model implies the equilibrium between the goods and financial market, and the four theoretical positions that found systematic causes for the crisis only referred to the financial aspect; if these developments are related to the very nature of capitalism is an object for an independent analysis that does not occur here. Our argumentation is that in capitalism, at this depth level that is the market without public policy interventions, crises are not necessary, but not impossible. In rather rare situations the market can lead to crises, but it generally has the means to eliminate this risk, and when the crisis arises, the market alone would actually play the role of eliminating non-viable economic actors by “punishing” exactly those who created the crisis. This is fair market, which can be understood by the IS-LM model, beyond the standard interpretations of economists who see in it only a model that needs to be improved by introducing public policies as a further variable³².

A more complex variant of an economic model is the so-called *AS-AD Model* which also includes, besides the commodity and financial ones, the labor market; central for this model is the balance between aggregate supply (AS) and aggregate demand (AD). Both AS and AD are determined as a balance between production and price levels. This model also studies the dynamics of the equilibrium that is established between the two elements, also in terms of production and price

³¹ Investopedia, *Economic Cycle*, 2018a in <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economic-cycle.asp>.

³² cf. Olivier Blanchard, David H. Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 85 compared with David Romer, *Advanced macroeconomics. 4th edition*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 2012, p. pp. 242-244.

Of course, as stated by Romer (David Romer, *op. cit.*, 2012, p. 244), aggregate demand also includes government spending, but if they did not intervene as a result of public policies, but simply as a participation in the market, then all the considerations in this paper stand. Obviously, this is rather a hypothetical consideration, but this hypothetical character itself confirms the idea that public policy interventions seriously distort the market, contributing to both the entry and exit from the crisis. But let's not get ahead of ourselves.

level³³. Although the economists are studying the model in order to show the behavior of the variables under the intervention of public policies – in particular by modifying the amount of money or budget deficit³⁴ – we are interested in observing that being more sophisticated, this model is also inspired by the Keynesian economy, even if it was formulated more recently, and that all the considerations we have made earlier apply to it as well. That is, as a last resort, we can assume that the money, goods and labor market can balance, can operate in a cycle of expansion and contraction without having to go into crisis. But, we repeat, all previous considerations apply to it.

The brief presentation of these two models shows that the central element of the capitalist economy, the market, be it of goods, money or labor and all of them in interaction, has cyclical evolutions with periods of expansion followed by contraction without the need for a crisis. This level described by the two models is the depth one, specific to the capitalist economy without political intervention. But, as we shall see immediately, economists themselves consider these models to be insufficient and introduce other models that explicitly include public policy as a variable. The reason they do this is correct, because a capitalist economy in its purest form with an absolutely free market has never existed. Everywhere the market is distorted in one way or another by public policies. In reality, there is only this combination made up from the market's depth level, of course from the point of view of the capitalist economy, and the medium level represented by public policies. From a theoretical perspective – and the model of crises' causes proposed here, as any model, is based on theory – these three levels (of depth, medium and surface) can and must be highlighted.

In our analysis, the level of depth is described by the two main models that take the variables they use (output, income, inflation, etc.) as given and neutral, natural to the market. Such a situation described by these models is not impossible – it is a whole different discussion if this market could be a perfect market – on the contrary, it is even probable and, in many ways, desirable. For a long time, that is to say, up to the end of the nineteenth century, state intervention in the market by public policy was minimal, monetary policies were largely left to private banks, and the state's fiscal policies were minimal, both regarding taxation as well as public expenditures. Thus, it is not difficult to represent a market-based economy and, above all, it is not difficult to understand the objective aspect of the market, even though today is combined with the voluntarist aspect of public policy, both in the economy and in the theoretical analyzes. This is why, even if the economic reality is placed at this intersection between the depth and the median levels, from the conceptual point of view we distinguish these two levels.

The first two models are appropriate for understanding the depth level of the balance between different variables that create stable economic conditions and the natural expansions and contractions of the market process. The two models below explain this mix of economy and public policy, mainly monetary and fiscal

³³ cf. Olivier Blanchard, David H. Johnson, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-142 (especially p. 135 fig. 7-1, p. 137 fig. 7-3b, p.140 fig. 7-5 and p. 141 fig. 7-6).

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 142.

policies: what quantity of money must exist on the market, what interest rate, what level of taxation, etc.

The first model is the IS-MP Model, i.e. the relationship between the commodities market and monetary policy; in fact, as in the IS-LM model, this model is about a balance between supply and demand for goods, whose expression is mathematically equivalent to the expression that describes the balance between investment and saving; hence the IS part is the same as in the first model presented. The equilibrium between demand and supply of money is replaced by the equilibrium relationship between money and interest rates; hence MP for Monetary Policy, as the Central Bank has as its main purpose the control of inflation through the quantity of currency, having as instrument the interest rates. In the full IS-MP model, a balance must be struck between, on one hand, the equilibrium between investment and saving (the commodities market) and, on the other hand, the equilibrium between the interest rate and the money supply, which obviously no longer depends on the free money market as such but on the monetary policy of the Central Bank³⁵. It can easily be observed that, on the one hand, there is an intervention of the public/political decision in the economy and, on the other hand, that this intervention, even if it has important consequences on the real economy, is not at the same level as the fundamentals of the economy. It can be easily seen that this is the case by returning to the theory of money in which their fiat money form, meaning monetary markings supported by a central bank, is a later invention and is disputed to date by a large number of economists. At the level of theoretical foundations, a commodity is exchanged for another commodity, and money is nothing but a commodity of great value, non-perishable and easily divided into smaller units. From the fact that a central bank can adopt a public policy of quadrupling the quantity of money, but cannot create more gold than it has in its safes, the difference between economic fundamentals and public policy intervention can be immediately understood. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that since Adam Smith the term used for a long time to denote economic science was *political economy*, not *economics*. The irony is that when the term was first used, political interventions were much smaller than today, when the second term is used. It is important to remind once again that the existing economy, as we know it, is in the form of this mix, which does not prevent us, however, especially when talking about the causes of the crisis and their remedies, to distinguish between levels. Knowing that something is at a certain level, we discover where the cause is from and we are prepared to treat it properly.

The second model that integrates public policies and which we present is also a development, this time of the AS-AD model. It is the so called *ASI-ADI Model*, namely the aggregate supply pondered by inflation and the aggregate demand pondered by inflation. This model is about integrating the level of inflation that is targeted by the Central Bank. As with AS-AD, this model is about two curves that need to be in equilibrium, but each of these curves, ASI and ADI have to integrate inflation. For this reason, when calculating ASI, no account is taken of production and prices, but of the national income (equal to the

³⁵ John Sloman, Alison Wride, Dean Garratt, *Economics. Ninth Edition*, Harlow, Pearson Education, 2015, p. 582.

production), and the inflation rate. Things are the same for ADI, and also when the two curves are combined, the variables to which they relate are the national income and the inflation rate³⁶. And in this case, since a central bank's main function is to target inflation, it can easily be observed that the model captures a relevant public policy, so from our perspective it describes the same mix between the two levels, the fundamental and the intermediate one.

The conclusion of this discussion is that the economic fundamentals must be at least conceptually distinguished from the intermediate level represented by public policies. The facts at the surface level cannot be conceptually analyzed by way of a proper model³⁷ because the reality that such a model would try to organize is multi-faceted, it integrates disparate aspects: incorrect banking practices, large Wall Street bonuses, the rating agencies' lack of correctitude, the creditors and borrower's euphoria, etc. Such issues could be reduced in the end to the performance of the models from the first or the second class; more technically expressed, some "exceptional" values of the variables in these models are precisely expressions of such surface causes (because induced by them)³⁸. If we wish we can even consider that such aspects as surface causes are extreme manifestations of the two previous levels³⁹. Conceptually, however, they are surface causes precisely because they are independent from economic fundamentals or public policies; they can affect the balanced functioning of these two latter levels. However, we consider them to be surface causes because – even if they manifest themselves (as extreme tendencies of the variables) at the level of market fundamentals – they would be corrected by the market itself, which penalizes unethical behavior (e.g. excessive speculation). Even if they were produced by excesses in public policies, such as deregulation made without prior impact studies, political life itself would impose their correction through the voting process, of course, harder to do because the process takes longer and, hence, is costlier. The two corrective processes do not take place either at a fundamental economic or political level, because of the interaction between systems: the politician insists on bail-out from the desire to avoid being forced to manage an aggravated situation, respectively the economic lobby puts pressure at some point for deregulation and, after the crisis hits, for intervention. In this economic and political space there are many phenomena we qualify as surface causes of crises and which are indeed just exaggerations, "deformities" introduced in the above economic models. For this reason, we cannot say more, we cannot order these causes (an incomplete list of them can be found above in the explanations given by Blinder, Feldstein or Münchau for the present crisis).

Once again, we can see that the economic reality consists of all three levels, but we can distinguish between them not only conceptually, as we have already done,

³⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 582-583, in particular figure 19.15 and figure 19.16.

³⁷ We have to clarify: this surface level is integrated in our general model of causes; but this integration does not contradict the fact that at this level in itself it can't be shaped an interpretative model, analogous to those in the depth, respectively intermediary levels.

³⁸ Obviously, we are referring to the functioning of the real economy

³⁹ We can see that the management's greed or the unethical behaviour are independent causes of surface; but such behaviours are facilitated by specific functioning of the economy's depth and intermediary levels. The next article will clarify further these aspects.

but even at the level of reality when there are times of crisis and remedies are proposed and introduced. For example, at a meeting held on October 13, 2008 between Paulson and the leaders of America's largest nine banks, there was an occurrence that best expresses the distinction between the fundamental economic and public policy levels. When Wells Fargo's Chairman Richard Kovacevich protested against the Treasury's offer to inject taxpayer's money for capitalizing his bank, arguing that "his bank was not in difficulty because of investments in exotic mortgages and did not need bail-out"⁴⁰, the Chairmen of Bank of America (Ken Lewis) and Morgan Stanley (John Mack) argued that they also did not need bail-out because they could raise capital from the market⁴¹. Eventually, they were all forced to take the money. Thus, in regard to the economic fundamentals, we observe, that even when the leaders of the financial sector want to keep them separate from the political, they cannot do that. This circumstance shows that even the levels of analysis can be separated, the politicians make serious intrusions into the fundamentals of the economy. An example in the opposite direction is that of the pressure made by the economic lobby in the late 1970s and early 1980s for deregulation without interest for the common good and only to the benefit of large corporations⁴². In itself, this move would not have been negative had it led to the full restoration of the market that would have played its fundamental role. Unfortunately, the same lobby, after enjoying the benefits of deregulation – especially in the financial and housing sectors – in the 1990s and early 2000s, suddenly, since 2008, faced with the speculative real estate bubble, began to press for state aid. Of the nine bankers mentioned above, only three were opposed initially, the other six enthusiastically embracing the offer. Examples of pressures on politics generated by a purely personal interest, i.e. for bonuses, made by US bank leaders can also be given. Thus, regarding Kovacevich's position, analysts argued that although it was economically correct, his bank not needing to be helped⁴³, he had a strong reason to refuse the Treasury because he feared losing his retirement benefits, estimated at \$ 43 million in cash and \$140 million in shares if the state injected money into the Wells Fargo⁴⁴.

In short, the problem that we are going to discuss in the next article – based on the third assessment procedure of the response to the crisis –, i.e. the consistency between this response and the principles put forward, can already be discerned from this analysis of how the economy is actually presented as a connection between these three levels. They can be distinguished conceptually, and even in the real economy, through the intermediary of such interventions as we have just mentioned.

⁴⁰ Mark Landler, Eric Dash, *Drama Behind a \$250 Billion Banking Deal*, New York Times, 2008 in <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/15/business/economy/15bailout.html>.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*.

⁴² James E. Sawyer, *Why Reaganomics and Keynesian Economics Failed*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 1987, p. 134.

⁴³ This in the context that at the beginning of the meeting, Paulson stated that he did not believe that there was a bank manager willing to refuse a cash infusion cf. Mark Landler, Eric Dash, *op. cit.*, in <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/15/business/economy/15bailout.html>.

⁴⁴ cf. Mark Landler, Eric Dash, *op. cit.* in <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/15/business/economy/15bailout.html>.

After this long series of explanations, we can show that the model consists of the economic fundamentals, the public policies intervening in them and mostly behavioral surface causes, visible as extreme values – statistically speaking, outliers – of depth and intermediate variables. It is difficult to consider such surface causes as determinant, but they are present and influence the economic equilibrium. Let us now see to what extent and in what way do the measures taken against the crisis respond to this causal model. For things to be clear, according to previous argumentation, at the deepest level of economic fundamentals, crises are not necessary in capitalism, but not impossible. Theoretically speaking – this statement cannot be extended to the real economy, where perfect or free of political intrusion market doesn't exist – crises at this profound level should rather be an exception. But this is a counterfactual claim, practically impossible to be confronted with the facts. Ultimately this is a hypothesis that economists can embrace according to their theoretical orientation. Or philosophers, usually according to their ideological orientation.

Certainly, it is more than a speculation to observe that the way Marx thought socialism (the first phase of communism) where “the individual producer gets back from society – after deductions - exactly what he has given it”⁴⁵ would have been viable if socialism had developed from a capitalist society with a perfect market. But Marx developed his ideas by interpreting British capitalism, that was far from having a perfect market. It is not without interest to observe in passing that it has been reproached to Marx that he formulated an ideal model of communism; it is very likely that his detachment from reality is due to the fact that he has worked – if our intuition is correct – with an ideal model of capitalism, with a perfect market. It is too often forgotten that the market presupposed as the central instrument of capitalism is essentially different from the much-celebrated competitive model of the perfect market that is as utopian as Marx's full communism. To emphasize the above hypothesis, we must note that there are left-wing Libertarians who descend directly from Marx, even if they do not recognize this, as there are right-wing Libertarians. The ones and the others are equally utopian when the first group considers that for moral reasons common ownership could meet the needs of each person, or, on the contrary, when the second group considers also for moral reasons that on the basis of private property one might give up what is necessary for those who have no property to live on. Holy naivety is the same in both cases.

Returning to the argument, however, if we take into account this level of economic fundamentals that could exceptionally lead to the crisis, it is clear that economic rebalancing should be produced by the market. In other words, if we study the public policy response to such a situation, the only relevant measure would be to refrain from interventions based on reasoning: the market is independent, it produces imbalances, then it will correct them. We should not be surprised, but for the specialists – if the decision not to intervene is a technical one, taken after the problem has been registered on the public agenda and nonintervention is found as the better alternative – abstaining from intervention

⁴⁵ Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, London, Dodo Press, 2009, p. 8.

is also a policy⁴⁶. In fact, the US authorities did so at the beginning of the Great Depression of 1929-1933, the effects of this judgment convincing decision-makers to change their minds and to intervene.

At the intermediate level, it is about active public policies, decisions taken to master the crisis. During the Great Depression, there were two types of politically determined measures, one backed by Keynes that applied the idea of increasing aggregate demand by public infrastructure programs, the other being of regulating certain markets, the best example of this being the *Glass-Steagall Act*. Aggregate demand growth measures adopted at the intermediate level of public policies have also responded to the epiphenomena, the surface causes of the crisis, such as the fall in US agricultural exports in the late 1920s. In the case of the recent crisis, the measures were also taken on two levels, the strictly economical one, respectively in terms of regulations, both being political decisions. Until now, we have only discussed the issue of economic measures. We will now briefly refer to the regulatory issues.

It is appropriate to evaluate the measures taken in a separate way, namely the USA and the EU, mainly Germany that gave the cue in the Union. In the case of the US, as we have already pointed out in the previous article, the measures taken primarily addressed surface issues such as the impossibility of mortgage payments, the lack of bank liquidity, exaggerated bonuses, and so on. As we have already shown, these measures of capital injection, takeover of toxic assets, guarantee of loans, etc. viewed together, outline an image in which, in full anti-Keynesian liberalism, Keynes's idea of increasing aggregate demand is dissimulated, not through direct state investments but by capital support of various private players. This is clearly a public policy at an intermediate level designed to support the functioning of the whole economy and to eliminate the intermediate cause which was the blocking of the markets generated by the effects of deregulation.

Moreover, if we look at the fact that the Fed has increased in a few years the amount of money four times, and we remember the economic models outlined above, we understand that these intermediate level public policies could affect the very economic fundamentals in the medium and long term. The big problem for the decision-makers, which knew that money was needed and that only a small part of the issued currency would go into circulation, was to decide on the amount of money to be printed. For the moment, at least, the fundamental economic equilibria were not affected by this amount of money because it has been and still is held by various private banks in their accounts at the Fed. This amount of roughly \$ 4 trillion is a huge liability for the US economy and society. By evaluating this policy, we can say that it even responded very well to the surface causes/problems, that is to say, the financial market's functioning was reinstated in short time. At the same time, this decision was also a good response for the intermediate level, where the public policy – simply anticyclical – of

⁴⁶ cf. Wilson, Richard, *Policy Analysis As Policy Advice in The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy* eds. Michael Moran, Martin Rein, Robert E. Goodin, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 153-154 and Werner Jann, Kai Wegrich, *Theories of the Policy Cycle in Handbook of Public Policy Analysis. Theory, Politics and Methods* eds. Frank Fischer, Gerald J. Miller, Mara S. Sidney, Boca Raton, CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2007, p. 46.

increasing supply of money had yielded results in the medium term. The problem arises in the long run. Firstly, what will happen with the huge amount of dollars issued. Secondly, when the state resorts to bail-outs, introducing a huge moral hazard, can we still talk about a free capitalist market, where the winners and the losers are decided? This, if we remember, enjoyed a warning from Hayek⁴⁷, but he referred in particular to the ever-deeper connection between big firms and the English government during the time of World War II. But who cared about the warnings of an implacable liberal when the game was about something more important than a war, that is the survival of Wall Street with its famous earnings of 40% of all profits made in the American economy and with a contribution to GDP of 8% in 2007⁴⁸. In short, the positive assessment made by economists to the US's anti-crisis response is based on a short-medium time preference which favors the financial sector. This assessment has to be weighted with the afferent long-run risks not only for the American economy, but for the global one. This is the result of a fundamental choice of the American variety of capitalism that also reverberates on other contemporary varieties of capitalism.

The second set of measures consisted of regulations, in order to eliminate the risks on medium and long term. The most important such regulation, of an intermediary level in our model addressed to the economic fundamentals was the *Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203*, adopted in July 2010. It had, as stated in its Preamble, as finality the creation of financial stabilization “to end «too big to fail», to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts”⁴⁹. To achieve these objectives, the law provided for numerous measures that could be systematized into two main categories. The first one includes the measures related to the strengthening of the institutional framework by creating new supervisory entities, respectively by strengthening the powers of the existing ones, and, in the second category, there were the measures taken in the field of financial services grouped according to their content: investments, hedge funds, borrowers, operations with various financial instruments such as swaps, securities, ratings, directors' responsibility and compensation, etc.

Part of the first category were the establishment of the *Financial Stability Oversight Council*, tasked primarily with overseeing non-banking financial activities (Sections 111-123), of the *Office of Financial Research* (Sections 151-156), of the *Investor Advisory Committee*, tasked with the study and development of rules for brokers, dealers and investment advisors (911-919D), of the *Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection*, which was tasked with controlling the very large banks, savings associations and credit unions, had the right to impose fines and was obliged to report to Congress (Section 1001-1048, especially Section 1025 for very large banks). Also included in this category were provisions for optimizing the activity of existing institutions with regulatory, supervision and

⁴⁷ Hayek, Friedrich A., *The Road to Serfdom*, New York, Rutledge, 2006, pp. 42-43.

⁴⁸ cf. UNCTAD Secretariat Task Force, (2009), *The global economic crisis: Systemic failures and multilateral remedies*, New York, United Nations, 2009, pp. 21-22.

⁴⁹ US Congress, *Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act*, Public Law 111–203. 124 Stat. 1376-2223, Washington DC., 2010, p. 1376 in <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf>

guaranteeing functions: the increase of the authority of the *Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve* so that it could oversee non-banking financial companies and holdings containing banks (Section 161-176), the strengthening of the role of the *Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation* (FDIC) as a legal liquidation authority (Section 201-207) and the more clear establishment of this institution's role in the reform of the deposits' guarantee system and in the elimination of procyclical assessments (Sections 331-336). Also, to the *Controller General*, as director of the *Governmental Accounting Office* were given powers regarding contracting, buying and renting of goods (Sections 300-319) and the powers of supervision of the financial regulation's system of the *Office* as such were strengthen (Sections 981-989J)⁵⁰.

Part of the second category, that included measures to regulate various activities in the financial field were: the adaptation of a long list of amendments to fundamental documents such as the *Federal Reserve Act*, the *Federal Housing Act*, the *Banking Act*, the *Bank Holding Company Act* or the *Bank Service Company Act*, laws adopted between 1934 and 1992 (Sections 351-378), the strengthening of regulation for hedge funds (Sections 401-416), the improvement of regulations for insurance and reinsurance companies (Sections 511-542), an entire title, VI, dedicated to improving the regulation of the activity of banks, savings associations, holding companies and depository institutions (Sections Sec 601 -628), the transparency of accounting regulations regarding Wall Street with special attention to swaps (with provisions on abusive swaps and their prohibition – Sections 714-715 – and, in particular, the explicit ban on the government to make bail-outs for these entities⁵¹ - Section 716), regulating their market in detail, whether they were based on loans and interest, or on securities (Sections 701-774). Also, rules were formulated to optimize the protection of investors and holders of securities (Sections 901-929Z), the regulation of rating agencies was improved (Sections 931-939H), especially regarding asset-based securities (Sections 941-946). The regulations regarding the protection of the financial consumer were also been optimized (Sections 1052-1079A) and, in connection with this, more than 25 amendments were made to various laws regarding credits, electronic transfers, the *Federal Trade Commission* (Sections 1081-1100H), etc. Title IX also provided for the Fed's duties (Sections 1101-1109), of which the most important for the crisis situations was section 1105, which concerned financial emergency stabilization. Title XII's provisions were formulated to improve access to the main financial institutions (Sections 1201-

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁵¹ Swaps are financial instruments that consist of certain assets made up from a principal and its interest. The trading mechanism is this: a bank created an institution of its own – which, under the argument that it was a separate institution, was not highlighted in the bank's balance sheet and endowed it with such instruments, another bank doing exactly the same procedure. When banks made the swap, they usually exchange not the assets themselves but the interest rates of those assets, the purpose of the exchange being usually to swap a variable interest rate with a fixed one so that the bank interested in earning more took the variable interest rate, and the bank interested in security taking the fixed interest rate. By section 716, *Dodd-Frank Act* (US Congress, *op. cit.*) prohibits the federal government from bailing-out entities set up by banks to trade such swaps over the counter.

1210), whilst Title XIII was devoted to assessing the achievements of TARP (Sections 1301-1306), with particular reference to section 1302 that reduced authorizations granted to the Treasury through TARP. Title XIV was concerned with better regulation of mortgage lending and the elimination of pre-existing loans (Sections 1401-1498). Finally, Titles XV and XVI looked at various contracts and various secondary provisions regarding restrictions on US funds for foreign governments, on the publication of payments, etc. (Sections 1501-1506 and Sections 1601 respectively)⁵².

Analyzing this particularly dense document in which it seems that legislators wanted to cover with regulations not only everything that was involved in the crisis, but also everything that functions on the financial market, it is enough to observe two elements that point to a fundamental difference from the regulations introduced after the Great Depression, in particular through the *Glass-Steagall Act*. The first observation is that at the time of the Great Depression it was desired to decouple the deposit and lending activities from the investment banking ones, respectively from the insurance institutions and from the corporations acting in the real economy; in other words, the economic and financial market was effectively redesigned. Most likely, this was one of the key reasons why capitalism, even though it has known stock market crashes, has not experienced any serious economic crisis in the half of century those provisions were in place. It took nearly 20 years of deregulation to make the recent crisis produce its effects. Deregulation had restructured the market not just the practices on it, producing real conglomerates with various financial-banking operations but also with investment ones and real economy activities. The *Dodd-Frank Act* regulations left exactly the same structure of the market, working only on the practices of the market. But banks' ingenuity is well known, especially in the context of informational asymmetry in relation to their customers. Under these circumstances, we must not be surprised that, for example, the directors' bonuses – the first ones interested – returned to the pre-crisis levels even in the year when the *Dodd-Frank Act* was adopted. Of course, politicians have an excuse that they have been obliged to take into account the economic and financial realities, the degree of integration between the elements in the market being much higher than in 1929-1933. The second observation is that the *Dodd-Frank Act* has no special provision to strengthen the Fed's obligation to efficiently sterilize and organize certain amounts of money. In fact, as we have shown above, quantitative easings took place during the debates and adoption of *Dodd-Frank Act*.

We can now formulate an assessment of the US authorities' intervention against the crisis, considering both the immediate measures by which the quantity of dollars needed to stimulate the economy was created and the regulatory measures aimed at facilitating the conduct of market processes without excessive speculation (i.e. without the rise in assets price, followed by the emergence of a speculative bubble and of the crisis). Even though some of the measures have been taken and adopted by and through the Fed, both TARP and *Dodd-Frank Act*, and even the QEs made by adapting the Fed's fiscal-monetary

⁵² US Congress, *op.cit.*

policies to the situation, are the fruit of politicians' decision. Thus, they were measures taken from the intermediate level of the capitalist economic complex and were directed to phenomena manifesting at the surface and depth levels. The treatment of immediate causes can be regarded as a success, as is the case, but it must be remembered that through it an important factor of uncertainty for the future was introduced and diffused both on an internal scale, the US economy, and on a global scale through the quadrupling of the amount of dollars in just a few years. For the success of the second set of measures – the regulations contained in the *Dodd-Frank Act* – it is too early for them to have had their effects; less than a decade after their adoption the financiers are still reserved, but their appetite for profits and bonuses and the fact that the specific provisions did not limit it are very bad signs for the evaluation of this bill. If after the deregulations of the 1980s it took almost three decades until the arrival of the crisis, under the conditions of insufficient and not properly calibrated new regulations, it may take other several decades to reach a new, even greater crisis. The main defect of post-crisis regulations is that they did not aim at restructuring the market, but just at managing the existing practices, a mechanism that, as we have seen, can be bypassed. It is no wonder in these conditions of a rather mixed assessment (a positive response to the surface causes and a less positive one to the intermediate and depth causes) of the American anti-crisis measures that many economists warn that the crisis may come back at any time.

The second assessment exercise is for the European Union and, in particular, for the euro area, based on the generally acknowledged reality – by economists, politicians, etc. – that Germany is the main responsible for determining the crisis response for the entire euro area, seconded by France. However, we must point out that at the same time, as explained in the previous article, at least in regards to the immediate measures taken against the crisis, the countries of the Union – whether or not in the euro area – had some degree of independence. These differences, which in some cases were more than beneficial (see the case of Hungary and Bulgaria) are paradoxically due to the absences from the *Treaty of the European Union* and from the *Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union* of certain provisions on common fiscal policies and the absence of German will to interpret as quickly as possible Article 48 TEU and Article 136 TFEU⁵³ in the direction of helping during the crisis the euro area countries in difficulty. Until the long-term measures – that would take place between 2010 and 2012 – entered into full force in 2013, each euro or non-euro country in the Union had a consistent discretion, with the pros and cons of this fact. As for the immediate measures, we have already shown that Germany – in its ordo-liberal tradition of collaboration between the real economy, the financial sector and the state in order to maintain low deficits and inflation – proceeded correctly, immediate taking counter-cyclical measures, injecting capital and guaranteeing loans (with the fortunately avoided risk of higher inflation and deficits). France did the same

⁵³ Paola Bilancia, *The Current State of the Governance of the Eurozone and the Increase in the European Democratic Deficit in The Consequences of the Crisis on European Integration and on the Member States the European Governance between Lisbon and Fiscal Compact* ed. Stelio Mangiameli, Belin, Springer, 2017, pp. 68-69.

thing, both states leaving the propaganda to the smaller states – “strangely”, in many cases those outside the eurozone – willing to listen to it. These immediate measures, addressed to the surface causes, had, as was economically normal, success in both Germany and France. From what we have already analyzed here, it can be seen that these measures were all the more successful as they were closer to an anti-cyclical character.

More interesting, but in no way harder to assess, are the measures taken in the EU almost in all euro or non-euro countries to regulate long-term financial-banking activities so as to avoid crises. It must be said from the outset that at this level there is a clear division between European measures, which generally and mainly concern the monetary policy of the ECB, the rules regarding fiscal policy, made by each state, and the measures concerning the banking institutions whose regulation was also left to each state. The latter aspect will not be dealt because it is too varied and does not fall directly into the subject of this research, but it must be said, however, that in monetary terms, policies are made by the ECB – which, in turn, implements a stricter provisions of the Basel agreements – the national central banks having no other role than to implement these decisions⁵⁴. It is normal for a globalized financial industry to follow these universal-purpose agreements. In addition, national banks and national law enforcement authorities have the task of regulating and supervising non-banking financial institutions or of establishing specific national rules for all financial institutions, provided they do not contradict European ones. We will deal here with the first aspect of general European policies.

It is a generally acknowledged fact⁵⁵ that Germany has an important voice in the EU and, in particular, in its monetary policy, requiring the ECB, which is in Frankfurt like the German *Bundesbank*, to pursue the same rigorous policy of controlling the quantity of money and of targeting inflation in order to keep it within the 1-2 percent range considered ideal for economic stability. By introducing amendments to Article 136 of the TFEU⁵⁶, the Union cannot only provide assistance to Member States in financial difficulty but can also impose fiscal constraints⁵⁷. European fiscal regulations currently operate on this legal basis. We highlight these constraints because, in the view of their German architects, the states are compelled to comply with certain fiscal targets; they are forced to take appropriate financial regulation measures. But the reality is resilient, as we will see that these financial institutions often escape national regulations.

Returning to the anti-crisis measures that shift from the immediate to long-term reaction, it must be said that the European Union has reacted late, mainly due to Germany’s resilience, with the establishment in May 2010 of the *European Financial Stability Facility*, consisting of 440 billion euro (funded by the

⁵⁴ For a summary of the regulations in the EU countries see Katarzyna Sum, *Post-Crisis Banking Regulation in the European Union. Opportunities and Threats*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp. 242-246, particularly table 6.10 on page 243.

⁵⁵ See, for example, Javier Bilbao-Ubillos (ed.), *The Economic Crisis and Governance in the European Union. A Critical Assessment*, London, Routledge, 2014 and Sergio Fabbrini, *Which European Union? Europe after the Euro Crisis*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015.

⁵⁶ cf. Paola Bilancia, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 69, n.5.

Eurozone) and, in parallel, forming the *European Financial Stabilization Mechanism* (EFSF), authorized to guarantee up to 60 billion euro collected from the free market⁵⁸. These are intermediate level measures because the peak of the crisis had already passed and the first reactions had taken place. The real long-term measures were the evolution of the EFSF in February 2012 into the *European Stability Mechanism* (ESM), which was a treaty that replaced the aforementioned programs, endowed with an intergovernmental oversight organization. This institution oversaw the various bail-out programs in Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Ireland, Latvia, Romania or Spain, some of them still underway (for example Greece), with a total of approximately 550 billion euro⁵⁹. Only a month later, 25 Member States (Croatia was not yet in the EU, while the UK and the Czech Republic rejected it) concluded the *Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union*, the so-called *Fiscal Compact*, the core of the treaty being “undoubtedly the golden rule of the balanced budget [...] the state’s annual budget must not exceed the structural deficit of 0.5% of GDP”⁶⁰. It is worth mentioning that in 2009 Germany had even introduced in the Constitution (Article 115) that the budget deficit could be only 0.35% of the nominal Gross Domestic Product, and when it exceeded 1.5% it had to be reduced in line with the economic cycle⁶¹. It is particularly important to note that Germany that imposed this mythology had, however, taken care to specify in its Constitution that after exceeding 1.5% of the GDP the deficit should be reduced, but this is also capital, in line with the economic cycle. Thus, the German state aimed to take measures to reduce the deficit when the economy was expanding, not contracting. Of this part of its constitutional provisions, Germany did not spoke at all, as it preferred not to speak about the fact that its development in the 1960s-1970s, as that of China today, was made by indebtedness and deficits. Of course, there is a whole discussion about how to use this money, but what we are interested in here is something else and we will show it immediately.

In short, the Fiscal Compact’s reasoning was to ensure by fiscal pressure on states that they do not go too far and do not have too large deficits, so they can resist the shock of a crisis. In addition, it was to be expected that each state was interested in seriously regulating the financial market precisely to avoid such shocks, knowing that it had these fiscal constraints. That was the ideal thing in the Euro-German plan. The reality is that few states had a relationship between government and banking as Germany; most of the Central, Eastern and Southern European states had much less control over the financial and banking sector and a low impact force on it as long as it is dominated by German, French, Dutch banks, etc. who could withdraw their capital at any time. In short, Germany’s policy in Europe was inspired by a double measure: monetary union and the rejection of a fiscal union. Monetary union is necessary for the Single Market, which is decisive for Germany’s export economy. A fiscal union involves common

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 66-67.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 68.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 73.

⁶¹ Bundestag, *Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Berlin, 2018 in <http://www.bundestag.de/gg>.

taxes and expenses by way of a common budget. Transfers from Dortmund to Palermo. This is unacceptable for Germany. Against this background, the fiscal imbalances in Italy, for example, jeopardized the stability of the euro and the Single Market, i.e. the interests of Germany. What could the latter do? To impose compulsory fiscal targets in the European Union, in the euro area and in Italy. Thus, other economies with different competitiveness (for various reasons, not just productivity), after being deprived of their own monetary policies that deprive them, for example, of the devaluation mechanism for their own currency and the stimulation of exports, were forced to set their fiscal policies within the limits convenient to Berlin: “the German decision-makers have to embrace the mental structure of all for one and one for all [...] the Three Musketeers are more desirable than the Four Knights of the Apocalypse”⁶². On the whole, it is a wonder that the Union still exists. In fact, even though the European Semester mechanism has institutionalized state budget reviews by the Commission, in reality, in the fifth year of operation of the Mechanism, no sanction was imposed on the countries that did not respect the budget deficit ceiling⁶³).

We understand that long-term European crisis-prevention measures were rather trying to stimulate Member States to better supervise financial-banking activity. As in the US, no market restructuring measures were taken, financial and banking institutions continuing to develop the same entangled activities. Each state, to the extent that it was able or interested, took its own steps to regulate the practice of these activities, far from being as significant as in the US⁶⁴. The financial markets in these countries are much less developed than those of the US and consequently the level of speculation is lower. As for the success of long-term European fiscal measures, it is rather questionable if Germany and France want at least to get closer to the idea of a fiscal union. Or, the political trend today is exactly the opposite, with a Europe on different speeds. It is worth noting that the European anti-crisis measures are the reflex of certain policies – rather than the response to the real economic needs of the different countries – even more so than those from US. And for this reason, the assessment of European exit policies is even more reserved than that of the American ones.

In front of this careful and long-term analysis of the crisis and of the interventions against it one must place the main attitude of governments, the bail-out that should be interpreted within the third assessment procedure of crisis response. We draw attention once again that this evaluation procedure is also relevant for the next article, in particular for the solution we are proposing for economic crises. This third assessment consists of comparing the response to the crisis as described and the dominant ideology at the level of the main actors, whether they are economists, bankers or politicians. In many cases, like Paulson or Bernanke, the main actors have two or even all three qualities. We will not argue here, but what we sustain are common facts that can be found in any history of

⁶² Franz-Josef Meiers, *Germany's Role in the Euro Crisis: Berlin's Quest for a More Perfect Monetary Union*, London, Springer, 2015, p. 140.

⁶³ European Commission, *2018 European Semester: Country Reports*, 2018 in https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2018-european-semester-country-reports_en.

⁶⁴ As can be seen in Sum, op. cit., pp. 242-246, especially p. 243, table 6.10.

economic thought or economics⁶⁵. Namely that following the half a century of western economic thinking and public policies inspired by Keynesianism and promoters of the regulation of economic and financial markets, there were, since the 1980s, two decades of public policies inspired by the neoliberal economy promoting deregulation. In short, the main actors have advocated deregulation, non-intervention of the state in the market, making the market not only a theoretical model of understanding the economy and its main mechanism, but the only one. Against these ideas and policies strongly encouraged since the Reagan and Thatcher Governments and then followed by Clinton, Bush, Blair, etc., that is to say, by all the important parties, the bail-out appeal appears not only as surprising, but even as contradictory. Politicians such as Paulson and Schäuble, specialists in economy and the stewards of liberalism, converted overnight in the most fervent interventionists. They themselves were, as shown above, so surprised that one might think they had an epiphany and met with Deng's spirit. The most important proof of conversion to interventionism is the bail-out appeal. The bail-out appeal was justified in all cases by the fact that the entities subject to it were too big-to-fail. There is a widespread literature on this claim that some firms are too big and have too many connections at the level of the economy for the political decision-makers to allow them to collapse. This literature is not always favorable to the idea. It is certain that providing insurance for firms in difficulty is justified by the need to eliminate the systemic risk involved in the collapse of a company that is too big to allow this to happen. As the bail-out process for financial firms, and not only in our case, is still a disputed one and because of how often invoked is the idea that a company by its size may involve systemic collapse risk, it is useful to introduce these concepts by calling for the neutral literature such as encyclopedias or dictionaries; then we will come back with more detailed considerations about the processes corresponding the introduced concepts.

According to the *bail-out* concept, this procedure does not necessarily take place through governmental intervention. The concept refers to supporting in one form or another a business that is in difficulty by an external entity, be it an individual, a firm or the government; they provide money, the cash needed by the business, either as loans, bonds, shares, or cash. It is interesting to note that traditionally such operations took place in industries that were not viable anymore, but it was considered that, in particular, losing jobs was difficult to manage⁶⁶. As can be seen, there are important differences between this traditional sense and the dominant motivation of bail-out in the recent crisis.

Another concept associated with rescuing or securing a company in difficulty is *bail-in*. The bail-in procedure is opposed to bail-out in that it does not involve saving the firm by external parties, but by the parties already involved in the firm.

⁶⁵ For example, Jürgen Georg Backhaus, (ed.), *Handbook of the History of Economic Thought Insights on the Founders of Modern Economics*, New York, Springer, 2012 especially pages 689-712; Vivien A. Schmidt, Mark Thatcher (eds.), *Resilient Liberalism in Europe's Political Economy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, who ascertain the survival of neoliberal practices even after the crisis or Paul Dragos Aligica, Vlad Tarko, *Capitalist Alternatives Models, taxonomies, and scenarios*, New York, Rutledge about the liberal or neoliberal character of Eastern European economies.

⁶⁶ Investopedia, *Bailout*, 2018b in <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bailout.asp>.

Thus, in the case of financial institutions, depositors, creditors and shareholders should participate in the bail-in, that is to accept the loss of part of their possessions in order to avoid the collapse of the firm. What is required is that in a similar, but symmetric, procedure of recovering the money in a bankruptcy procedure, in the case of bail-in, there should be rules on who – of shareholders, creditors and depositors – and how much loses. Of course, if it is not a deposit bank or if it is a company other than a financial one, the bail-in should only be done on behalf of shareholders and creditors⁶⁷. We will see in the next article how important is, however, that banks have depositors, and they have less information than the shareholders and the creditors.

The concept of *too-big-to-fail* refers to businesses that have become too big and too involved in the economic fabric to allow their collapse. This would produce a systemic risk that should be avoided. It is obvious that too-big-to-fail's appreciation and intervention in these cases lies with the government, which is the only one accredited to decide for the collective good of the economy. The central issue in the case of too-big-to-fail is that the government that does the bail-out of the respective business must have the competence and means to calculate the negative consequences of the systemic risk in the event of those business collapse, and also to show that there are higher costs for taxpayers than the bail-out's costs⁶⁸. In fact, no one has ever made such a calculation. We will make some brief remarks on this subject in the next article.

Another relevant concept for our discussion is *moral hazard*. The literature provides several definitions, one of which is that moral hazard is the risk that one part of a contract is not of good faith, attempting to win without complying with the terms of the contract; this assumed risk has negative effects on the other party⁶⁹. A more appropriate formulation for the purpose of this paper is: "Moral hazard is the prospect that a risk-protected part behaves differently from the way in which it behaves if exposed to risk; [moral hazard] occurs when an individual or institution does not fully assume the consequences of its action, and thus tends to act less cautiously, leaving another party to bear responsibility for the consequences of this action"⁷⁰. In a general perspective, moral hazard occurs when the common rules of the relationship between the parties are violated so that the parties cannot calculate future developments. Practically, moral hazard is the consequence of breaking the rules, a negative consequence for parties other than those in favor of which the rule was broken; but also, that part can suffer negative consequences, as the one who breaks the rule is not necessarily that part, but can also be a third party. In our case, the first definition of moral hazard applies to the relationship between banks and clients: banks take risks because their earning desire, violating transparency and fair bookkeeping (by actions or

⁶⁷ Investopedia, *Bail-In*, 2018c in <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bailin.asp>.

⁶⁸ Investopedia, *Too Big To Fail*, 2018d in <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/too-big-to-fail.asp>.

⁶⁹ Investopedia, *Moral Hazard*, 2018e in <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/moralthazard.asp>.

⁷⁰ Allard Dembe, Leslie I. Boden, "Moral Hazard: A Question of Morality?", *New Solutions*, Vol 10, No. 3, 2000, p. 276.

instruments outside of the balance sheet) and, ultimately, the consequences are suffered by the investors who bought such banking products. More relevant to the line of our research, the second definition applies if the banks have taken risks outside the market rules and, confronted with bankruptcy, managed to avoid it by state intervention through bail-out. It is like the driver who, knowing he has extensive insurance, drives too quickly knowing he is financially protected; trespassing the traffic rules, the accident hurts all the drivers⁷¹. Financial institutions, in particular banks, knowing that they can be saved by the taxpayer's money, are no longer interested in adhering to market rules and, in the pursuit of profit, knowing themselves protected from bankruptcy, will take excessive risks that can create a crisis if this behavior is sufficiently spread to other institutions of the same kind.

Already from the analysis of these concepts, we understand that it is normal for financial institutions in difficulty firstly to initiate a bail-in. But, as Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser found, "more binding approaches were only adopted if public policy adjustment and official funding did not work; bail-ins are tools used late, if not ultimately"⁷². It should be noted that these views were formulated before the crisis, and that the government's response through public policy to this crisis has fully confirmed this observation.

Secondly, we understand from these concepts that it is desirable that the cost of the bail-out be lower than the cost of the systemic risk generated by the collapse of the firms considered too big. This obviously implies some calculations, several scenarios of systemic risk with a maximum and a minimum of losses and their comparison with the cost of bail-out. Nobody has done this, motivation being purely abstract and ideological: they are too big, the systemic risk is too high compared to the bail-out costs. Exactly this totally inadequate argumentation was used by one of the banks' Chairmen, JPMorgan's Jamie Dimon, when quoting in a letter addressed to Paulson – in a metaphorical form – a statement made by Theodore Roosevelt. Thus, according to Dimon, Paulson, Geithner, or Bernanke were no more or less than "the men in the arena whose faces are full of dust, sweat and blood, who struggle courageously [with the crisis]"⁷³. It is ironic that they have all gained quite well from the positions held and battles fought; the situation was worse for taxpayers, dollar owners, and the financial market: although the system was rebooted, the consciousness that the big players were not penalized and things can start again is still persistent. It would be much more appropriate the recourse to alternative scenarios and pertinent calculations. But...

Third, we can understand that, in the absence of the *Glass-Steagall Act*, financial institutions have indeed grown very large, probably large enough to generate systemic risks. But, beyond the fact that nobody provided such

⁷¹ Barry Ritholtz *Bailout Nation How Greed and Easy Money Corrupted Wall Street and Shook the World Economy*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, p. 162.

⁷² Nouriel Roubini, Brad Setser, *Bail-ins or bailouts: responding to financial crises in emerging economies*, Washington DC., Institute for International Economics, 2004, p. 179.

⁷³ Andrew Ross Sorkin, *Too big to fail: The inside story of how Wall Street and Washington fought to save the Financial System and themselves*, London, Penguin Books, 2010, p. 543.

calculations, the main problem with the regulation is that it needs to restructure the market so companies cannot grow too big, not just deal with the practices of the already excessively big financial companies. The data already presented on the profitability of the financial sector as being much higher than its contribution to GDP clearly shows that firms in this sector have grown too much⁷⁴. In this indirect way, the imbalance recorded in 2008 that the US financial companies had a contribution to GDP of 8% and made 40% of total corporate profits, it is clear that financial firms extract value created in other sectors, are parasitic and it is necessary to restructure the market or leave it free.

The last thing that we need to understand is exactly what we will deal with in the following article, namely that there is a major incoherence between non-interventionism in banks when they make profits and interventionism when they are at risk of bankruptcy. Often the same tenants of market freedom support both movements. The assessment of this behavior can only be negative, as it will be proven in the following article. For the moment, we have to notice that profits remain in the financial system and losses are externalized and that the emergence of crises is stimulated by government policies and, accordingly, short-term success in dealing with the crisis increases the medium and long-term risks of its reemergence on a bigger scale both through the introduction of moral hazard and the enormous increase in liquidity.

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⁷⁴ Imad A. Moosa, *The Myth of Too Big to Fail*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 82-85.

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THE IMPACT OF PIRACY MOVEMENT OFF SOMALIA COAST, THE GULF OF ADEN AND RED SEA TO ETHIOPIA IN LIGHT OF MARITIME SECURITY, DIPLOMACY AND ECONOMY

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Abstract: Following the collapse of central government of Somalia in 1991, the failed state has become a safe haven to various armed groups and terrorists. As various news outlets show dozens of ships were attacked and/or hijacked by Somalia based pirates. Piracy off the coast of Somalia has been a great threat to international shipping services in the Gulf of Aden and the Red sea. For instance, according to One Earth Future Foundation (2011), in 2011, about \$160 million was paid for ransom. Thus, this desk study, collecting data from various secondary sources, aims to assess impacts of piracy movement off Somalia Coast, the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea on Ethiopia on its maritime security, diplomacy and economy. And, this study found out that Ethiopia is and has been one of the victim countries of this movement in the East and Horn Africa region. Thus, Ethiopia in cooperation with other countries in the region and other countries which have a geo-political interest in the area like the USA, China, Saudi Arabia, EU in particular, should work jointly to strengthen the security situation in the main land Somalia, fight pirates inside-and-in the Atlantic Ocean to bring them to justice.

Keywords: Ethiopia, Failed State, off coast Somalia, Piracy, Safe heaven.

1. Introduction

According to the United Nations Law of the Sea convention (LOS), piracy is defined as: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention committed for private ends by the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (I) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (II) Against a ship, aircraft, persons, or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state; (b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act¹.

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** *Ibidem*.

¹ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Montego Bay, December 10, 1982. Available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf Retrieved on 11/12/2017.

Piracy is not a recent phenomenon; present since man has taken to the seas, piracy has always been an issue for seafarers. Piracy truly began when commerce expanded across large bodies of water. Maritime piracy has been around since the beginning of time. While it has washed-out from one area, it appeared on other maritime area. It has never been eradicated, but instead has been pushed to the few remaining lawless patches of the oceans.

Maritime piracy will never be completely eradicated, but through diplomatic and military means the threat can be greatly reduced. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has data of each attack for the purpose of establishing trends and assistance to fight pirates in the volatile region². Despite the fact that no one can exactly know the exact impact of piracy, it is evident that it affects all citizens globally either directly or indirectly. Other point which is also clear at this level is that piracy would not be eradicated totally, but through a coordinated diplomacy and military means, international community can reduce the impact maritime piracy has on global society³.

Somalia has been lacking a functioning state since the overthrow of the military government, led by General Siyad Bare, in 1991 by clan based rebel factions, spearheaded by warlords and politicians. The early 1990's is the saddest period in the history of Somalia where the total collapse of the country began to witness due to the broke out of civil war all over the country. The aftermath of the Somali civil war has been the seceding of many clans from the main Somalia; 1991 was the last time Somalia was united under one government. The collapse of political and civil order in Somalia and the absence of central law enforcement in the coastal regions meant that pirates could vastly increase the profitability of their activities by hijacking and holding ships for ransom. Attacks increased in frequency and audacity. Ships can be held mostly unchallenged by the authorities in the ports of Eyl, Hobyo and Gharardeere until ransom negotiations are concluded. Increasing returns from piracy appear to have funded technological improvements, such as small arms, automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenades. This has raised the stakes for crews who want to resist pirates⁴.

This event has made piracy off the Horn of Africa to grow/increase substantially in recent years. Data from the International Maritime Bureau reveals that there were 22 pirate attacks in 2000, rising to 108 in 2008 and 143 in the first half of 2009. The types of incidents involving pirates in the region have ranged from small-scale captures as in the recent capture of a British couple sailing round the world in their yacht on October, 2009, to large attacks with potential implications for international security, as when the Ukrainian tanker MV Faina was captured along with its cargo of battle tanks, artillery shells and grenade launchers⁵.

Piracy off the coast of Somalia has escalated over the last few years and is a major concern for the international community in general and the neighbouring

² Islam, R.M., *Piracy and its impact on the economy*. Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace Repository. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2010.

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ Leung, C., *Piracy in Somalia: An Economic Analysis of RPG*, New York University, 2010.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

states in particular. The threat is not only primarily to the attacks of ships rather, the threat is to the world states economy, security and environmental impacts⁶.

Somalia has been unwilling or unable to combat piracy within its waters. Its lack of central governance limits the country's capacity to tackle onshore piracy. Furthermore, the active offshore piracy that is taking place in the Gulf of Aden provides a clear indication of the state of anarchy within Somalia. It is not possible to confront piracy without addressing the collapse of the Somali state and the inherent poverty, governance issues, and absence of the rule of law in this troubled region. In addition, the ongoing civil war in Somalia has led to the internal displacement of millions of people, making the country a refuge for suspected terrorist organizations.⁷ Thus, the international community in general and the neighbouring countries in the region with significant military power are the first victims of instability in Somalia due to the fact that they share large boundaries like Ethiopia in particular actors making peace and reconstruction in the war torn country to must enable Somalia to deal with piracy in a meaningful and effective way.

Thus, this desk study attempts to shed light on the growing impact of Somalia maritime piracy and the role that powerful countries like USA, China and Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region especially Ethiopia would play to manage the problem. Besides, the paper assesses the implication of this piracy movement on economy, military and diplomatic areas of Ethiopia and suggest military and diplomatic solutions to access the ports in the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea by Ethiopia.

2. General overview of piracy in Somalia

Piracy off the coast of Somalia is deeply rooted in the population due to various socio-economic causes like poverty, hunger, and civil insecurity. Currently, Puntland has become the centre of this movement for the reason that, strategically, "vessels can be identified and targeted much more easily as they travel through the Gulf of Aden."⁸

2.1. Origins of Piracy in Somalia

Before 1990, piracy was not a main agenda off the coast of Somalia, but like most coastal nations there were irregular occurrences of armed robbery against small fishingboats that fell prey to an armed group, or ships that foundered off the coast. According to a report from a workshop held between 10-21 November in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2008, with the theme "Piracy off the Somali Coast", a more structured form of piracy began in the mid 1990's when some armed groups, claiming they were authorized coast guards in charge of protecting Somalia's fishing resources, attacked vessels they claimed were fishing illegally in their territorial waters and held them for ransom.

⁶ *Ibidem.*

⁷ *Ibidem.*

⁸ Marley, D., *Modern Piracy: A Reference Handbook*. ABC-CLIO, 2011. ISSN: 1598844334, 9781598844337.

This slowly expanded after 2000 to any vessel that sailed close to Somali territorial waters. Both vessels and crews would be held hostage and ransom demanded. During 2005 an increase was noted in the number of attacks being attempted against vessels sailing in the Indian Ocean off the coast of Somalia⁹. By 2006 some of the pirate attacks were extending as far as 350 nm off the coast of Somalia. During 2006 piracy escalated as more attempts were made to hijack ships not only in the Indian Ocean but also in the Gulf of Aden and the mouth of the Red Sea. The phenomenon grew through 2007 from the major pirate bases of Eyl, Hobyo and Haradheere concentrated along the east coast of Somalia. By 2008 this reached outlandish proportions with ships being attacked seemingly at random and whenever the pirates decided. Consequently marine travel off the northern coast of Somalia, known as Puntland, has become the most dangerous region in the world for pirate attacks.

2.2. Why Piracy in Somalia?

Compared to pirate operations in other parts of the world, namely the Java Sea, South China Sea and off the coast of Nigeria, Somalia does not have the natural coastal terrain so required by pirates, namely numerous forested inlets and islands, where ships can be hidden from aerial and maritime surveillance, according to the report from a workshop held between 10-21 November in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2008, with the theme “Piracy off the Somali Coast.”

Somali pirates do not need this type of terrain because their piratical aims are very singular and straight forward, ransom for hostages only. They are not interested in stealing the cargo and/or reusing the ship for other purposes, where there is a need to have a secure location hidden from view where a ship can be concealed while it is renamed and repainted. They are interested in ransom only. When a ship is taken by Somali pirates it and the crew are held for ransom. This is all done off the off Somali coast in a day light. While doing this “...pirates are fully aware that they are relatively secure from any rescue mission being launched directly against them while on the ship.”¹⁰ The only alternative remaining to guarantee a secure and safe conclusion to the hostage situation is the payment of the requested ransom. The above report also noted that one striking aspect of piracy along the Somali coast is that despite differences of location and clan, the methodology used for the targeting, attack and getting hold of ships, and the detention of crews is the same.

2.3. Triggering factors for piracy in Somalia

There are many factors that drive piracy in Somalia. One should not be surprised that piracy has taken root in Somalia given the social upheavals, human hardship, environmental degradation and the entrepreneurial spirit of the Somali.¹¹ Piracy is still there in coastal areas of Somalia despite decreasing in recent years. While the action of piracy involves some risk, the benefits far outweigh that risk, a fact indicated by the few arrests made and fewer deaths and

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p 202.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

injuries suffered by pirates to date. Poverty, lack of employment, environmental hardship, pitifully low incomes, reduction of pastoralist and maritime resources due to drought and illegal fishing and a volatile security and political situation all contribute to the rise and continuity of piracy in Somalia. This situation will remain like this until there is an effective and simultaneous action taken against the pirate trade and an alternative means of income support mechanism implemented to replace it; otherwise criminal activity, in some shape or the other will continue to take priority as a means of generating income among the armed militias of Somalia.

The pirates began to think, believe and act as if they had full right and the duty to attack any illegal ships operating in their water territories from Asia and Europe which extract and exploit their fishing resources. The problem is that:

[Despite] the international community is fully aware that this illegal activity has been going on for nearly seventeen years but has taken no action against it. The pirates believe they are the only option to curtailing this injustice. Equally, the pirates did admit that the initial idea of protecting their coast line has been hijacked to the current situation where any vulnerable vessel is a target. Targeting other ships is supposed to highlight the illegal shipping but has now become such a huge international problem that the origins for the initial actions have been forgotten. However, they do admit that humanitarian aid and other supporting commercial vessels should not be targeted for piratical gain¹².

3. The Economic, Security and Diplomatic implications of Somalia piracy on Ethiopia

Somali piracy presents a regional security threat in various ways for neighbouring countries. Firstly, seen through the framework of the traditional security theory, the links between piracy and insurgent groups affect the stability of the Somali government. In turn, a failed Somali state produces a destabilizing effect on other governments in the region as it provides a suitable route for illicit trade, especially in arms and ammunition. Secondly, using securitization theory, piracy is an economic security issue because it affects vital economic trade relations since the Gulf of Aden is one of the world's busiest shipping lanes. This further endangers the income of neighbouring countries engaged in commercial shipping. Finally, there is the environmental danger than an oil spill would cause and severely affect the East African coastline since Ethiopia is also part and parcel of east Africa.¹³ In nutshell, Somalia sea piracy has implication below.

3.1. Security Implication

Ethiopia has a long non-demarcated border with Somalia in the east. Ethiopia and Somalia have a long hostile history over the Somali inhabited Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia which has resulted in interstate wars between the two countries. This created a new security concern for Ethiopia. Groups of

¹² *Ibidem*.

¹³ Grosse-Kettler, S., *External actors in stateless Somalia: A war economy and its promoters*. Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), 2004. Paper 39. Bonn: BICC. p. 28.

different identity in Somalia threatened and carried out attacks in Ethiopia.¹⁴ The hostile history between the two countries, followed by the nature of conflicts to “spill over” in nearby countries and affect them in different ways, motivated the Ethiopian involvement in the Somali conflict. As Brown explained, conflicts have important implications for regional stability in many aspects¹⁵. This is because; conflicts spread quickly and create instability in the neighbouring states in a variety of ways including transfer of weapons and cross border attacks. In the case of Somalia, Al-Itihad, one of foremost Islamist groups in Somalia declared war against Ethiopia and waged terrorist attacks in that country. Al-Itihad had their military bases in Gedo region of southern Somalia, but had strong popularity and supporters throughout Somalia. The group, whose political motive was to establish an Islamic state in Somalia, also, strived to spread Islamic radicalism in the horn of Africa. Moreover, the conflict in Somalia created a platform for Ethiopian rebel groups that create instability in Ethiopia. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), rebel group that fights with Ethiopia in the Ogaden region has got sympathizers and hiding places in Somalia to wage wars against Ethiopia.

This scenario in the Somali conflict created a serious concern to the neighbouring states, mainly to Ethiopia. Although this has existed since the downfall of Somalia’s state, it increased when the ICU captured territories close to the Transitional Federal Government bases in Baidoa and threatened its existence. The Islamists, whose motive is to impose strict Sharia rule in Somalia, has also repeatedly threatened Ethiopia and vowed to impose their rule to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital. This has aggravated the situation and Ethiopia consequently decided to intervene in Somalia militarily. This transformed the phenomenon of Somalia’s conflict into a “new war” context. This is because of the multiplicity of the actors involved in it, changing dimensions and war techniques used in the conflict. However, Ethiopia undermined some of the efforts in which its interest was at stake; for example, it challenged the Cairo peace process by recruiting and persuading two main Somalia faction leaders to boycott the process. General Aden Gabyow and Colonel Abdullahi Yussuf withdrew from the process in Cairo and flew to Addis Abba.¹⁶ Due to the fact that Egypt has a strong geo-political and security interest in the region and has a long historical dispute with Ethiopia with regard to Nile water, Ethiopia was unhappy with the mediating role facilitated by Egypt. Ethiopia intervenes in Somalia’s conflict not only to protect its national security from threats posed by actors in Somalia, but also wants to prevent other states, such as Eritrea that allegedly supported Somali factions as well as Ethiopian opposition in Somalia as proxy. What is the so called “opportunistic intervention?” This means that states intervene in internal

¹⁴ Abbink, J., *Ethiopia-Eritrea Proxy Wars and Prospects of Peace in the Horn of Africa*. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 21 (3): 408-425, 2006. DOI: 10.1080/0258900032000142446. p. 8.

¹⁵ Brown, M., *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*. Edited by Michael E. Brown, (ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. p. 591.

¹⁶ Abbink, J., *Ethiopia-Eritrea Proxy Wars and Prospects of Peace in the Horn of Africa*. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 21 (3): 408-425, 2006. DOI: 10.1080/0258900032000142446. p. 8.

conflicts by taking advantage of internal weaknesses and turmoil. Such internal weaknesses have the potential to create windows of opportunities for other states that usually support friendly internal actors as well as friendly rebel groups to engage in proxy wars with their rival states. This type of intervention includes sending of the formal forces into internal conflicts in the context of peace intervention. This is exactly what Ethiopia did when it believed its security was at stake by rival Eritrea and Somali Islamists.

Thus, the presence of maritime piracy in Somalia has a negative impact on neighbouring state security like Ethiopia. The ports of Somalia have earned the reputation of being the world's largest duty free shop due to their well-established illicit network of sea ports, overland trucking companies and established channels through the porous borders of neighbouring countries. Some of the more important illicit trading commodities that pass through Somalia are arms and explosives. Because of the lack of a functional government, smugglers can conduct their operations freely. For example, weapons have been smuggled through Somalia into Kenya and to the Ogden National Liberation Front in Ethiopia in 2003. Arms and ammunition have become constant trading goods in the country. Consequently, the entire region is affected. As arms are at the basis of any sustainable governance system, and are a vital resource for the fuelling and prolongation of violence, private armament resulting from the Somali trade exacerbates the threat to regional stability. That is why Al-Shabaab consolidated his power and destabilized the east Africa like Ethiopia and Kenya. The terrorist attacks held in Ethiopia like Wabisheble hotel and other areas and in Kenya marketing hall are the direct implication of the outcome of Somalia piracy. Ethiopia has send thousands of soldiers to Somalia, since Ethiopia shared large boundaries with Somalia. The destabilization of Somalia has a spill over effect on Ethiopia. Unless Ethiopia takes measures to establish a stable Somalia government, it paves the ways for terrorists like Al-Shabaab, Ginbot 7 and Ogden Liberation Front (ONLF) to easily bombard Ethiopia via Somalia.

3.2. Economic Implication

Somalia's being a war torn and destabilized country has an economic implication for Ethiopia. Ethiopia is a land locked country that badly needs ports to satisfy the increasing import and export demands. Since Somalia has been a collapsed state for few years, the crime of maritime piracy has escalated at the highs level. Moreover, most inhabitants of Ethiopia, as in Somalia, live in poverty. According to Euro monitor 2002/2003/ on its report entitled "The world Economic Fact book: Ethiopia" noted that Somali refugees in Ethiopia seem to suffer the most in the nation, due to desperate conditions, which further fuels their opposition to Ethiopian intervention in Somalia. The military presence Ethiopia maintains in Somalia is also an economic drain. Despite the fact that Ethiopia is receiving an increased amount of economic aid, the deficit created by the war is larger than the sum of aid money that is funnelled into the nation. The longer Ethiopia remains in Somalia, the direr their economic situation, as well as Somalia's, will become. An increasing amount of economic aid has been flowing to Ethiopia from several nations, including the United States and Israel. These

nations view Ethiopia as a valuable ally in the effort to combat the developing terrorist networks in Somalia. Ethiopia's economic problems played a key role in its government's decision to intervene in Somalia. Unlike Somalia, Ethiopia is landlocked, with access only to a few ports for trading in Somaliland, a portion of Somalia seeking independence. Unlike Somalia, Ethiopia is landlocked, with access only to a few ports for trading in Somaliland, a more stable part of Somalia. Despite not being recognized by the international community, it declare its independence from the mainland of Somalia following the collapse of the central government in 1991. Ethiopia's late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi realized that if a moderate government was installed in Somalia, his country would have easier access to the ports in the region.

3.3. Diplomatic Implication

The Somalia piracy movement has a diplomatic implication for Ethiopia. On one hand, sending Ethiopian soldiers to Somalia in order to fight terrorism and sea piracy helped Ethiopia to get international support. Furthermore, it helps Ethiopia to change the tarnished image of Somalia people towards Ethiopia because of war and irredentism question on Ogden. This in turns, leads to economic integration and common utilization of ports for importing and exporting of commodities and fighting common enemies together via dialogue and, as a last resort, by establishing common defense force that maintained the interest of both countries. In a nutshell, the destabilization of our neighbouring states is the destabilization and insecurity of our county. So, beyond military intervention, the Ethiopia government should play a significant role in reconciling the clan conflict and creating cooperation with countries that have economic interest in Somalia. Because Ethiopia shares large boundaries with Somalia and has hostile historical relation, a diplomatic gap would make Ethiopia incur costs i.e. serious violation of human rights and economic crippling down for Ethiopia by opening the doors for terrorists groups and for those states that badly need the destabilization of Ethiopia like Egypt and Eritrea.

4. Impact of Maritime Piracy

According to the USA Department for transportation while noting the economic impact of piracy on the Gulf of Aden, maritime piracy imposes direct costs on humanitarian assistance and has an impact on maritime economic activities such as oil production and cost of energy, insurance and shipping costs, tourism and fishing. Moreover, maritime piracy greatly influence human security, and led to economic crippling down and unregulated market or intensification of black market that led counties to lose income collected from tax and encourage migration or increase the numbers of refugees in neighbouring counties and also raise the level of unemployment that in turn increased the number of piracy crimes and destabilization of the regional states by allowing the movement of illicit firearms and is becoming the hostage and main income source of terrorists.

5. The role of international actors in Somalia piracy

Somalia is strategically important for international trade. Because of this reason various states want Somalia become the stabilized countries. In short, various states such as Saudi Arabia, USA, China, Egypt, and Eritrea want to get involved in Somalia for their own geo-politics and economic interest.

5.1. The United States of America (USA)

Among others USA is a key actors that want the creation of stabilized Somalia because of its economic interest. Although the United States is not dependent on commercial shipping vessels Somalia owns, the U.S. is reliant on the shipping lanes off the coast of Somalia. The United States, along with every other country shipping merchandise via the seas, has two options; they can assume the risk of a possible hijacking in the Gulf of Aden or they can reroute their ships through Cape of Good Hope. If a merchant vessel is rerouted from a country in the Gulf through the Cape of Good Hope, they can expect approximately 2,700 miles added to their voyage.¹⁷ This longer distance will rise the annual operating cost of the vessel by decreasing the delivery capacity for the ship from about six round-trip voyages to five voyages, or a drop of about 26%. The additional fuel cost of traveling via the Cape of Good Hope is about \$3.5 million annually. If the commercial vessels were departing from Europe instead of the Gulf, and transiting through the Cape of Good Hope instead of transiting the Suez Canal, the increased operating costs would be much greater. This adds “An estimated additional \$89 million annually, which includes \$74.4 million in fuel and \$14.6 million in charter expenses. In addition, the rerouting would increase transit times by about 5.7 days per ship¹⁸.

As indicated above, piracy has become another means through which a number of terrorist organizations mobilize resource and generate money for their evil ends. Moreover, the fact that Somalia is a predominantly Muslim state increases the likelihood of terrorist networks, also predominantly Muslim, to be accepted and find support in the region (Peterson 2002: 69). By providing a safe-haven for terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda, the issue clearly becomes an international concern. As the purpose of terrorists is to affect the stability of the state through violent attacks on strategic objects that attract social media, and political attention, facilitating terrorism makes piracy a security threat.¹⁹ Above all, very recently Al Shabab has declared its allegiance to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) also known as Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). This means that the security situation of Somalia must be checked closely. Unless ISIS/ISIL is defeated in Iraq and Syria, it may get new ground elsewhere in Africa. As the purpose of terrorists is to affect the stability of the state through violent attacks on strategic objects that attract social media, and political attention, facilitating terrorism makes piracy a security threat. Following the 9/11 attacks against the

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹ United Nations Security Council. *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts*. Resolution adopted by the Security Council 5053rd meeting. SC/1566 October 8, 2004.

US, Somalia further gained international, and particularly US attention as a possible safe-haven for Islamic terrorists. The USA is concerned about the Al Qaeda presence in Somalia, and specifically individuals and their presence in Somalia (Gardner, 2006)."

Somalia is believed to have been the base for the cells that attacked and blew up simultaneously two U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998. It is also believed to have been the main base for the Al Qaeda attack on an Israeli-owned hotel near Mombasa, and a failed attempt to shoot down an Israeli airliner in 2002. A more serious threat is the potential development of direct collaboration between terrorist groups and Somali pirates. The danger is that Al Qaeda or other international terrorist organization can seek involvement in the illegal enterprise, especially because of the recent dramatic increase in revenue from ransom that pirates gain. Al Qaeda has been involved before in both hindering international shipping commerce and in the piracy affecting Southeast Asia.

5.2. People's Republic of China

Although many states allow other states to have jurisdiction in their exclusive economic zones, China has always thought that the legal authority in this zone belonged to the coastal states only.²⁰ The main principle behind their point of view was the fact that unlike many western countries, the Chinese government did not accept legal authorities as a sovereign without the consent of the coastal state (Ibid). It is firstly, it is important to note that China realized it had a large interest in maintaining the safety of the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Coast. Like the majority of the countries in the world, China had an important economic interest in this region. Vessels under China's flag use these waters on a daily basis. Furthermore, China declared it had the responsibility to protect its ships and ships sailing under the flags of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau, if requested. Moreover, six ships under Chinese flags were attacked in 2008 alone and 17 crew members of Chinese fisher ships were in captivity. Thus, China as a global super power should take measures to weaken pirates' movement in the region and international water territories.

The paradox for China was:

"...caused by the fact that they needed to engage in a military operation to combat Somali piracy, yet at the same time, they had to maintain their principle of non-interference and respect for the sovereignty of the coastal states. That is why China was one of the strong opponents of the restrictions on Resolution 1816."²¹

²⁰ Dutton, P., "Charting a Course: US-China Cooperation at Sea." China Security, 5 (1): 11-26, 2009.

²¹ Tatou, M., *The Dilemma Behind Somali Piracy: How Territorial Integrity Hinders Effective State Response*. (MA Thesis, Unpublished). URL:

https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/19229/MA_thesis.docx?sequence=1. 2012. Retrieved on 23/12/2017. p. 18.

5.3. Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia also has high interest in Somalia because of its geo-political interests. Saudi Arabia was aligned on the side of UIC. As being the ally of Egypt and member of Arab League it assisted UIC tacitly. It tried to give diplomatic assistance for UIC. Because Somalia wants to promote religious extremism or provide the territory for religious extremists, our neighbours could sorely test the young democracy of Ethiopia which is based on the separation of state and religion and religious tolerance. History revealed that and Ethiopian governments have repeatedly said publicly that the destabilization of Ethiopia offers economic and religious profit to Egypt. Egypt wants to settle the Nile River related issues by making Ethiopia a destabilized nation, Saudi Arabia also wants to turn Ethiopia into an Islamic state states and the members of Arab League and Somalia itself have an irredentism question on Ogden. Thus, since they share common interest, the best scenario is sponsored terrorist groups and destabilizing Ethiopia. Thus, Ethiopia has legitimate security interest in the region. As a state, one can secure the surrounding areas which causes insecurity.²² Beyond this, Somalia's maritime transportation system is primarily controlled by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). While the UAE are able to capitalize on this situation, the Federal Somali government also benefits from having this vessel operate out of Berbera and Bossaso. This UAE controlled commercial shipping vessel is the primary resource for all exported goods helping to generate a source of income for the country.

6. Further Recommendations

Based on the things discussed above in this desk study, and in order to overcome or, at least, minimize, at least to minimize, the list of problems related to Somalia piracy caused by the movement of pirates in the Indian Ocean, Red sea and Gulf of Aden, which would be a relief to the international community in general and for Ethiopia to get a safe or secured opportunity to access to the Somalia ports in the Indian Ocean where Ethiopia's significant amount of import and export trade follows, the authors of this study forward the following possible solutions as they are clearly listed below one following the other:

➤ Firstly, Ethiopia must influence Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)²³ member states shall continue their support in terms of training, finance, and logistics. The recruitment of Somalia government forces to be trained, for instance, should be carefully selected to avoid desertion and infiltration by the Al-Shabaab. IGAD member states and the Somalia government should also strengthen their intelligence to identify and apprehend hard core elements of the Al-Shabaab;

²² Marchal, R., *Islamic political dynamics in the Somali civil war. Islam in Africa South of the Sahara: Essays in Gender Relations and Political Reform*, 2013. p. 331.

²³ It (IGAD) is an intergovernmental trade bloc in the east African region established in 1996 which consists of eight (8) countries as a member. Namely, Djibouti, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda where except South Sudan admitted membership in 2011 all the other seven countries are founders of this organization. The organization before it get its current name, it was known as "Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD)" founded in 1986 by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Kenya, with a prime focus on development and environmental control issues.

➤ Ethiopia must pressurize the Somalia government. A one-sided militaristic approach alone could exacerbate the situation. It should strengthen its ties and negotiate power-sharing with various clans and groups as it did with Al-Sunna Wal-Jama. More effort should also be exerted in bringing all actors including those who allied with Al-Shabaab for tactical reasons and are willing to negotiate;

➤ Economic integration will also connect the destiny of the peoples in the region making the means of violence and sabotage self-destructive;

➤ The international community must pressure the Arab League to encourage the departure of Islamic jihadists from Somalia;

➤ In order to promote greater stability in East Africa, Ethiopia must also receive economic aid from the United States and other nations involved in the peace process;

➤ To fully convince the Somali people of the Ethiopian commitment to Somalia's stability, no Ethiopian troops should be part of the peacekeeping forces;

➤ Ethiopia must conduct dialogue with the Somalia government and it should deal with its internal weaknesses, divisions and rivalries;

➤ Sanctioning Eritrea could temporarily reduce arms and financial support reaching the radical groups in Somalia. Peaceful mechanisms should, however, be explored by IGAD to bring Eritrea on board and deal with Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam for sustainable peace in Somalia and the region at large;

➤ The long-awaited IGAD peace and security strategy failed to be adopted by IGAD member states. Advancing common peace and security agenda enhances mutual benefits for all the members. Therefore, the member states should reconsider having a common policy to enable IGAD to effectively address conflicts in the region;

➤ It is crucial that the African Union and the United Nations send a large peacekeeping force into the region, to replace Ethiopian troops that are supporting the fledgling transitional government in order to prevent a power vacuum from developing;

➤ Promoting international cooperation and participation of the Somali Diaspora in the social and economic development of countries of origin, by supporting the channelling of their human, financial and social resources, and by identifying synergies between the communities of origin and of destination. Co-funding of selected activities is possible through a micro-credit/ grant scheme;

➤ Strengthening the operational capacity of the regional Somali law enforcement authorities, and establishing/enhancing border management and protection system.

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THE TRADITION AND CHEKHOV'S INDIVIDUAL TALENT IN ADAPTING IBSEN'S *THE WILD DUCK* IN *THE SEAGULL*

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Abstract: "Henrik Ibsen is a widely known writer that influenced many playwrights and critics with his challenging plays such as *The Wild Duck*, *An Enemy of the People* and *Ghosts*". In his plays, he mostly includes criticism about the society and individual, for instance he deals with the conformity in society, gender apartheid, the hypocrisy in politics and the struggle of the individual in finding a voice for him/herself in the mass. While stating his criticism, he mostly applies the symbols. In *The Wild Duck*, he uses the wild duck as a symbol of the change in the individual and the conformity process that the voice of the individual gets lost. Likewise, as one of the playwrights that was influenced by Ibsen, Anton Chekhov writes *The Seagull* and he applies the symbol of the seagull like Ibsen's wild duck. Moreover, the characters in Chekhov's work clearly represent the wild duck that Ibsen describes in his work. This paper aims to analyze how Chekhov adapts Ibsen's wild duck on the characters in *The Seagull* and shows his individual talent in addition to applying at the tradition."

Keywords: Chekhov, Ibsen, *The Wild Duck*, *The Seagull*.

Introduction

Comparing and analyzing two literary texts is a widely known and applied technique in literature. While reading, the reader can discover some similar or associated points among the works and mostly undertakes the task of comparing and analyzing them. In addition to the similarities, the differences or the peculiar sides of the works can also be the important means of comparison and evaluation. T. S. Eliot draws the attention of the critics to the evaluation part and claims that the tradition in literature is a heritage from the past to the future and the authors apply this tradition while creating new literary pieces by adding their individual talents.¹ At this point, when analyzing Henrik Ibsen's (1884) *The Wild Duck* and Anton Chekhov's (1895) *The Seagull*, Eliot's tradition is applicable depending on the common symbols, characters and plot. Though Chekhov's work might be considered as an improvisation of Ibsen's, the crucial point lies in the individual talent that he exhibits on the adaptation of Ibsen's *The Wild Duck* on different characters in different ways in his play. It means, though it can be claimed that Chekhov's characters in *The Seagull* are like the reflection of what Ibsen describes as the wild duck in his work, the difference lies in their preferences on how to be a wild duck, which means Chekhov shows the different

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¹ Eliot, T.S. "Tradition and the Individual Talent." *Perspecta*, vol. 19, 1982, pp. 36-7.

types of Ibsen's wild duck, he experiments which characters achieve to be a wild duck in *The Seagull* and he eventually proves that being able to achieve what the wild ducks do is not always achievable as clearly seen in Nina's case.

T.S. Eliot "Tradition and the Individual Talent"

In "Tradition and the Individual Talent", T. S. Eliot clearly explains the possibility of the resemblance among the literary texts and describes how the peculiarity and uniqueness in a text can be achieved. He theorizes the act of taking inspiration from the past or previous works as tradition and the ability to create a unique work while getting connected with the predecessors as the individual talent. In his claim, he starts with the role of the reader in criticism of the originality of literary works. While criticizing, the reader focuses on the similar points of a new work with the previous ones while appreciating the writer by "the aspects of his work in which he least resembles anyone else"²; moreover, the reader insistently looks for the different sides of the work which, he falsely thinks, creates the peculiarity and originality for that writer. However, if the reader eliminates the prejudice and looks from an objective point of view, he "shall often find that not only the best, but the most individual parts of his work may be those in which the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their immortality most vigorously"³. The prejudice and individual perspective prevent one from seeing the originality of the text because the originality may lie in the combination of the ancestors' heritage and that writer's individual ideas. So, to Eliot, applying at the previous literary texts does not prevent any writer from being original; on the contrary, he can find a peculiar place in the treasure of the past.

Eliot describes what tradition is and warns that tradition does not mean repetition. To him, tradition has a "historical sense"⁴ and it emerges when the pastness of the past and its presence are evaluated together. He claims that to reach novelty, a writer must have the knowledge of the predecessors and be aware of his contemporary age, so that he can know his place and decide his steps further. However, to create a new work, he must have the inspiration and guidance from the past, so "what happens when a new work of art is created is something that happens simultaneously to all the works of art which preceded it"⁵. As a result, while appreciating a contemporary work, the reader should keep in mind that that contemporary piece of art is a production of the previous masterpieces, so he should appreciate the previous ones, too. This is called the "conformity between the old and the new"⁶, and this determines the value of a new work, which means the quality of a new one is judged by the standards of the previous.

The conformity between the past and the present is somehow a change through development according to Eliot. The poet evaluates the elements of the past via the current understanding and creates a new work mingled with the past

² *Ibid.*, p. 36.

³ *Ibid.* p. 37.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

factors in it. However, in this context, the value of the past is quite important since though the new productions as fruits of the past are fresh and beautiful, the roots are even more crucial and life-giving to those fruits. So, with respect and faith to the past, some changes and developments can occur while producing new works. At this point, the function of the contemporary writer would be to have “an awareness of the past in a way and to an extent which the past's awareness of itself cannot show”⁷, which means to carry the past to the present and to present it to the reader with the contemporary language, discourse and theories, which the past itself cannot do without the help of the present. In this issue, poet is the responsible one for the process; because while adapting the past consciousness to the present, at the same time “he should continue to develop this consciousness throughout his career”⁸. However, this process takes time and effort and “the progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality”, which means “depersonalization”.⁹ To create a mixture of the past and the present, the poet must leave his age's prejudice and mind, so that he can get involved in the consciousness of the past and takes its core to the present, which ends up with getting eliminated from his own personality and age.

Eliot obviously proves the necessity of the past to create the unique present works, as he thinks the roots are in the past and the value of a new work can be decided by the propriety with the previous works. To succeed the novelty, applying at the ancestors is required, so it gives tradition an important role in creating the qualified contemporary works. However, only tradition is not enough. There is another factor that determines the works' novelty: individual talent. The relation of a poem as a work with the other works and “poetry as a living whole”¹⁰ defines tradition; on the other hand, the relation of the poem to its poet is related to the individual talent. The difference between a mature and an immature poet is hidden in individual talent and in applying his individual skills to combine the varied feelings. Eliot gives an example of forming sulphurous acid and states that to have this acid, platinum is essential. He resembles poet's mind to platinum. It is the place in which emotions and experiences are mingled and a new poem as sulphurous acid is formed. To him, the more perfect the poet and his experiences are, the more perfect the poem would be. He also claims the effect of emotions experienced by a work of art is more valuable than the emotions themselves. So, in his mind, with the impressions and emotions, the poet creates the poem and the perfection of his poem shows the degree of his individual talent. In addition, Eliot supports the idea that poetry is an area in which consciousness and deliberateness play important roles. So, deliberately escaping from emotions and personality depersonalizes the poet in a poem and by applying the tradition and his individual talent in keeping his emotions and identity away from his work, he can create a perfect piece of art, as Eliot describes.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

Ibsen's *The Wild Duck* and Chekhov's Individual Talent in Its Adaptation in *The Seagull*

Born in 1828 in Norway, the famous Norwegian playwright Henrik Ibsen is known with his innovative and influential works such as *An Enemy of the People*, *Rosmersholm*, *A Doll House*, and *The Wild Duck*. Most of Ibsen's plays are about the social and political issues of his age and they reflect the conditions the middle class is in. That is why, his works are quite shocking and challenging as he undertakes the role of being the voice and critic of his society especially of the middle class by focusing on the important issues such as women, corruption in politics and religion, ethics, education and children. Ibsen's works mostly question the morality in society so they were censored and criticized harshly by authority and people as "What they had never seen was people dressed more or less like themselves, sitting in tastefully furnished drawing rooms more or less like their own, using everyday language filled with awkward silences, saying and doing the socially unthinkable, right there on the stage in front of them".¹¹ Additionally, Ibsen's works also reveal "the middle-class social unconscious" and "its dark workings"¹², thus they are regarded as dangerous and awakening.

Focusing on the social problems, applying symbolism and realism in his texts, adopting telling-the-truth as a method and dramatizing the middle class society and their life ironically bring reputation to Ibsen. As Martin Esslin states "... it was Ibsen who established that tradition, and proved that the theatre could be a forum for the serious consideration of the problems of the age. He is thus the founder and source of the whole strand of modern political and ideological theatre"¹³. Though his plays are condemned and forbidden from time to time, what makes him widely known and read is the translators and writers that would befriend him soon. Among them, George Bernard Shaw, James Joyce, Oscar Wilde and August Strindberg are the ones who were influenced by Ibsen while studying on his works.¹⁴

Ibsen's career life is not fully shining all the time. During his first contract with the theatre in Bergen, Ibsen gave the production of his early years of writing that can be taken as a step to success.¹⁵ Asbjorn Aarseth claims that Ibsen read many plays including Shakespeare's before writing and influenced by Sallust most¹⁶. From Sallust, he gets the idea of the "double nature of man"¹⁷ and he applied this idea in his plays frequently. Though the characters change, the love triangle is also a common issue in most of his plays. Alyssa Harad gives a brief summary of Ibsen's writing career and she states that starting with *The Burial Mound* (1950), *St. John's Night* (1853), *Lady Inger* (1855), *The Feast at Solhoug* (1856) which is his first successful play to be staged, and *Olaf Liljekrans* (1857),

¹¹ Ibsen, Henrik, and Alyssa Harad. *Four Great Plays*. Edited by Cynthia Brantley Johnson, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010. p. x

¹² *Ibid.*, p. viii.

¹³ Esslin, Martin. "Ibsen and Modern Drama." *Ibsen and the Theatre*, 1980, p. 72.

¹⁴ Ibsen, Henrik, and Alyssa Harad. p. xiii.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. ix.

¹⁶ Aarseth, Asbjorn. "Ibsen's Dramatic Apprenticeship." *The Cambridge Companion to Ibsen*, edited by James McFarlane, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 1.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

he ended his contract with the theatre in Bergen and at this point, he was a young and promising playwright. Then, in his middle and late periods in writing, he wrote masterpieces to inspire the upcoming playwrights and critics. Some of his masterpieces can be ranked as *Brand* (1866), *Peer Gynt* (1867), *A Doll House* (1879), *Ghosts* (1881), *An Enemy of the People* (1882), *The Wild Duck* (1884), *Hedda Gabler* (1890) and *The Master Builder* (1892). Thanks to his innovative and challenging style, Ibsen is claimed to influence most of his successors.¹⁸

On the other hand, Anton Chekhov is a Russian writer who was born in 1860 in Taganrog. According to Nick Worrall's introduction, during his high school education, he wrote short plays and at university where he took medical education in Moscow, he wrote stories for magazines¹⁹. As Worrall adds, meanwhile, he offered a play which is supposed to be *Platonov* to a magazine and it was rejected, then he became a doctor and earned his life through treatment when he published his first collection of the short stories. In 1886, he wrote two one-act plays *Swan Song* and *On the Harmfulness of Tobacco* in a newspaper. As a long play, *Ivanov* appeared in 1887, then the one-act plays *The Bear* and *The Proposal* were written in 1888. In that year, Chekhov was awarded by Russian Academy for his short story collection *In the Twilight*. In 1889, his plays *The Wood Demon*, *A Tragedian in spite of Himself* and *The Wedding* appeared. He started a journey, interviewed with the convicts and wrote *The Island of Sakhalin* in 1890. His journey continued to Europe and in 1891 he wrote one-act play *The Anniversary*. During his travel through Europe, he met Tolstoy. Meanwhile, his health worsened and he was diagnosed with tuberculosis.²⁰

Worrall also states that in 1896, *The Seagull* was staged but could not get fame, but in 1898, it was staged successfully. In 1899, *Uncle Vanya* which is a revised form of *The Wood Demon* was staged again and brought success to Chekhov. During 1899-1902, he revised and published his *Complete Works*. In 1900, he wrote another successful play, *Three Sisters* and in 1903, his second *Complete Works* appeared. In that year, his successful play *The Cherry Orchard* was written and in 1904 it was staged. In that year, Chekhov died.²¹

During his lifetime, Chekhov meets Leo Tolstoy, Maxim Gorky, Ivan Bunin and Alexander Kuprin.²² According to Esslin, "In the English-speaking world today Henrik Ibsen has become one of the three major classics of the theatre: Shakespeare, Chekhov and Ibsen are at the very centre of the standard repertoire, and no actor can aspire to the very first rank unless he has played some of the leading roles in the works of these three giants", which means Chekhov is regarded as one of the cornerstones of theatre genre in addition to Shakespeare and Ibsen.²³ He applies symbolism in his works and tries to involve daily life matters in his plays. Though he makes use of realism and real life in writing, he

¹⁸ Ibsen, Henrik, and Alyssa Harad. p. xiii.

¹⁹ Chekhov, Anton. *The Seagull*. Edited by Nick Worrall. Translated by Michael Frayn, Methuen Drama, 2002. p. v.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. viii.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. ix.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Esslin, Martin. p. 71.

successfully distinguishes life and art and “T.S. Eliot was grudgingly led to say that Chekhov did things of which he, Eliot, would not otherwise have thought prose to be capable”²⁴. Chekhov tries to make his plays different from melodramas and the conventions of the traditional stage applying direct action. Geoffrey Borny states that “Instead of producing exciting on-stage events, Chekhov was attempting to write a work of indirect action, where the main events of the drama take place off-stage and the text reflects only the trivial surface of life”²⁵. Chekhov deals with the offstage actions’ effects and reflection on stage such as Konstantin’s shooting the seagull or suicide in *The Seagull*. The points on the stage are mostly less important or trivial events, and the characters are mostly selfish, indifferent or unaware of the interests of the others in Chekhov’s plays which makes the work nearer to daily-life discourse.

The resemblance between Ibsen’s *The Wild Duck* and Chekhov’s *The Seagull* is a long-time discussed issue. There are some notably common points; however, this similarity can be taken as a form of tradition, in Eliot’s sense, and among these common points applied successfully, what makes these works different would be the individual talent. To begin with, Ibsen wrote *The Wild Duck* in 1884 while Chekhov produced *The Seagull* in 1895, which gives the idea that Chekhov might have read and got influenced by Ibsen’s drama. As Eliot declares, the tradition is necessary for the new works, which means the contemporary authors can read and get affected by the previous ones so that the past can guide the present as Ibsen’s play may guide Chekhov’s. Analyzing these plays, the reader can see that the tradition starts in the title of them. Both are the names of wild birds that are difficult to be tamed. Secondly, in both plays, symbolism and realist approach are common. Like Ibsen who holds a mirror to the middle class life, “Chekhov wished to show his spectators images of people very like themselves who waste their potential by living ‘silly trivial lives’”²⁶.

In addition, as Brian Johnston describes *The Wild Duck* as having “psychologically more complex situations”²⁷ such as “self-sacrifice”²⁸, likewise Eric Bentley says, “Chekhov’s theatre, like Ibsen’s, is psychological. The drama grows out of the characters”²⁹. Moreover, the love triangle among Konstantin, Nina and Trigorin reminds the relationship among Gina, Hialmar and Werle. In both plays, nature has an influential role as the main symbols reside in nature. Additionally, off-stage actions such as suicide also draw the attention of the reader. Apart from these common issues, this paper focuses on the idea that Ibsen’s wild duck is a symbol that depicts the characters in *The Seagull*, in this context, Chekhov can be claimed to portray his characters according to Ibsen’s description of the wild duck and Eliot’s tradition lies in this point; however, not to

²⁴ Borny, Geoffrey, “The Seagull: From Disaster to Triumph.” *Interpreting Chekhov*, ANU Press, 2006, p. 141.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Johnston, Brian, *The Ibsen Cycle: The Design of The Plays from Pillars of Society to When We Dead Awaken*, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. p.44.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.40.

²⁹ Bentley, Eric, “Chekhov as Playwright (Reconsiderations, No. XI),” *The Kenyon Review*, vol. 11, no. 2, 1949, pp. 226–250. *JSTOR*, p. 229.

write a mere imitation, Chekhov's individual talent resides in adapting the tradition in Ibsen's work on some of *The Seagull's* characters so that he portrays different kinds of wild duck in his play; what is more, the question on whether these characters achieve being a wild duck or not is more essential in revealing Chekhov's individual talent in *The Seagull*.

Ibsen's wild duck lives in an artificial nature in Ekdals' house, beforehand it was shot by Werle, but did not die. Before diving at the bottom, it was captured by the dog and given to Ekdals who created a fake habitat for her and tamed her there. Generally, when being shot, as Ekdal also states, the wild ducks "always do that, wild ducks do. They shoot at the bottom as deep as they can get, sir – and bite themselves fast in the tangle and seaweed – and all the devil's own mess that grows down there. And they never come up again"³⁰. However, this wild duck was taken from the sea and put in a garret, which symbolizes the double-sidedness of life. The house of Ekdals seem as a photography studio; however, a garret with animals is hidden inside. The reality challenges against the illusion. Moreover, Ibsen's wild duck is kept in that garret so long that it forgets its natural habitat and wild life. At this point, Gregers warns Hjalmar on never letting "her to get a glimpse of the sky and the sea"³¹ to prevent her awakening to the reality and wilderness. Moreover, Gregers says "one soon gets used to that sort of thing. I daresay I shall be like the wild duck..."³² by implying that the wild duck is accustomed to the fake environment and illusions around it, so the garret has become her reality. Additionally, as Joan Carr states, Ibsen's wild duck is "wounded, friendless, and mysterious in its origins"³³. The speech between Gregers and Hedvig in Act Three also proves that the wild duck is a lonely creature:

GREGERS. I see; for no doubt the wild duck is by far the most distinguished inhabitant of the garret?

HEDVIG. Yes, indeed she is; for she is a real wild fowl, you know. And then she is so much to be pitied; she has no one to care for, poor thing.

GREGERS. She has no family, as the rabbits have—

HEDVIG. No. The hens too, many of them, were chickens together; but she has been taken right away from all her friends. And then there is so much that is strange about the wild duck. Nobody knows her, and nobody knows where she came from either.³⁴

The wild duck is a mysterious creature because there are some unknown and uncertain points about her. She has no family or friends that is why she is all alone. She gets used to living in the lies, so she forgets about sea and sky. As a result, Ibsen's wild duck is a wounded, mysterious and lonely creature which would kill herself if she could find an opportunity.

³⁰ Ibsen, Henrik, *The Wild Duck. Four Great Plays*, edited by Cynthia Brantley Johnson, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010, p. 132.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 134.

³³ Carr, Joan, 'The Forest's Revenge': Subconscious Motivation in "The Wild Duck." *The Modern Language Review*, vol. 72, no. 4, 1977, pp. 845–856. *JSTOR*, p. 853.

³⁴ Ibsen, Henrik, p. 146.

Chekhov's *The Seagull* is considered as a "transition ... from direct action to indirect action"³⁵, that is why it is more psychological. This play focuses mostly on the characters and their state of minds. Chekhov's characters are depicted undeniably as a reflection of Ibsen's wild duck. Jacob H. Adler says that "Chekhov's 'The Seagull' is the first important play owing a major debt to 'The Wild Duck'". Many critics have concluded that the resemblance between two plays is "too great to be coincidental" and that Chekhov's use of "The Wild Duck" must have been conscious"³⁶. As a result, the reflection of the wild duck's characteristics is clearly seen in Chekhov's characters in *The Seagull*.

Firstly, as one of the main characters in Chekhov's play, Arkadina is a widely known and successful actress whose main aim is to gain money and keep it. She loves controlling people around; however, in reality she has no one intimate and bound to her. She has Trigorin as a partner; however, his love is not trustworthy; indeed, Arkadina already wants Trigorin's dependency on her much more than his love. On the other hand, she has Konstantin as a son; however, her careless attitude and Konstantin's jealousy set a wall between them. So, Arkadina is a lonely woman among the crowd. As a mother, her main duty in life should have been being a good mother and keening on with her son; however, like the wild duck, so immensely she gets used to being an actress and living in a social and material environment that, the illusion in fame and money makes her forget her innate nature. As an actress she talks about money and fame, and she has bank accounts; however, as a mother, she cannot even understand her own son: "Can anyone tell me what the matter is with my son? Why is he being so stern and boring?"³⁷. In reality, she even does not care about listening to him as she declares "Let him write as his fancy takes him and his talent allows, just so long as he leaves me alone"³⁸. Actually, like the wild duck, Arkadina is a lonely, isolated and wounded woman firstly because of her lover as Trigorin cheats on her with Nina, and secondly because of the distance between her and her son.

Additionally, her brother Sorin is another example of the wild duck. He confesses that "once upon a time there were two things I passionately wanted in life: I wanted to marry and I wanted to become a literary man, and I never managed either. So there we are. Nice to be even a minor literary man, when all's said and done"³⁹. In addition, he likes to live in city; however, as he is retired he returns back to country and starts to live there though he does not like the country life. He also says that "I've been lying here like an old boot, stuck here like a gudgeon in the mud"⁴⁰. Clearly, he is again the convinced, imprisoned and conformed wild duck which has no choice than living in a fake place and going on with the imposed things.

³⁵ Strand, Ginger, "New Forms: On 'The Seagull', Art, and Artist." *New England Review*, vol. 22, no. 3, 2001, pp. 66–81. *JSTOR*. p. 70.

³⁶ Adler, Jacob H., "Two 'Hamlet' Plays: 'The Wild Duck' and 'The Sea Gull.'" *Journal of Modern Literature*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1970, pp. 226–248. *JSTOR*. p. 239.

³⁷ Chekhov, Anton, *The Seagull*. Edited by Nick Worrall. Translated by Michael Frayn, Methuen Drama, 2002. p. 22.

³⁸ *Ibid.* p. 14.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

In addition, Masha is another character that exemplifies the wild duck with her discontent with the life she is in and her attempt to dive to the bottom. She loves Konstantin; however, this is an unrequited love, thus as a reaction, she decides to marry Medvedenko, a school teacher, even though she does not feel compassion for him. She announces to Trigorin that "Loving without hope, waiting year after year for something to happen... I'm certainly not marrying for love, but I'll have new troubles to drown out the old. Be a change, anyway. Have another one, shall we?"⁴¹. She is certainly a wounded wild duck because of Konstantin's love for Nina, not for her; and she tries to dive into the depths of the sea by getting married with a man whom she does not love and this marriage would bring new troubles for her. She somehow sacrifices herself in this marriage.

Like Masha, Polina is also a victim of love in this context. Her situation is different from Masha's, though. From her speech, the reader grasps that once upon a time, Dorn and she fell in love; however, now she is married to Shamrayev, who is a rude man and the steward of Sorin. Polina is again a wounded wild duck because of her oppressive husband and her feelings for another man; however, she sees the sky which means she sees the opportunity in fleeing from the house with Dorn, so, because she wants the sky and the sun, she is not happy with her place as she has to get accustomed to her unbearable husband. But, because Dorn does not accept, she cannot succeed in getting out of the garret and stays there by being aware of the sun and sky outside, which gives pain to this wild duck.

The famous writer and Arkadina's lover, Trigorin, is another wild duck among these characters. Though he is an appreciated writer, he is not contented because in his free nature, he does not want to be a writer. He lives in a fake environment with deluding characters and events. He declares that "What success? I've never given any pleasure to myself. I don't like myself as a writer. ... I can see that life and science are getting further and further ahead of me all the time, while I fall further and further behind, ... And in the end I feel that all I can write is landscapes, and that in everything else I'm false – false to the marrow of my bones"⁴². To escape from the banality of this world of illusions made by fame, Arkadina's support and money, he looks for new excitements and falls in love with Nina. He takes the opportunity with Nina to form a new life and they see the sky and sun as two wild ducks together; however, they cannot make use of this chance and each returns back to his/her own life. Meanwhile, because Nina is also a part of illusions in his environment, escaping with her would not be a remedy for him. In the end, he accepts to be deluded again and continues to live in the dissatisfying life.

And last but not least, there are two important kinds of the wild duck in this play. The first one is represented by Konstantin. And the second one is symbolized by Nina. The first one is the traditional one which is appropriate to Ibsen's wild duck. After wounded, the wild duck either dives to the bottom or if it is captured, it gets used to its new environment and forgets about its natural wild life. Konstantin is a perfect representation of this kind of wild duck. To begin

⁴¹ *Ibid.* p.34.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 31-2.

with, he is wounded by his mother and lover because both left him for fame and love for Trigorin. He is never captured and put in a fake area because neither his mother Arkadina nor his lover Nina wants to rescue him from his loneliness or suicide as none of them could really understand him. He accepts he is an alone and desperate wild duck. In Act Four, he says to Nina "I'm all alone. I've no one's affection to warm me – I'm as cold as the grave – and whatever I write, it's dry and stale and joyless."⁴³ Like Ibsen's wild duck in the garret, Konstantin is also all alone, friendless or kinless. When his problems in his career are added to these problems, under these circumstances, he cannot resist and he suicides. In Konstantin's part, Chekhov applies tradition successfully.

However, in Nina's part, in addition to the tradition and involvement of the past which is Ibsen's, the individual talent of Chekhov emerges, too. Nina as a daughter of a wealthy man in country is not contented with her state in the society and she wants to be an actress. So, she leaves Konstantin and flees with Trigorin with the hope of fame and money. However, she is not accustomed to the environment of Trigorin, and she becomes an isolated wild duck in the world of famous people as she cannot achieve to be as successful as she supposed to be. Moreover, she has a baby and her baby dies. Thus, with the failure in career, love and motherhood, she returns back to where she starts. Till now, the tradition part can be seen. However, Nina's choice after turning back to the country makes her different from others. When she returns, she is aware of her being a wild duck like Konstantin. She was defeated after getting wounded and now she returns back to the illusions. She gets rejected by her family and Trigorin, so she gets alone like Konstantin. She considers herself as a seagull, another symbol to be used instead of the wild duck, she accepts the defeat; however, she seems as if she did not accept the conformity and delusions and made an effort to continue in the goal of being an actress, so she tries struggle for a new path and resists on finding an alternative way. She declares that "I'm the seagull ... That's not right. I'm the actress. Yes!"⁴⁴. Nevertheless, as clearly seen in this speech too, Nina tries to live in the world of illusions and she denies the truth about her being a wild duck. She indeed knows that she is the seagull which was shot and died long before which is the sign of the loss of the pleasure and purpose of life for her, but still she tries to convince herself on following her dreams to be an actress, the chance of which she has already missed. As a result, she pretends to be resisting; however, in reality, she accepts that she is the seagull, which implies she is the wild duck that was shot by her desire for fame and Trigorin. Differently from Ibsen's wild duck, Nina is a highly poor and alone wild one because after being shot, neither she could dive to the bottom as she does not have that much awareness, nor Trigorin who is the main character in her deluded life wants to keep her in a garret. So, she gets lost in the way of being a wild duck because once she was one, she lost the chance of performing the necessities of being it. In the end, she becomes like a ghost who sways from side to side.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

Conclusion

Consequently, in addition to Arkadina, Sorin, Polina and Masha, as the most important representations of the wild duck in terms of tradition and individual talent, Konstantin and Nina differ in their paths and purposes. Eliot claims that tradition means to use the past as a source while adding individual talent into the past and creating a new form in literary text. Eliot's theory can explain the similarity between Ibsen's *The Wild Duck* and Chekhov's *The Seagull*. Especially, Konstantin refers to the tradition part of this theory because in Ibsen's play, it is said that when wounded, the wild duck dives to the bottom, bites itself and seaweed and never comes back again. Konstantin does the same thing. He is so alone, desperate and wounded that the only thing for him to do would be to dive into the bottom. He says to Nina "You've found your way – you know where you're going. While I'm still floundering in a chaos of dreams and images without knowing who or what it's all for. I've no faith, nor any idea where my location lies"⁴⁵. Clearly understood from Konstantin's speech, as a traditional wild duck, Konstantin cannot endure his wounds and loneliness, so he commits suicide; however, Nina seems to apply her individual talent and the will to resist against the system and she thinks she found a way to live with her wounds. In this context, indeed Nina is aware of her being wild duck and the loss of chance to fulfill the stages of being one, which are either diving to the bottom or getting used to the new environment by forgetting about the past. Here, Chekhov's individual talent emerges because Chekhov clearly shows that being a wild duck is an accomplishment and Nina could not succeed it because as a wild duck, she had to either be a successful actress and live in that deluded environment of artists with Trigorin, or dive to the bottom and put an end to all these when she was shot by the love of Trigorin and her unsuccessful attempts in being an actress. In the end, by returning back to reality from the environment of Trigorin, Nina gets lost between her past, present and future though being a wild duck and following what wild ducks do would be better for her. For the further studies, Ibsen's Hedvig and Chekhov's Nina may be compared in terms of being wild ducks.

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⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 64.

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DEFINITION OF THE TERM “BIOTECHNOLOGY”

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Abstract: *The article is devoted to the definition of the term as a way of its studying. The study of the definition of the term within the framework of scientific and professional discourse is one of the most significant and actively developing directions in terminology and cognitive linguistics. Analyzing the definition of the term “biotechnology” in English and Russian, the author points to the lack of a well-defined definition of this term, which confirms the temporal definition of concepts in any science that can be transformed depending on the development of the latter.*

Keywords: *definition, term, terminology, biotechnological terminology.*

Introduction

Science can exist only in the presence of language. The concept does not become the property of scientific thought until it isn't expressed verbally with the help of the term and its definition.

The term is a verbal designation of a concept, which is included in the system of concepts of a certain area of professional knowledge and requires the definition to be created in order to establish its meaning. Terminological units are connected as follows: as members of a concept system, a definition of a scientific notion (concept), and as members of a specific language system (word), a name, a name of a concept, its verbal designation.

Definition is the second form of expression of a verbal concept, the study of which may be useful for scientific fields of knowledge. After all, the clarification of the definition of a scientific concept, that is, the specification of the meaning of a term, provides the possibility of a clearer use of this term, increases the level of scientific communication.

The process of defining a term, clarifying its limits by optimizing a set of its essential features is in itself a research process. It should be noted that in modern science the terms “definition” and “determination” are not used as duplicates, that is, full synonyms.

Determination is a logical operation, during which the content of a concept is revealed, while definition is a verbal expression of those specific features (essential features) that distinguish a certain concept from adjacent ones and represent it. This is only an analytical expression of the concept. Definitions are an integral part of any scientific theory and largely determine its content.

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It should be noted that today the study of the definition of terms in the frameworks of scientific and professional discourse is one of the most significant and actively developed areas in terminology and cognitive linguistics.

The analysis of the scientific literature

The problem of the definitions of terms were studied by G. Grishechkina¹, A. Zarva², M. Latu, A. Razduev³, O. Makarikhin⁴, A. Sokolova⁵, E. Shilova⁶, T. Yashina⁷, and others.

The analyzed scientific literature on the problem gave the reason to suggest that the analysis of the problem of definitions of terms is a growing interest of scientists as there are many young terminological systems at the stage of formation in connection with the high level of innovation.

The purpose of the article

The study of the specifics of the definition of terms, in our opinion, is most relevant to the material of the innovation-technical discourse, which is a relatively new field of knowledge, for example, biotechnology, the terminology of which is at the formative stage.

Appeal to the issues of biotechnological terminology is explained by the rapid pace of development of this sphere, the discovery of new objects and phenomena of reality, which need a terminological nomination.

The purpose of the article is to consider the specificity of the definition of a term in the scientific and professional discourse, as well as to identify with specific examples the features of the definition of the term “biotechnology” in the English and Russian languages.

The concept of definition

Definition is a unique logical and linguistic phenomenon in which language and thinking interact, improving each other. The definition can be called a kind of “bridge of mutual understanding,” because it connects old knowledge with new, participates in the transfer of experience from generation to generation, helps

¹ Grishechkina, G.YU., *Vidy definitsiy terminov v nauchno-populyarnom tekste*. Uchenyye zapiski Orlovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya: Gumanitarnyye i sotsial'nyye nauki, 1, 2010, p. 120-127.

² Zarva, A.M., *Definitsiya kak tipologicheskaya raznovidnost' nauchnogo teksta*: dis. ... kand. filol. nauk: 10.02.19, Nal'chik, 2003, p.156.

³ M.N., Razduyev, A.V., *Diskursivnaya spetsifika definitsii termina (na primere russkoyazychnykh politicheskikh terminov)*. Politicheskaya lingvistika, 5, 2016, p. 136-144.

⁴ Makarikhina, O.A., *Analiz i modelirovaniye ponyatiynoy struktury terminov kul'turologii religiovedeniya*. Vestnik NNGU. Ser.: Istoriya, 2, 2003, p. 200-207.

⁵ Sokolova, A.G., *Leksikograficheskaya definitsiya kak predmet lingvisticheskogo opisaniya*: dis. ... kand. filol. nauk: 10.02.01. Arkhangel'sk, 2011, p. 296.

⁶ Shilova, Ye.V., *Terminologicheskaya definitsiya kak metatekst v russkoyazychnoy i angloyazychnoy nauchno-tekhnicheskoy literature*: dis. ... kand. filol. nauk: 10.02.20. Yekaterinburg, 2005, p. 226.

⁷ Yashina, T.V., *Evolutsiya terminologicheskogo apparata v distsiplinarnom kontekste innovatsionno-tekhnicheskogo diskursa*. Filologicheskiye nauki. Voprosy teorii i praktiki, 7 (25), Vol.1, 2013, p. 217-221.

communication among specialists in all fields of knowledge, and contributes to the effectiveness and success of human cognitive activity⁸.

Like any linguistic phenomenon, the definition has a certain form and content. Both the form and the content of the definition are determined by the laws of thought and the language in which the thinking process takes place.

Since the text of the definition is a pragmatic speech-communicative act, the degree of informativeness of such text must be very high, and the syntactic structure is strictly logical, since the term is fixed in the text of the definition. Thus, the definition is a short term-fixing text (term V.M. Leychik⁹).

From a logical point of view, the definition is two-part, it consists of the defined concept (*definiendum*), represented by the term, and the defining concept (*definiens*). This is the horizontal structure of the text of the definition, its linear deployment. In semantic terms, in content, the definition is not equal to the scientific concept, which it defines, but only approaches it. The semantic structure of the definition is built from classification semantic features that are universal for terms in different subject areas and are mostly determined by the type of conceptual category, therefore this structure has such characteristics as greater uniformity and standardization.

The metalanguage of the definition is characterized by a greater or lesser termination depending on the type and category of the concept, with its grammatical composition tracing the use of all the main significant and service parts of speech¹⁰.

The concept of “biotechnology”

The formation of the terminological system of the innovation-technical discourse is directly related to the term biotechnology, which comes from the Greek words *bios* — life, *techne* — art, *logos* — word, teaching, science. Today, this concept underlies a significant part of innovative research and it is present in the overwhelming majority of scientific papers in this disciplinary segment.

The concept of “biotechnology” appeared in our language relatively recently. The term “biotechnology” proposed in 1917 by K. Ereki meant “types of work in which certain products are produced from raw materials using living organisms”¹¹.

Despite the capacious reflection of the essence of the technology, such an understanding did not stick, and therefore the term was used in two ways for a long time: some used it in connection with the fermentation process, others meant the person and his practical activity in order to optimize tools, conditions and the labor process.

⁸ Grischechkina, G.YU, *Sposoby raskrytiya termina v nauchno-populyarnom tekste*. Voprosy kognitivnoy lingvistiki, 2, 2011, p.92-100.

⁹ Leychik, V.M., *Terminovedeniye: predmet, metody, struktura*. 3 izd. M.: Izd-vo LKI., 2007, p. 63.

¹⁰ Leychik, V.M., *Terminovedeniye: predmet, metody, struktura*. 3 izd. M.: Izd-vo LKI, 2007, p. 63-67.

¹¹ Biotekhnologiya [Elektronnyy resurs]. URL:http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/dic_biology/644/Biotekhnologiya.

Until 1971, this term was used mainly in the food industry and agriculture. At the moment, there are many interpretations of the concept, but in general they all boil down to one thing: in the traditional understanding of biotechnology, this is an interdisciplinary field that has arisen at the junction of biological, chemical and technical sciences; it is the use of living organisms and biological processes in industrial production. Thus, biotechnology is an integration of natural and technical sciences that studies the possibilities of using living organisms and biological processes for the production and processing of various valuable substances and products. Today, biotechnology is among the top priorities of scientific and technological progress, being a vivid example of “high technology”.

As noted above, there is no consensus in the literature regarding the definition of biotechnology as a science. M. Bekker (1979)¹² in his book “Introduction to Biotechnology” defines biotechnology as a section of the science of obtaining biosynthesis products. A. Sasson defined biotechnology as a technological process implemented using biological systems – living organisms and living cell components¹³.

By definition, the European Biotechnology Federation (1980)¹⁴, biotechnology is the combined use of biochemistry, microbiology and chemical technology for the technological (industrial) use of the beneficial properties of microorganisms and tissue cultures. In other words, biotechnology is a human-directed complex of methods for obtaining society-friendly target products using biological agents of microorganisms, viruses, animal and plant cells, as well as using extracellular substances and cell components.

These definitions are mostly correct, but the range of sciences, the practical results of which are embodied in biotechnology is much broader.

In 1983, at the congress of the socialist countries on biotechnology in Bratislava, the following definition was made: “biotechnology is a science that develops the scientific basis for large-scale implementation of the processes of obtaining various substances and means of environmental protection using biocatalysts”.

At the moment, there is no consensus in understanding biotechnology. It is interpreted as a set of methods and techniques for obtaining products and phenomena that are useful to humans with the help of biological agents¹⁵; special social activities of human transformation of the world and himself through the use of biological processes and agents¹⁶; the science “about the methods of obtaining target products using biosynthesis, controlled by environmental parameters or genetic engineering manipulations, or a combination of these effects”¹⁷.

¹² Bekker, M.Ye, *Vvedeniye v biotekhnologiyu*. Moskva, 1978, p. 232.

¹³ Sasson, A., *Biotehnologiya: sversheniya i nadezhdy*. M., 1987, p. 411.

¹⁴ Prezhdo, V.V. ta inshi, *Ekolohichnyy slovnyk*. Kharkiv: KHDAMH, 1999, p. 57.

¹⁵ Karavayeva, Ye.I., Kravtsov, R.V., *Biomeditsinskiye tekhnologii: voprosy pravovogo regulirovaniya i otvetstvennosti*. Sibirskiy yuridicheskiy vestnik, 3, 2005, p. 7.

¹⁶ Vorontsova, Z.I., *Iskhodnyye printsipy deyatel'nostnogo podkhoda k analizu biotekhnologiy kak formy nauchnogo truda*. Obshchestvo i pravo, 5, 2010, p. 251-253.

¹⁷ Volova, T.G., *Biotehnologiya*. Novosibirsk, 1999, p. 3.

Based on the analysis of existing definitions, it can be concluded that the definition of biotechnology given in the late 1970s is basically correct. As we can see from the presented definitions, the term “biotechnology” has two meanings: on the one hand, it is the science of using biotechnological processes in production, on the other, it is a complex scientific and technical direction that studies these processes.

Thus, in the mid-70s of the twentieth century, the term “biotechnology” appeared, which immediately filled in the pages of academic and popular publications. It should be noted that biotechnology science is served exclusively by English terminology, although the development of scientific research in the field of biotechnology is not a priority for the Anglo-American community. The analysis of English biotechnology terminology causes a growing interest of scientists, since it is a young term system, which is at the stage of formation due to the high level of innovation and dynamism of biotechnology. Therefore, the study of the general tendencies of the definition of the term “biotechnology” in the English and Russian languages and its individual features is interesting, in our opinion, from both theoretical and practical points of view.

As noted above, the term unit biotechnology (biotechnology), despite belonging to the basic terms of innovative technical discourse, does not have an established definition in either English or Russian. Despite the fact that one of the basic requirements for the term is its uniqueness, examples of definitions of the term unit biotechnology (biotechnology), selected from dictionaries and glossaries, can cast doubt on this condition for the existence of special lexical units.

Consider the following definitions: 1) Biotechnology – the use of a living organism to solve an engineering problem or perform an industrial task¹⁸. 2) Biotechnology is the use of biological processes, organisms, or systems to manufacture products intended to improve the quality of human life¹⁹. 3) Biotechnology – the manipulation (through genetic engineering) of living organisms or their components to produce useful usually commercial products (such as pest resistant crops, new bacterial strains, or novel pharmaceuticals)²⁰; 4) Biotechnology – techniques that use living organisms or parts of organisms to produce a variety of products (from medicines to industrial enzymes) to improve plants or animals or to develop microorganisms to remove toxics from bodies of water, or act as pesticides²¹; 5) Biotechnology – the use of bacteria and plant and animal cells for industrial or scientific purposes, for example to make drugs or chemicals²²; 6) Biotechnology – techniques that use living organisms or parts of

¹⁸ Biotechnology [Elektronnyy resurs]. // The American Heritage. Science Dictionary URL: <https://www.amazon.com/American-Heritage-Science-Dictionary/dp/0547470924> //

¹⁹ Biotechnology [Elektronnyy resurs]. URL: <https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/biotechnology> // Definition from WhatIs.

²⁰ Biotechnology [Elektronnyy resurs] // Dictionary by Merriam-Webster. URL: <https://www.merriam-webster.com>.

²¹ Biotechnology [Elektronnyy resurs] // Encyclopedia of Environment and Society. URL: <https://books.google.com.ua/books?>

²² Biotechnology [Elektronnyy resurs] // MedicineNet [Elektronnyy resurs]. URL: <https://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=2467>.

organisms to produce a variety of products (from medicines to industrial enzymes) to improve plants or animals or to develop microorganisms to remove toxics from bodies of water, or act as pesticides²³; 7) Biotechnology is technology that utilizes biological systems, living organisms or parts of this to develop or create different products²⁴; 8) Biotechnology: the fusion of biology and technology, the application of biological techniques to product research and development²⁵. 9) Biotechnology, the use of biology to solve problems and make useful products. The most prominent area of biotechnology is the production of therapeutic proteins and other drugs through genetic engineering²⁶.

Conclusions

As we can see from a small number of examples, the term biotechnology is by no means unambiguous, and the reason lies not only in the difference in the wording and its prevalence, but also in the selection of the relevant features of the concept when creating the definition. In most of the definitions, the definition is based on the use of living organisms or their components for the production of products designed to improve the quality of life of people. Other definitions emphasize that biotechnology is a technology that combines biology and technology that uses biological systems, living organisms or their fragments to develop or create various products.

In almost all definitions, the idea of the benefits of biotechnology is expressed, namely: biotechnology is used to obtain useful products for society with the help of biological agents of microorganisms, viruses, animal and plant cells; creating useful products (from drugs to industrial enzymes); to improve plants or animals; to solve engineering and industrial problems, etc.

It should be noted that almost all definitions have a different nuclear seme or genus and species trait: science (science); technology; manipulation; techniques; use; area.

Such differences in the definition of the key term of the biotechnology sphere confirm the proposition that the definitions of concepts in any science are temporary and, depending on the development of the latter, can be transformed.

So, in the presented examples of the definition of one term “biotechnology”, we tried to demonstrate the diversity of definitional variations of the term in its static (vocabulary) manifestation at the initial stage of the formation of terminology, i.e. on the way to the formation of the term system. This fact indicates the dynamic structure of the term, the development of the denotation, the concept and signification. The terminology of biotechnology is not fully formed and needs to be standardized in order to provide the recipient with information about the concept reflected in the definition.

²³ Biotechnology [Elektronnyy resurs] // Macmillan Dictionary. URL: <https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/biotechnology>.

²⁴ Biotechnology definition [Elektronnyy resurs]. URL: <https://www.amazon.com/Stedmans-Medical-Dictionary/dp/0781733901>.

²⁵ Biotechnology [Elektronnyy resurs]. // Encyclopaedia Britannica. URL: <https://www.britannica.com/technology/biotechnology>.

²⁶ What is Biotechnology? [Elektronnyy resurs] // Department of Biotechnology and Food Science. URL: <https://www.ntnu.edu/ibt/about-us/what-is-biotechnology>.

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WAYS OF TRANSITION TERMS IN THE SPHERES OF AGRO-INDUSTRIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL INDUSTRIES

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Abstract: *The article is dealing with translation issues of English terms of the spheres of agro-industrial and environmental industries. The issue of determining the term is considered. Particular attention is paid to possible variants and peculiarities of the translation of agrarian and environmental terms, examples of which are represented in the article. It was found that the translation process consists in the maximum accurate selection of the equivalent, or (if the equivalent does not exist) at least as accurate as its replacement, in order to achieve as accurate translation as possible, which corresponds to the structure, content, and logical sequence of the original.*

Keywords: *agro-industrial, branch, environmental, term, structure of the term, ways of term translation.*

Introduction

The spheres of agro-industrial and environmental industries, in particular, have undergone intensive development in recent years (this development continues today), therefore, the terminology of these spheres pays special attention to the translation. Professional terms as linguistic signs representing the concept of the agro-industry form an essential component of professional texts and one of the main difficulties of their translation due to their ambiguity, lack of language matching of new terms, as well as certain differences in the terminology process in English and Ukrainian languages. In addition, if we take into account the exchange of information between foreign and domestic scientists, the analysis of the problems of the translation of narrow-sector terms becomes of particular urgency.

The analysis of the scientific literature

The problem of term translation is sufficiently considered in the works of A. Kovalenko, L. Belozerskaya.

Scientists such as O. Tsytkina, S. Popov, O. Blinov studied the issue of definition and the classification of terms. Many domestic scholars - linguists are engaged in studies of general theoretical issues of terminology and various industry terminology: A. Buryachko, V. Greschuk, V. Danilenko, I. Kochan, T. Panko, L. Symonenko, N. Rodzevich, A. Hayutin, P. Kholdoleev and others.

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The problem of translation is highlighted in the works of domestic and foreign linguists (V. Karaban, V. Koptilov, S. Vlahov, S. Florin, B. Komissarov, A. Akhmanov, V. Kozlovsky, P. Newmark, L. Venuti and others). Studying the specifics of the translation of terms, their types, stages of translation, the basic requirements for translation in general, linguists emphasize that adequate translation of terms requires, first of all, excellent interpreter knowledge of the field of science or technology, which in fact relates to translation and, secondly, understanding terms of English language and knowledge of the professional terminology in the native language.

Among many terms that scientists have been studying, we can find terms of agrarian thematic that require more thorough study.

The purpose of the article

The purpose of the article is to define the term, to describe different ways of translating the terms of agrarian subjects and to identify the main difficulties encountered in the translation of these terms from English into Ukrainian.

Term definition

Before we determined the peculiarities of term translation on the example of agrarian sphere, we had examined the definitions of the term in the scientific literature.

In modern linguistics “term” is presented as “a word or phrase, expressing a clearly defined concept in a particular field of science, technology, art, social and political life, etc.”¹.

Most researchers admit that terminology is one of the main stylistic features of scientific style, an informative core of vocabulary of the language of science. As a rule, term is understood the linguistic means of expressing a special concept.

O. Akhmanova defines a term as a “word or phrase of a special (scientific, technical, etc.) language, which is created, received or borrowed for the exact expression of special concepts and the designation of special objects”².

By definition A. Kovalenko, “a term is an emotionally neutral word or phrase, which is used to determine the concepts or names of objects accurately”³.

V. Danilenko adheres to the view that “a term is a word (or phrase) of a special sphere of application, which calls a special notion” also⁴.

Approximately the same definition of terminology we find in foreign dictionaries of linguistic terms. Thus, in the dictionary of J. Maruzo⁵ terminology is defined as a system of terms used to express the concepts inherent given science.

At the heart of each term necessarily the definition of reality lies, which it denotes, so the terms represent an accurate and at the same time a brief

¹ Gerd, A.S., *Yazyk nauki i tekhniki kak ob'yekt lingvisticheskogo izucheniya*, Filologicheskiye nauki, 2, 1986, p. 48 - 56.

² Akhmanova, O.S., *Lingvisticheskiye problemy perevod*, Sb. statey MGU, 4, 1981, p. 11.

³ Kovalenko, A.YA., *Zahal'nyy kurs naukovo-tekhnichnoho perekladu*, 2001, p. 255.

⁴ Danilenko, V.P., *Semanticheskaya struktura spetsial'nogo slova i yeye leksikograficheskoye opisaniye*, Sverdlovsk, 1991, p. 12.

⁵ Maruzo, Z.H., *Slovar' lingvisticheskikh terminov*. Per. s frants, M.: Inostrannaya literatura, 1960, p. 361.

description of the object or phenomenon. Each branch of knowledge operates its own terms, which constitute the essence of the terminology system of a certain science.

Consequently, all scientists emphasize the specificity of the terms, their uniqueness and the relation with the concepts of a certain field of knowledge. Concepts have a linguistic expression and can not exist without it.

Thus, the term in the article we understand “a special word or phrase accepted in a professional activity, which is used in special conditions”⁶.

Specificity of terms translation

The development of civilization is accompanied by the emergence of numerous terms in various fields of science and technology. Since a significant part of the linguistic fund is specialized vocabulary, it is quite natural that linguists, translators and philologists attach particular importance to the study of the peculiarities of the term.

The peculiarity of the translation of terms is that the most important condition for achieving adequacy is the preservation of the translation of the content's precision of the original units, the maintenance of the absolute identity of the concepts expressed by the terms of the source language and the language of translation. Translation of terms requires knowledge of the industry, which includes translated text, understanding of terms in foreign language and knowledge of terminology in their native language. Thus, V. Slipovych distinguishes between two tasks that the interpreter must perform when translating: 1) to correctly understand the content of the statement (text) in the language of the original; 2) complete and accurately convey the content by means of the language of translation⁷.

In the translation of terminology, difficulties arise in the selection of an exact translation equivalent, which is a prerequisite for an adequate translation. This is due to the following reasons: 1) differences in the structure of the terms of English and Ukrainian; 2) the presence of a non-equivalent vocabulary; 3) the ambiguity and variability of correspondences in translation. The material manifestation of this is: polysemy (having more than one meaning in the term); homonymy (the semantic relation of internally unrelated meanings, expressed by similar tokens and varies in the text due to the context); synonymy (the coincidence of the basic meaning of words, morphemes, constructions, phraseological units), hyponymy (the broader meaning, which expresses the general, generic notion, the name of the class of objects (properties, attributes), antonymy (a binary principle of describing facts and phenomena of reality that it turns out in the affirmation of the presence or absence of this or that sign, in opposition to qualitative indicators)⁸.

⁶ Akhmanova, O.S., *Lingvisticheskiye problemy perevod*, Sb. statey MGU, 4, 1981, p. 14.

⁷ Slipovych, V.S., *Kurs perevoda (anhlyyskyy - russkyy yazyk)*. Mn.: Tetra Systems, 2004, p.7.

⁸ Huzynets, M.M., Kozub, L.C., *Spetsyfika perekladu terminiv v pidmistsi ahrarnoyi haluzi*. Naukovi zapysky Natsionalnoho universytetu «Ostrozka akademiya», 2015, p. 73.

Many scholars identify the main methods of translation of terms. In the translation of agrarian literature, the interaction of the term with the context is important, which results in the meaning of the word. Thus, A. Kovalenko defines two stages in the process of translation of the term: the first is to find out the meaning of the term in the context, the second is to translate into the native language⁹. Translation by lexical equivalent is the main means of translating terms. Important role in this case is played by terms having equivalents in their mother tongue. These terms serve as support points in the text. It depends not only on the meaning of other words, but also on the disclosure of the nature of the text as a whole. That is why it is important to be able to find the equivalent in the native language and to extend knowledge of the terms-equivalents.

Studying the specifics of the translation of the English language terms of biotechnology in the texts of professional direction L. L. Rytikova points to complex cases of their functioning and variants of transmission to their native language.

1. A large number of commonly used words acquire values specific to the agrarian sphere, that is, they become narrow terms: habitat – mistse rozpovsyudzhennya, mistse rozpovsyudzhennya, pryrodne seredovyshche, navkolyshnye seredovyshche; meal – yizha, boroshno hruboho pomelu.

2. The meaning of the term is one of the meanings of the word and translated using the lexical equivalent: habitat of life – sposib zhyttya.

3. In modern scientific literature, in particular on agrarian problems, it is often traced to a phenomenon where the term in one branch has two or more meanings: crop – urozhay; zhnyva; posiv; s.-h. kul'tura, food – 1) yizha, korm; 2) produkty kharchuvannya; 3) pozhyvni rechovyny; 4) pozhyvnyy.

Such ambiguity, in the opinion of the scientist, creates the fuzziness and substitution of one term for others. And here it is especially important to take into account the context, that is, the lexical and grammatical environment of the given term¹⁰.

Since in modern English terminology the terms-phrases are very common, attention should be paid to the basic methods of translating these lexical units.

1. The translation is carried out using words and expressions of the native language, which literally represent words and expressions of the English language (so-called loan-translation): chain reaction – lantsyuhova reaktsiya, abiotic factor – abiotychnyy factor, natural selection – pryrodnyy dobir.

2. Translation using the genitive case, for example: soil conservation – zberezheniya gruntu, plant protection – zakhyst roslyn, soil erosion – eroziya hruntu, materials cycles – kruhoobih rechovyn.

3. Translation of the noun using the adjective, for example: seed bank – vydivyy bahat-stvo, species richness – vydove bahat-stvo, stem cell – stovburova klityna, water energy – vodna enerhiya, cell engineering – klitna inzheneriya.

⁹ Kovalenko, A. YA., *Naukovo-tekhnichnyy pereklad*. Ternopil: Vyd–vo Karpyuka, 2004, p. 15.

¹⁰ Slipovych, V.S., *Kurs perevoda (anhlyyskyy – russkyi yazyk)*. Mn.: Tetra Systems, p. 320, 2004, p. 174.

4. Translation of word combinations using the group of explanatory words, for example: biotechnology-derived – toy, shcho maye biotekhnolohichne pokhodzhennya, relay cropping – zminna systema vyroshchuvannya s/h kul'tur, plant-incorporated protectants (PIPs) – inkorporovani v roslyny zasoby zakhystu.

5. Translation with the change of the order of components of the attributive group, for example: farm crop cultivation – kul'tyvatsiya sil's'kohospodars'koyi kul'tury, plant protection measures – zasoby zakhystu roslyn, ecosystem equilibrium state – stan rivnovahy ekosystemy.

Particular attention should be paid to the translation of terminological combinations that consist of two or three words: food safety – bezpeka produktiv kharchuvannya, food crop – sil's'kohospodars'ka prodoval'cha kul'tura, herbicide – tolerant crop – sil's'kohospodars'ka kul'tura, stiyka do herbitsydiv¹¹.

In modern science, there are many different models that determine the order and methods of translating terminology units. The main task of an interpreter is to use the means of another language to accurately and accurately convey the contents of the original, while preserving all its features. At the same time, the “integrity” of the translation should be understood as the unity of form and content on a new linguistic basis. If the criterion of the accuracy of the translation is the identity of the information reported in different languages, then only integral (full or adequate) can be recognized only such a translation that transmits this information by equivalent means. In other words, the translation must convey not only what is expressed in the original, but also as it is expressed in it. This requirement applies to both the translation of the text as a whole and its individual parts.

Conclusions

Thus, the above examples, which demonstrate the functioning of the terms of the agrarian sphere and possible variants of their translation, draw attention to the fact that this terminology has a tendency to be multi-valent in translation, to polysemy or homonymy, and complex words, in most cases, require special knowledge and comprehension in their translation. In order to prevent the difficulties encountered in the translation of professional texts, it is necessary to thoroughly analyze the special vocabulary, to study its polysemy, synonymy, antonymy of the peculiarities of word formation and the possibility of translation.

The results obtained during the study of the peculiarities of the translation of the English terminology of the agrarian sector can be effectively used during further in-depth study of the structural-semantic features of these terms in the translation aspect.

¹¹ Rytikova, L.L., *Spetsyfika perekladu anhlomovnykh terminiv biotekhnolohiyi u tekstakh profesiynoho spryamuвання*. Materiały VIII Międzynarodowej naukowo-praktycznej konferencji «Europejska nauka XXI powieką – 2012», Vol 11. Filologiczne nauki, Przemysł: Nauka i studia, 2012, p. 24–29.

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Review for Philosophy and Consciousness with the Romanians

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An Examination of Conscience

The book written by Prof. Gabriela Pohoata PhD, under review here, issued bilingually in English and Romanian (English version by Reader Mihaela Mocanu PhD and Assoc. Prof. Iulia Waniek PhD.), is a scientific project dedicated to the 100th Anniversary of Great Romania (1919-2018). The scientific value and historical significance of this monography are highlighted both in the Preface by Academician Victor Tvirgun from the Academy of Sciences of Moldova and in the Afterword signed by Academician Alexandru Surdu from the Romanian Academy. The book presents some important moments of Romanian philosophical thinking and integrates these into an [auto] reflexive approach to the specific features of Romanian spirituality. The perspective has a legitimate momentum. In the history of Romanian philosophical thinking, especially in the first four decades of the past century, two opposing tendencies have emerged: on the one hand, the mystical option - in the prolongation of the native historical-anthropological themes - and, on the other hand, the assumption of a rationalism that guides and clarifies lucidly the problems of life.

Following the way in which "the metaphysical premises are connected with the axiological (political, moral) options" the author considers that one cannot gain awareness of one's ethnic identity by a mystique of the irreducible individuality, but by thinking what is universal in the human condition, because "the path of philosophy is to free us, to the greatest extent, of all the limiting environments and hereditary fatalities." In fact, the cultural postmodernity in which we live legitimizes the diversity of creative initiatives, lifestyles and types of discourse, so there are no taboo values or no themes of reflection are historically outdated; only the excessive ideologization of differences by the followers of some fashions without a future, raises - in all fields - intolerance through hasty judgments and conjectural excommunications. That is why I consider that Gabriela Pohoată's scientific project dedicated to the Centenary is not only compatible with the processes of economic, civilizational and cultural production globalization but also meets certain requirements assumed by the very final structure of these processes that define our times, namely the fate of personal and collective identity. People cannot live as if they were from anywhere or nowhere, but expressing affection and respect for the values emerging from indigenous traditions, equally appreciating alterity. In fact, being a patriot means nothing but producing competitive

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history, economic, political and cultural activities, with the means of the century in which we live, using the traditions, the specific energies and creative potential of one's people.

Mankind can be standardized in many ways - from consumption to imaginary contents - but, fortunately, there will be still differences in how we perceive, understand and value the world, life, history, what is happening and what is happening to us, *te caetera*.

Gabriela Pohoată's study proposes, from its very title, a lucid invitation to the self-knowledge of the Romanian ethos, of its own qualities, chances and failures, as well as of its creative potential tested by a millennial history. The enthusiasm of the writing combines with the explicit admiration for the lucidity of Eminescu sentences proposed as a motto. An intellectual with a long academic experience, editor of elite magazines - *Cogito* and *Euromentor* - who was structurally formed by profound philosophical reading, the author recognizes that in the very moment and in the form in which she expresses herself as a European citizen, she does it as belonging to a symbolic horizon and stylistic matrix specific to our national culture. Although it is very contemporary through its information and message, one can detect in this volume a latent Illuminist pathos, especially in the pages that manifest the qualities of a discrete ethnopedagogical plea. In this unitary work - as to its basic intention and ideative architecture, the reader can discover several layers of content, as if the book aimed to embrace everything that has been said and can be significant for Romanians at this anniversary time. Thus, the book is prone to various readings and levels of interpretation, depending on the focal point of the reader's attention. The book presents important moments in the history of Romanian philosophy, either by highlighting the contributions of great thinkers - from D. Cantemir to Emil Cioran - or through thematic cuts such as the theme of the origin and nature of consciousness, the role of transcendence and reference to values, or the engagement of man in the horizons of the cultural sacred. It is interesting to note that the sequence of chapters reveals a convincing scenario of initiation in self-knowledge as a personal exercise of life and, especially, self-knowledge as illustrated by Romanian philosophy. The leap from life to the reflection that creates spiritual issues has axiological and therapeutic functions, proposing existential solutions, attitudes, behavioral patterns, abstract models of authentic humanity. That is why we recognize ourselves, with all our attempts, in the ideas of the great creators and in the philosophy present in the native language, which extracts wisdom from the historical experiences and the tradition of a folk culture. From the analysis of human consciousness, the book advances towards the rigors of self-knowledge, with the inevitable thematization of the unconscious, explaining the obvious metaphysical as well as everyday meanings of assuming a symbolic heredity, so that, the most worldly issues - happiness as emotional paradox, the rigors of morality, the state of happiness in Romanians, the radiography of that Romanian anxiety called longing, the condition of moral values and the problem of the meaning of life - can be naturally explained; the applied analyses are accompanied by numerous references to the specific spiritual profile and to the psychological and axiological characteristics of our culture. In a synthetic concluding remark I would say that through this whole work Gabriela Pohoată tries to confess that she simply passes through life suffering in and enjoying life in the Romanian language, recognizing this fate in the Romanian philosophical sensibility.